Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/1–2354

No. 176
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)¹

top secret

Washington, January 23, 1954.

Subject:

• Turkish–Pakistan Pact

In view of the rapid pace developing in plans pertaining to prospective exploratory talks between Turkey and Pakistan and relative United States military aid, there are several aspects of the matter which EUR believes should be given urgent attention.

EUR’s immediate interest in these developments is to avoid unnecessary friction with our principal allies and among the smaller NATO members. Such difficulties, we believe, can be minimized, if a satisfactory understanding is achieved among the United States, United Kingdom and France. If all three support the arrangements and the Turkish presentation in the NAC, there is no reason to believe any unmanageable problems will arise. Thus EUR believes that every effort should be made to assure that the timing of steps now being planned, such as presentation to NAC by Turkey, press communiqués, Presidents statement, etc., should take this contingency into account.

Because of her previous association in the sponsorship of MEDO and because of her basic desire to maintain a position as a great power entitled to consultation generally in global matters, and especially in the Middle East, France may seek assurances of future consultation on developments in this area as a condition for speaking in support of the Turkish statement in the NAC at this stage. In fact, if this question is raised and not resolved to France’s satisfaction, the latter might well combine with the British in an effort to assure consistency between any plans which might develop from Turkish–Pakistan talks and their own interest in the area.

British support is even more important because (1) Pakistan is a member of the British Commonwealth with all that implies; (2) British interests and responsibilities in the area; and (3) if understanding is not reached with the British, the latter might well combine with the French in demanding closer association.

If the United Kingdom and France were both to refrain from supporting the Turkish statement in NAC, and from favorable public comment on the proposed arrangement, other NATO members and the world at large would immediately sense disagreement among the three countries, especially between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Against this background, EUR suggests the following steps:

1. The United Kingdom and France should be informed as soon as possible of the various moves which we have in mind:

(a) the proposed statement by the Secretary on the Pact (Deptel 786 to Ankara);²

(b) the proposed statement by the President on military aid to Pakistan (Deptel 785 to Ankara);²

(c) the fact that the President intends to send a personal message to Nehru, together with a description of the main elements of the message (Deptel 787 to Ankara).²

2. It could be made clear to the British and French that they are only being informed of (not consulted about) the military aid aspect of the problem (1(b) and (c) above), since this is primarily a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Pakistan.³

3. With respect to the Pact, however, we would urge the British (and perhaps less importantly the French) to make a public statement more or less paralleling 1(a) above.

4. We would urge concerted action by the U.S., U.K. and France in the NAC, with each supporting in separate statements the proposed Turkish–Pakistan exploratory talks. We should avoid a U.S.-U.K.-French tripartite statement in the NAC, since this would tend to cast the prospective Turkish–Pakistan arrangements in the character of successor to the deceased MEDO project. It would also tend to cast U.S.–U.K.–France in the role of sponsors of the new arrangements and to give France a basis for asserting the right of consultation or participation in the future.

EUR also has the following specific comments on Deptels 785, 786 and 787 to Ankara:

1. The following statement is made in the fourth paragraph of the suggested draft letter from the President to Nehru: “We … have admired the effective way your Government has taken over from the British the direction of your military establishment.” We feel the British may take a second or third reading of this. Though undoubtedly not intended by the drafters, a Britisher might interpret the remark as a pat on India’s back for expelling the British Raj.

2. On the question of base rights, we note the following statements:

(a) in the draft letter from the President—“Many statements have been made … that we are obtaining base rights in Pakistan. …”

(b) in the proposed White House press release—“it has been suggested that the United States may ask for base rights, etc. …”

These statements are followed by denials. We wonder whether the present wording may create difficulties for us in future in the event we should require bases there. We suggest some such wording as “the United States has not requested base rights.”⁴

1. Drafted by Palmer and Adair, and cleared by WE, BNA, and RA.
2. Not printed, but see Document 174.
2. Not printed, but see Document 174.
2. Not printed, but see Document 174.
3. Telegram 758 from Ankara, Jan. 23, not printed, reported that the Turks had given the British Embassy general background on developments, and had expressed the view that the French should also be informed. (780.5/1–2354)
4. A memorandum by Byroade to Bonbright, dated Jan. 26, answered that most of the points mentioned in this memorandum were being taken care of. The British had been brought up to date, and the Department of State was advising the Turks to inform the French in Ankara and, with regard to NATO, to make a statement at the same time that India, Afghanistan, and Iraq were informed. With reference to the suggestion on base rights, Ambassador Hildreth had recommended that the Department delete the reference to bases in the President’s statement, and that would be done. (780.5/1–2654)