Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

880.2553/1–2354

No. 327
Transcript of Meeting With Oil Company Representatives, at the Department of State, January 23, 1954¹

confidential

January 23, 1954

[Extracts]

Report by Oil Companies on Effect of Anti-Trust Suit in the Middle East

Participants:

• Department of State:
  • Acting Secretary Walter Bedell Smith
  • Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy, G
  • Assistant Secretary Henry A. Byroade, NEA
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, E
  • Mr. Willis C. Armstrong, E
  • Mr. W. Clyde Dunn, DRN
  • Mr. Robert H. S. Eakens, PED
  • Mr. A. David Fritzlan, NE
  • Mr. Fred L. Hadsel, NEA
  • Mr. Parker T. Hart, NE
  • Mr. Stanley D. Metzger, L/E
  • Mr. John H. Stutesman, Jr., GTI
  • Mr. Philip H. Trezise, OIR/OD
  • Mr. Frazer Wilkins, S/P
• Central Intelligence Agency:
  • Lt. General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director (with four advisers)
• Department of Defense:
  • Mr. Thomas Gates, Under Secretary of the Navy
  • Comdr. C. E. Cragg, ONI
  • Lt. Comdr. Frank Goodspeed, OSD
  • Col. G. H. Montgomery, Petroleum Logistics Division
  • Col. R. E. O’Brien, G–2
  • Mr. John A. Power, A–2
  • Comdr. J. G. Thorburn, ONI
  • Mr. Baxter Wood, G–2
• Donovan, Leisure, Newton and Irvine, Attorneys for Socony Vacuum Oil Company:
  • Mr. George S. Leisure
  • Mr. James R. Withrow
  • Mr. George Birrell
• Cahill, Gordon, Zachry and Reindel, Attorneys for Standard Oil Company:
  • Mr. James A. Fowler
  • Mr. William M. Sayre
• Socony Vacuum Oil Company:
  • Mr. Austin T. Foster, General Counsel
  • Mr. W. L. King, Counsel
• Texas Company:
  • Mr. Oscar John Dorwin, General Counsel
  • Mr. Leo T. Kissam, Counsel
• Dorr, Hammond, Hand and Dawson:
  • Mr. Goldthwaite H. Dorr

[The meeting convened at 10:05 a.m.]²

Assistant Secretary Byroade: We are here, I think, to listen and learn. I’d like to turn the meeting over to Mr. Foster. The show is yours.

Mr. Foster: Gentlemen, I’m going to apologize for a very bad voice and, because of that in part, I’m going to say very little except to introduce Mr. Withrow. You all know of the survey which we had made in the Middle East by Mr. Withrow and Mr. King with the assistance of Mr. Ray of Aramco.

Mr. Withrow is a lawyer. He is a partner in the firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton and Irvine, and during World War II he was Chief of Mission in Indochina. So he made the survey not without background.

As I say, I’m not going to make any introduction. You know what we are talking about and what Mr. Withrow is here to explain to you, so I will ask Mr. Withrow to proceed.

Mr. Withrow: As Mr. Foster told you, I was one of two or three that made this survey in the Middle East. I went out there and tried to make this survey and reach my conclusions from the same point of view and with the same assessing of the people I talked to that I had employed when I was an officer in the service of the United States during the war and for a short period after the war.

Now, I’m here to present the facts as we found them on the very narrow issue of what would be the effect on the national interest of the United States if the civil case called the international oil cartel case would be revived in open court and with the attendant publicity that a case of that kind would have. This presentation is based on current information. We got back just before Christmas and we had been out there talking with people throughout the Middle East. The facts that we have are directed to the one narrow issue, as I say, of the effect of a revival of the case.

. . . . . . .

We tried to check and recheck our information with officials, business men and other people, so that I think all told we actually have assessed the opinions of around 75 or 80 people by firsthand contact. I think not all of you are aware of the development of this international oil cartel case. Let me just run over it.

Back in August of 1952 a staff report of the Federal Trade Commission on international oil was published and Grand Jury proceedings were begun here in Washington. Decisions were reached first by President Truman and his Security Council and apparently later by President Eisenhower and his, which resulted in the bringing of a civil suit and the dropping of the Grand Jury proceedings. The next step was on the first of September in 1953 the defendants filed their answers in considerable detail, setting forth their defenses.

