Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/2–2453: Telegram

No. 122
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

secret

Washington, March 6, 1953—1:06 p.m.

892. Re Deptel 891 March 6.² Department appreciative urtels 1032 February 22³ and 1050 February 26⁴ and despatch 596 February 24⁵ which suggest fuller US–UK consideration Nuri’s idea working towards “a MEDO” through protocol to existing Arab Collective Security Pact. While Department did not see fit discuss this approach in London talks, Department has been opinion that joint development of “a MEDO” would not preclude an examination of such Arab state suggestions, particularly if “a MEDO” could be made more effective or more palatable and consequently implemented quicker by “going in the back door”. At time when West is already heavily committed provide armaments in Far East war theaters and Europe to extent that few additional military commitments can be fulfilled for Middle East at an early date, there might well be advantages in giving Middle East participants at least psychological benefit of having word spread throughout area that Western powers are prepared join them in area defense rather than vice versa. These advantages might include:

(a) Preservation of fundamental MEDO objectives plus more willing cooperation from Arab states on common defense measures.

(b) “Diplomatic victory” for Middle East governments which might strengthen their domestic and international position to point where cooperation with West could be sold to public. Specifically this approach might more easily enable Naguib to buy UK “Government’s package deal” on Suez. (Reference Embassy Cairo cables.⁶)

(c) Concrete measure to implement “psychological objectives” of PSB program for Middle East as contained document D22 February 6, 1953.⁷

(d) Manifestation of “Administration’s new approach” to Middle East as anxiously awaited in the area.

(e) Counter for Communist propaganda that MEDO is imperialistic scheme foisted on unwilling Arab states by West.

(f) Positive and possibly dramatic move in foreign affairs field for US domestic consumption, particularly if parallel Security Pact arrangements with Israel could be developed.

(g) Reversed tactical position whereby Arab Collective Security Pact rather than MEDO proposals become target of attention, criticism and consequent modification.

Disadvantages, while not yet fully explored, would include (1) implications re Israel and (2) ACSP language. However it may develop that any defense scheme would be faced with (1) and suggested protocol might allow West to subscribe only to those parts of (2) which might be acceptable.

Department would appreciate further field comments re this backdoor approach, particularly Embassy Cairo views as to whether discussions with Arab states along lines Baghdad Despatch 596 February 24 might dispel adverse popular impression of MEDO sufficiently to contribute to successful conclusion of British-Egyptian “package deal” on Suez. In making field recommendations it should be kept in mind that Department places in high priority necessity for obtaining psychological warfare by-products which may be perhaps more valuable than immediate military benefits from any defense organization. An essential result which must follow any tactical approach to the Middle East states on defense arrangements is, of course, continued Western interest in and access to Suez Base.

Dulles

1. Repeated as telegram 5910 to London, 4734 to Paris, 1763 to Cairo, 515 to Jidda, 506 to Damascus, 820 to Tel Aviv, 1114 to Ankara, and transmitted to Moscow by air pouch. Drafted by Funkhouser and cleared by GTI, EUR, S/P, NEA, BNA, RA, and S/S–CR.
2. Not printed; it reported the Department of State was giving further study to the approach to MEDO through a protocol to the Arab Collective Security Pact. The “back door approach” would be considered as a substitute if Egypt was unable to accept the original MEDO draft. (780.5/3–0653)
3. Not printed; it reported on a telegram being sent to London by the British Embassy in Baghdad, concerning the substance of a Feb. 19 conversation between the British Ambassador and the Premier of Iraq. Telegram 1032 reads, in part, summarizing the British Embassy telegram: “Nuri reiterated his idea that Middle East defense should be based on Arab collective security pact. He said a protocol could be added to the pact enabling non-Arab countries to become parties to it. Nuri said previous defense proposals sponsored by West had two defects, namely (a) a ‘command’ (sic) implied purely military arrangement without any covering political agreement; (b) Arab states, except for Egypt, would have had an inferior position.” (641.87/22253)
4. Not printed. It reads, in part: “Embassy suggests that Nuri’s idea of relating a Middle East defense to the Arab collective security pact is being put forward by him in his belief that it is potentially acceptable to the Iraqi people in contrast to a western involved MEDO, against which Iraq opinion has been aroused. Further consideration by the Department might therefore be given to fuller utilization of Nuri’s ideas in developing a defense plan, if only as insurance against failure of Anglo-Egyptian talks. Embassy further suggests that obstacle to the proper consideration and acceptance by Iraq of a MEDO is the continued lack of anything concrete which the government or the public can grasp. In the meantime, the field is left clear to those who, for political or ideological reasons, are conjuring up all the dangers and disadvantages which a Middle East Defense Organization could bring to Iraq.” (641.87/2–2653)
5. Not printed; it reported on some thought by the British Embassy in Baghdad to stimulate the calling of a consultative conference of Middle Eastern states to discuss Middle East defense proposals if the negotiations with Egypt with regard to the Middle East Defense Organization should fail. (780.5/2–2453)
6. See Documents 947 ff.
7. Not printed. Document D22, Feb. 6, 1953, was a 35-page paper entitled “Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East”, which was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board at its 17th meeting on Jan. 15, 1953. The major psychological objectives stated in the paper were: to strengthen confidence in the integrity of the United States and its sincere friendship for the people of the area; to convince Middle Eastern leaders that their interests were identical with those of the free world, and that the only prospect for adequate defense of the Middle East lay in cooperation with the United States and its allies; to promote an awareness of the Soviet threat; to encourage progressive elements in the Middle East to advance programs for the improvement of economic and social conditions in their area; and to develop an attitude in the leaders and opinion-forming groups in the area that it would be to their advantage to take steps which would facilitate the resolution of international and intra-regional controversies which weakened the area. (780.5/2–653)