Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 39
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret
ST D–8

New Dehli, May 21, 1953—11:30 a.m.

Subject:

• India

Participants:

• Prime Minister Nehru
• Secretary Dulles

1. Mr. Nehru emphasized India’s need to create internal unity. There was danger that the country might fall apart. Independence had brought many exaggerated hopes, and it was easy to arouse discontent. That is why India concentrates upon its own internal economy and such topics as the Five Year Plan. India cannot risk renewed starvation.

2. India has almost no contacts, economic or political, with the Government of Soviet Russia. The contacts of the Indian Communist Party are largely via England rather than direct. The Indian Communist Party originally treated the Chinese Communists as “deviationists” and only within the last two years changed their attitude under instructions from Moscow. The Indian Communists had made alliances which gave them considerable political success in certain areas, but their political allies are tending to separate from them.

3. China, like Soviet Russia, is going through an expansionist phase. This is not wholly due to Communist rule. The Communists are accepted as rulers, because they provide a measure of internal order, but most of the Chinese are not themselves Communists. Almost assuredly Communist China will divorce itself from Soviet Russia within 15 or 25 years. Already the ties are weakened by the death of Stalin. The Soviet Union, while pretending to want the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, does not want this in reality because it wants to keep China dependent upon the Soviet Union as its spokesman. The material dependence of Communist China on Russia has increased during the last two years largely because of the Korean War. Probably China would want to build up itself economically before engaging in any major aggression.

4. India has a two thousand-mile frontier with China and has a deep concern with its relation with China. India has proclaimed that the Himalayas are its frontier and that it will not tolerate a penetration to the south. This has particular reference to Nepal. India still maintains approximately 250 troops in Tibet with the acquiescence of the Chinese government. India does not particularly fear aggression via Burma. The Chinese could easily penetrate into Burma but they could not easily move on into India. It does not appear that the Chinese now have any aggressive designs against Burma, otherwise they would have taken advantage of the presence in Burma of the Chinese Nationalist troops which gave them a ready pretext.

5. Indo-China is an area where Indian and Chinese influences have always converged. Mr. Nehru thinks that the fighting in Indo-China is more of a native than of a Chinese Communist origin. He seemed rather unconcerned about the fate of Siam, stating that Siam had always had an unstable government.

6. Mr. Nehru feels that a high-level conference of world leaders would serve a useful purpose and a beginning of relaxation of tension, but feels that this should not occur prior to a Korean armistice and perhaps the conclusion of an Austrian treaty which he said should be quickly obtainable. Mr. Nehru feels that the new generation of Russians is more interested in economic improvement than in expansion. Thus he believes that recent changes of tactics by Soviet leaders may have more than superficial significance.

7. Mr. Nehru spoke of the importance of disarmament. I stated the President had already taken action which could, if the Soviet responded, end the so-called armament race. He had cut Truman’s defense budget on theory of having a military establishment compatible with economic health rather than based on arms to match the Soviet military establishment. If the Soviet would cut its military budget in accordance with the same principle applying more of its economic productivity to the welfare of the people and less to armament then a start to reverse the present trend would have been made and this might be more productive than the disarmament conference which had almost assuredly bogged down in attempting an impossible task of trying to evaluate mechanistically the various military potentials.

8. We discussed the Korean armistice. I stated that our latest proposal contemplated the exclusive use of Indian troops to take custody of prisoners not desiring to be repatriated and that I hoped that India would accept this responsibility. Mr. Nehru indicated acquiescence. Mr. Nehru urged the importance of concluding an armistice, stating that he feared otherwise the fighting would extend. I agreed with his estimate, stating that if the armistice negotiations collapsed, the United States would probably make a stronger rather than a lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of conflict. (Note: I assumed this would be relayed.) I said that we were, however, sincerely trying to get an armistice and that only crazy people could think that the United States wanted to prolong the struggle, which had already cost us about 150,000 casualties and 10 to 15 billion dollars of expenditures. Mr. Nehru said that he completely accepted the proposition that we wanted an armistice and not to prolong the war. I said that the problem of dealing with the Republic of Korea was one which apparently most people overlooked. It could not be overlooked because the ROK had a moral interest and also a material position which could not be ignored. If in disgust their troops stopped fighting, that could presage not an armistice but a great military disaster for the United States forces there. Also if they decided to go on fighting, there could be no armistice. That is why we had introduced the proposal for an immediate freeing of the North Koreans who did not want to be repatriated. This was strongly desired by President Rhee, and would make the armistice more acceptable. In fact the North Koreans had already acted in this same way as regards South Korean POWs. We were, however, still striving to find an acceptable armistice formula. We could not, however, abandon the concept of political asylum. That was something in which President Eisenhower and the American people believed strongly. Perhaps in this matter we were idealistic, but the one thing for which Americans had been willing to fight and die was their ideals. We did not apologize for this.

9. It was agreed to meet again the next day to complete the discussion of other items.

1. This conversation took place at the Office of the Prime Minister.