It wasn’t until we worked on the answer and filed the answer that we began to realize, as lawyers, that the issues in the civil case were at least equally damaging to the oil companies in the Middle East and, as we studied it further, we began to realize that the rumors that had been coming back in the form of reports from the field that the civil case was very dangerous, that the prestige of the United States and of the oil companies had been affected by the initial criminal case and that a publication of the civil case would also be detrimental.

I think that when the matter was changed from criminal to civil that, as American lawyers, we had the normal reaction, well, that is an improvement. But I think later on, as I go on with our story, I can show you—as it finally dawned on us—that actually the civil case is a greater threat than the crinimal case ever was or could have been because it’s in the civil case that you drag out in the open the fact of an American court reviewing acts taking place within the inside of these Arab states; where an Arab, by the mere fact of the daily publication of what goes on in the trial, would get to learn that their own sovereignty or their control over acts in their country was being litigated and questioned in an American court.

It’s in the civil case and not in the criminal case where the court considers the matter of the price of crude oil at the well, the level of those prices; and of course the level of those prices, if they are too high, in the civil case, you would force them down. That affects the economy of the Arab states very, very directly. And it’s in the civil case and not in the criminal case that the court and the prosecution and defense will be discussing in detail the terms of the concession agreement, whether the concession agreement is proper under our law, whether the agreements to take the crude oil as produced are proper under the law. All of those things actually become more important to the Arab states and are more apparent to them under the civil case than under a criminal case. [At this point General Smith joined the meeting.]

. . . . . . .

We came back, we offered the results of our survey to the Department of Justice and they referred us here and that is the reason we are here with this group.

Now, this survey did not purport to survey the tensions that exist in the Middle East. You people are more aware of them probably than we are. They certainly exist and everything that I say here, of course, must be taken in the background of those tensions that are there. We didn’t go out to investigate the effect on the oil companies but rather the effects on the American community generally and on our national interest.

The conclusion, of course, is—or else I wouldn’t be here—that it would have a very adverse effect, that any revival would be repeatedly exploited by the Communists directly or through the local nationalist movements in an effort to alienate the Middle East from America.

. . . . . . .

They had great difficulty—or rather even I would say an impossibility—of understanding how the United States Government could attack one of its companies out there. They just couldn’t believe that there wasn’t some connection between Aramco and the United States. I think that stems, as a matter of fact, as I cross examined and talked with them, from the fact that they are used to British and French companies in that area. And, of course, with these ones, when they get in trouble you find the French Government or the British Government out there fighting the battle for the company.

But they also had another point. They said, “Look, we are important business people, we have a lot of money. But we never could have gotten an oil concession in Saudi Arabia. It must have been the American Government that got that concession for Aramco.” And they said the same thing about the Pipeline concessions through Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. They said, “We, as substantial businessmen out here, would never be given that sort of right. It must be your government.”

Now, the important answer to that is, I think twofold. One, it means it’s absolutely impossible for them to understand why the United States Government is bringing a suit and, second, and perhaps more important, that any time they get distrust of an American business interest of the type I’m talking about that distrust also covers the United States. I mean the Arab is not a completely logical person, at least on this point, so that any time the oil companies are torn down it in effect is a tearing down of the United States’ own position. They just identify them that closely together.

. . . . . . .

I want to make it clear that I am distinguishing or trying to distinguish between the fact that these charges are used against the oil companies to get a bigger slice for the local country—I mean, that is true, they are used every day for that purpose, but what I am primarily talking about is the effect over and beyond the oil companies. Of course, when the effect on the oil companies is nationalization, I think you can see that that perhaps is an effect on the United States.

. . . . . . .

