No. 131
Editorial Note
The Embassy in Jordan sent the only reply suggesting agreement with the Turkish proposals for going along with a defense organization without the Arabs. Telegram 1006 from Amman, May 27, did not consider the proposal advanced in the airgram of May 1, supra, likely to be acceptable to Jordan, and believed the only way to achieve a Middle East Defense Organization was to establish it without Arab support, giving the Arab States the right to join later. The Embassy was not unduly concerned with the dangers of confronting the Arab States with a fait accompli since it considered the danger to lie in showing weakness rather than strength.
Telegram 2059 from Beirut, May 26, commented that the Embassy was firmly convinced a collective defense organization with Western participation was essential to overcome the security vacuum in the Middle East, but considered the political climate unpropitious, and in fact suggested that a connection between United States defense thinking and the Arab pact might destroy the Arab collective security effort. The Embassy felt that all regional defense proposals should be held up until the return of the Secretary of State and a reexamination of United States Near East policies. Positive steps to resolve the situations in Palestine and Egypt might improve the political climate in the area; and military aid, [Page 372] especially to Egypt and Syria, might provide an opening wedge for a successful regional defense organization.
Telegram 2439 from Cairo, May 15, advised the Department of State that since General Naguib and others had mentioned to the Secretary of State the possibility of using the Arab Collective Security Pact as a foundation for regional defense arrangements. Egypt would probably react favorably to the military annex alternative to the Middle East Defense Organization if the evacuation issue were settled to the satisfaction of the Egyptians. The Embassy believed the suggestion should be pursued cautiously, but saw no objection to planting the idea with appropriate friendly Arab leaders without delay.
The Embassy in Jidda, in telegrams 877, May 16, considered the suggestion for working through the Arab organization an excellent one, as it might help to remove local suspicions that a Middle East Defense Organization might be an instrument for the reimposition of British and French hegemony in the Middle East.
The Embassy in Baghdad replied on May 26, in telegram 1410, that it doubted any area-wide Middle East Defense Organization would be practicable until the Suez problem was satisfactorily resolved. It was attracted to the idea set forth in the May 1 airgram, since it believed an indigenous basis for a defense organization was probably a necessity for success, but suggested waiting until the Suez problem was settled before trying to stimulate any Arab leader to make a proposal on a regional defense organization.
The Embassy in Damascus wrote that the Department of State’s alternative approach of the May 1 airgram might appeal to Shi-shikli, especially if the United States offered substantial aid, if progress were made toward the settlement of the Palestine and Suez questions, and if he saw impartial treatment by the United States of both Israel and the Arab States. The Embassy adhered to the view that defense arrangements in the Middle East must not only include the Arab States but must also provide a basis for dealing with area problems in a spirit of mutual confidence.
The above telegrams are in Department of State file 780.5.