We talked, of course, in Saudi Arabia to the Aramco people, and looked around for what other people we could talk to. We were advised both by some representatives of the Company and by everybody we talked to that it was completely unsafe to talk to any Saudi Arab about this, that it would only result in the very thing that we were examining into, namely a use of the existence of the case against the United States in some way. Of course the Aramco people expressed a very clearcut opinion on this. They are at the firing line. They feel the effects every day. They feel the distrust and hostilities of the Saudi Arabs. As a matter of fact, 1953 was sort of a special year to the people in Aramco. For a while after the Federal Trade Commission report was handed down, nothing was said in Arabia about the report. Things seemed to be going along very nicely, except for one remark in the fall of 1952 about finally Saudi Arabia had a secret weapon. Well, nothing was said about this secret weapon until May, 1953, and the secret weapon turned out to be a copy of the staff report in Arabic. This was the first time that the existence of the case had ever been mentioned in any of the governmental negotiations, and beginning in May of 1953, the oil officials have been berated with the use of this report on the occasion of absolutely every meeting between the Saudi Arab Government representatives and representatives of the Oil Company. The Saudi Arabs have made it quite clear on some occasions that they think that maybe Aramco has been repudiated by the United States. The new King, in some of his first remarks, said that “I will deal fairly with anybody that deals fairly with me, and if my present friends are false, I will find friends elsewhere.” That in effect was the gist of his remarks. There are people who feel that the whole structure of Aramco is even now undermined, but that is not the general feeling. They pointed out that the Saudi Arabs do not yet understand that the real gist of what is going to go on will be an examination into the actions which take place in Saudi Arabia. Up until now the use of that report has been—well, the innuendoes and things in that staff report which indicate perhaps sharp dealing or price fixing or things of that kind, and not the type of thing which is going to be investigated into in the civil case, which is whether or not there should be joint ownership of production in Saudi Arabia, and what the arrangements should be for the off-take of oil.

. . . . . . .

Frankly, when I went out on this trip I was skeptical about the results. I was skeptical that the effect would be as cataclysmic as some of the people had forecast in their letters back. I came back then, after what I think was a pretty thorough investigation, conducted with a willingness to have any thesis disproved and examination and reexamination and evaluation at every stage of the game. I might say—I should say that upon completing this, we, even in the field, threw up a part of this picture or all of it to the local American Ambassador for him to punch whatever holes or take whatever stand he wanted to. I feel a strong conviction myself that a revival of this case, with how it is going to be used out there, in the atmosphere that is there, would be very bad. I have a feeling that the result would be such a diminishing of U.S. influence and prestige that there would be a sort of vacuum in the Middle East, and I can’t believe that a vacuum would exist there very long. I think Russia has indicated all too well its intentions and interests in the Middle East and would be only too glad to step in.

. . . . . . .

Assistant Secretary Byroade: I would like to ask one question. If this case proceeds—I am not a very good lawyer, but presumably it will cover matters internal in these countries and also cover matters of marketing that would be outside the Middle East. Isn’t that correct?

Mr. Withrow: That’s right. I was addressing myself entirely to the case as it affects the Middle East. If that aspect of the case weren’t there, why, I wouldn’t be here.

Assistant Secretary Byroade: In other words, the difficulties here in court about marketing this oil somewhere else in the world aren’t really so much of a factor in your mind as the internal settlement?

Mr. Withrow: That’s right.

Mr. Dorr: It’s the inherent situation in this case on the company as it now stands and on the position the Government would appear to them to take of the invasion of the sovereignty and of the interests of these countries.

Assistant Secretary Byroade: But as the case now stands, these two, the external-internal aspects, are all thrown together?

Mr. Dorr: They are thrown together and are pretty inextricable in the minds of the people out there. They would never understand any attempt to separate them. It is really, as I would say from the things Jim has been putting before you, the effect on the oil companies is very largely the repercussions on them of the attitudes toward the United States for these positions, which appear to invade the sovereignties and economic interests of these various countries.

Assistant Secretary Byroade: But you don’t think the external and internal could be separated. Is that right?

Mr. Dorr: I don’t know how. You certainly can’t do it to a substantial extent, and I don’t believe you could do it in the minds of these people out there.

Mr. Foster: I don’t believe it could be in this lawsuit. Another lawsuit might be brought that would extend to another aspect of the business, but this suit involves the production and marketing in the Middle East. I scarcely think it could be sorted out, and at least in the minds of the people of the Arab world, I suspect—although this could be examined—that it is one lawsuit.

Mr. Dorr: But, you see, even these particular situations in the Middle East are set forth as a cardinal part of the complaint, and the whole IPC arrangements, the Aramco arrangements, the Kuwait arrangements—they are all in there as the very foundation of the situation. Now those are the facts. Those all exist, and it is not on something new which the Government is going to prove: it is a position which is known to be the fact, which is the damaging thing to the United States.

Mr. Kalijarvi: Mr. Withrow, I have a number of questions. I don’t want to monopolize any part of this period, but I think they are all addressed to the framework within which your report was prepared. I think you said that when you started out, that you were skeptical that the results would be “as cataclysmic” as some of the people interviewed feared. What did you expect to find when you started on your report?

Mr. Withrow: Well, I can remember from the conversation that Larry King and I had just before we took the plane, and some people had thought that even going out to make the report was not worthwhile, that we couldn’t find anything. We were told, for example, by the people in the field that no one outside the oil companies would really talk on this subject. We found them wrong. So as we talked, just before we left, we said, “Well, we wonder whether it is worth risking not being home by Christmas in order to make this survey?” I mean, that is how skeptical we were.

Mr. Kalijarvi: I see. Well, then, the second question—and I hope whoever is presiding here will shut me off if I ask too many of them—is, how many non-English-speaking people did you interview?

Mr. Withrow: Quite a few. Most of them, fortunately, spoke French if they didn’t speak English, and I can get by in French, having been educated there. I don’t recall but perhaps one or two that were unable to make themselves understood in either French or English. With those I used as translator either Saba Habachy or Col. Eddy, so of course they were there. But you find most of the people of the type that we are speaking of—well, they talk either French or English. Syria and Lebanon having been French mandates, anybody of much consequence speaks French or English.

Mr. Kalijarvi: Well, then, the third one, and that will be all. Suppose the case were dropped, how does this prove the charges were not true? If the charges were not proved untrue through court action, how do we avoid leaving an even worse opinion?

Mr. Withrow: Well, I think the answer is probably twofold. One, most of the people out there think the case is dead, and to a certain extent, even with the attempts like the attempt I mentioned in the newspaper that announces it is going to talk about the case once a week, those attempts haven’t been too successful at keeping it alive, as a living issue. It kind of dies off, and so if nothing more is ever said, eventually it will wear off, and you enable the people who are out there to rebuild the belief in themselves and their integrity and their position. That is one thing.

The other thing is, if the suit is called off, I should think that the American Government and the companies would have a very definite interest in the form and substance of the statement which is issued to the press at the time it is called off, and it could be done in such a way that it would not be damaging. We talked to various people out there a little on that subject, when we thought we could, when we got that far, particularly with the lawyers I mentioned—I mean the local lawyers—and the people like Col. Eddy, and so forth. Is that an answer?

Mr. Kalijarvi: Yes, sir.

Mr. Leisure: The other side of that coin, if I may mention it, the real damage is the attendant publicity of a suit that will be used by extremist elements from day to day if the suit proceeds. That is where the real damage comes in, as we see it.

Mr. Dorr: It is not the ultimate result of the suit. No matter how that ultimately were decided in the Supreme Court, four or five years from now, that is not the thing we are talking about now. What we are talking about is the effect on the Arab minds and of these others of the publicity attendant with what goes on meanwhile, and not things which reflect on the companies but things which reflect on the United States for its interfering or assuming to deal with the affairs of those countries, which they regard as within their sovereign rights. That is the nub of it in our minds.

Assistant [Deputy Under] Secretary Murphy: I wonder if I could ask an ignorant question, which is probably very hypothetical? Apart from the psychological impact on the Arab mind, supposing the suit is prosecuted and suppose it goes to a successful conclusion on the part of our Government, what would be the practical, we will say official effect as a practical matter in Saudi Arabia? What would you visualize as happening actually from a business point of view?

Mr. Withrow: It is very difficult for me to say, because I don’t know as a lawyer precisely what are the results the U.S. Department of Justice wants from this lawsuit. I don’t now know what relief it is asking for. The complaint, after reciting all of these companies, like Aramco, which are in existence by agreement, asks the Court to break up all of the agreements. I don’t know whether that means to break up Aramco. I don’t know. In other words, until you know that, it is difficult to forecast—I mean, forgetting that there might be a blow-up in the meantime—what the result would be.

Assistant Secretary Murphy: But your fear would be that there would be a general deterioration of the relationship with the Saudi Arabia Government as one feature?

Mr. Withrow: There is no question in my mind that if that case went on, that the Saudi Arabia Government would eventually get to the point of this sort of analysis: that if the U.S. Government can examine into contracts and say they are no good because they are against the public interest, let’s look at the concession and examine it and decide there is no concession because it is against the Saudi Arab’s public interest.

Mr. Foster: Isn’t it also relevant, Jim, to mention that one of the people whom you saw—I don’t remember who he was—commented that if the United States was attacking these companies, they were of course criminals, and the concession therefore was of course null and void. I think that was their reaction: that any concession, that any contract with a criminal was no good.

Assistant Secretary Murphy: You fear a cancellation of the concession?

Mr. Foster: Yes.

Mr. King: If I may speak to that for a moment also, I am sure all of you gentlemen realize only too well that the Middle East leaders, the educated leaders would have only too clear a realization of the tremendous strategic significance and importance of the Middle East area. That is one of the reasons why it would be completely incomprehensible to the Arab mind that the United States Government, in the interests of destroying what they think of as at the most cooperation between companies naturally interested in the area, would undermine their whole position. Here they are, calling these companies conspirators, price fixers, scoundrels. They have held these same companies forth, and Aramco notably, as shining examples of what American free enterprise can offer, so if this case goes on through the years, again you have a search for what the underlying motive may be: “Is it American imperialism? It can’t be true that it is this minor aspect, which we don’t understand. What else is it? And in what other direction is Arab animosity directed? There must be some other conspiracy than this.”

Mr. Foster: I don’t know whether you all met each other. That was Mr. King, who went with Mr. Withrow.

Mr. Dorr: I will just say two things about the position which the Government has taken, which never yet has been borne home out there. One is that the United States has a right to determine what companies Saudi Arabia uses as its instrumentality for developing its resources, and to say whether they shall be used. Now, after all, Saudi Arabia selected these companies for certain reasons, and it selected them as American companies because of certain reasons because of its interests. Now, is the United States going to say, “It is all very well, it is your oil, and it is there; but nevertheless it is for us in our courts to determine whom you use as instrumentalities for producing this oil”? That is just inherently offensive.

Another position which they have taken, which has been taken and which should be considered by the Government representatives, is that the effect of this alleged combination was to bring the Middle East oil into Europe and to force American exports out of Europe. Well, now, if the object of this situation is to cut down the Arabian oil and Middle East oil going into Europe for the benefit of Americans, why, that is not going to be a very pleasant prospect. It is just food for propaganda for this group. It is food for propaganda.

And the same way with the price. After all, these countries are dependent for their economy on what they get. They are dependent for their very life, some of them almost entirely, on what they get out of this oil which is produced. Now, if the indication is that the position of the United States appears to be that this Middle East oil is overpriced, and the result of this suit is going to be to force down the price of Arabian oil because it happens to be very rich and can be extracted cheaply, there again you have a direct apparent conflict, not between the companies but between the American interests, the United States Government interests and those countries.

Those things stick up like sore thumbs.

Assistant Secretary Byroade: There is only one bright light in the picture, Goldie: They are going to be so mad at us on so many things—

[Laughter]

Mr. Dorr: On that, since you said that, let me say this, Hank. We fully appreciate that there are other things which create tensions and disturbances out there besides our little part of the picture, but I will say this, that the oil companies perhaps have suffered somewhat by repercussions from other grounds that are of real offensive objection to the United States.

Assistant Secretary Murphy: Are there any other questions? Has Defense any questions?

Lt. Comdr. Goodspeed: I would like to ask a question. If this suit should go forward and result in a consent decree, which might result in some apparent change in the alignment of the companies or operation of the companies, would that, do you think, have the same effect? The detrimental effect?

Mr. Withrow: I am glad you asked that question, because I, as most speakers, have notes enough to keep them going all day, and I did have that and somehow or other I skipped that page. We investigated that with a number of people out there, and the reaction was that that would be just as detrimental as the trial, and they suggested that the only—they wanted to know why can’t you make whatever adjustments you have to make, if you have to make any, without a formal court decree, which I personally think was a pretty sensible suggestion. They say that a decree, a finding against these companies would be used and exploited. I also want to point out that in my dealings with the Department on consent decrees, and I have negotiated quite a few, they have a lot of what they call boiler plate provisions, and those boiler plate provisions in effect forbid you to do a lot of heinous things, some of which you may have done and some of which you may not have done, and you are not in a very good position usually to argue against them, because it is perfectly clear they are against the law, and by eliminating them you aren’t getting any rights. But the consent decree angle is not a real solution to this problem. I don’t think that means there isn’t one.

Mr. Kalijarvi: That brings up another question entirely aside from the legal aspect, the psychological one. Suppose the suit were dropped, what happens to the United States per se on that particular item? Does it mean that the United States in the eyes of the Arab world would be looked upon as having been wrong and therefore the suit has been dropped?

Mr. Withrow: I think most Arabs would say that it would result in heaping a little bit more opprobrium on the prior regime, I don’t know—it wasn’t very well liked—and I think that they would say, “Well, sure, the new Party, the new President, he sees things better from the Arab point of view than the old one.” I don’t foresee the difficulty that you do.

Mr. Kalijarvi: Just one technicality: the present suit was filed by Brownell.

Mr. Withrow: I know, but that is fairly well lost in the Arab mind. The publicity and everything about this case is there in the August-through-December period in this country which was reflected out there about the suit. The actual change from civil to criminal didn’t actually cause a ripple out there. Why, I really don’t know. Probably because they didn’t understand it.

Lt. Gen. Cabell: Does Mr. Murphy plan to make available some of these witnesses referred to for any individual interrogation?

Mr. Withrow: Yes. We will advise whomever we should advise, if a channel is set up, as to when these men are here, when they are available. I was going to say that should anybody think of a question he wished he had asked me, after we adjourn today, I will be only too happy to come down with all the information I have and my notes and try to go over this. This meeting, I know, is kind of unsatisfactory for getting at the particular angles that some of you might be interested in, and I would be only too happy to do that. You set up the channel and we will tell you when these other people will be available.

Assistant Secretary Murphy: I should think the three agencies would provide a contact and then could communicate directly with Mr. Withrow. Would that be the thing, Hank?

Assistant Secretary Byroade: Yes.

Assistant Secretary Murphy: Is that agreeable to the others?

[General agreement.]

Mr. King: I would like to make one further point that may be of interest. It was suggested out there that if these charges are pressed, if this publicity does occur, isn’t it bound to deprive us of any effective future diplomatic support? “How possibly can your Government go forward with these charges, as we understand them, and then afford the oil industry as it exists today or in anything like its present form any effective diplomatic support in the future?” That calls to mind, perhaps, King Ibn Saud’s remark at the end of the Aramco negotiations, when he said to the chief negotiator for Aramco, “Perhaps you would not be interested to know why the Arabian-American Oil company received this concession?” The negotiator said, “Very much.” And His Majesty said, “Well, I don’t recall seeing many American warships around these waters!”

[Laughter.]

Assistant Secretary Murphy: Bill Eddy as a former Marine probably would have appreciated that.

[Laughter.]

Mr. Leisure: On your question, sir, that you asked a moment ago, about what would happen to the prestige of the United States if the suit is dropped, I think that is a very good question. Of course, we feel that the charges should never have been made. When we stop to think of what it will mean to the Navy’s supply of oil and the supply of oil in the Middle East, we think it never should have been brought. We think consideration was not given to that point of view when the charges were made. We think the case was brought by lawyers looking at it from a legalistic point of view, who agreed among themselves to bring an anti-trust suit, without giving sufficient consideration to all the other factors involved. So the problem we have today is, the question now is, where will we be best off? Where will the prestige of the United States be best served? By continuing a lawsuit which should never have been brought in the first place? Or by dropping a suit that should not have been brought? Maybe there will be some loss of prestige. I don’t think so. I think it can be handled in such a way that there will be no loss of prestige, but whether there is or not, there we are.

Mr. Kalijarvi: When you are prepared to discuss this aspect of the problem, I would like to discuss it further with you.

Mr. Leisure: We should like to.

Mr. Murphy: Any more questions? [None]

We certainly are very grateful to you. We will have a transcript made of this thing, and I should think we would want to keep it classified as “confidential,” but copies will be available.

[Mr. Leisure and Mr. Foster expressed their appreciation to the Department officials.]

Mr. Dorr: I don’t think it should be, because after all, these names have been mentioned, and these statements, so you have got to keep them off the limb.

Mr. Murphy: As far as we are concerned, it will be classified as “confidential.” A transcript will be available to you and will be classified as “confidential.” As far as we are concerned, it is confidential.

Thank you very much.

[The meeting was adjourned at 12:10.]

1. A notation after the list of participants stated that the transcript was reported by Violet Ruth Voce and Edna C. Moyer, Department of State, Division of Central Services.
2. Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.