Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers

No. 605
Record of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 10, 1953, 12:40 p.m.¹

Washington, July 10, 1953, 12:40 p.m.

1. The Secretary phoned his brother and asked how he came out with McCarthy? Allen Dulles read him a ticker, which was McCarthy’s version of the bout. He said it was something of a draw, he wasn’t making any statement, and it would be resumed on Tuesday. He said McCarthy was in an ugly mood having been slapped down pretty hard yesterday, but Mundt was helpful, Potter mum, and Dirksen absent. The general tenor of McCarthy’s statement was that CIA was neither sacrosanct nor immune from investigation.

2. The Secretary said that on the Russian thing his views, and those of the Department were at variance with those expressed at Cabinet by Allen and C. D. Jackson.² We think it presages a tougher policy and return to Stalinism. The Secretary said he had gone back to his bible (Problems of Leninism) and quoted extensively from it to prove his point. Allen did not think that there comparable men to replace those executed in these days, and felt that the army must have been with Malenkov. Also he thought, based on the theater party, that this had been decided about 10 days ago and there were new evidences of softness since then, the reforms in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which sort of upset State’s theory.

Jackson had made the statement that we should not accept an armistice at this time. The Secretary said that Beetle and the staff feel it is less likely that we will get one, that there is a likelihood that there will be more nationalistic policy which make our chances recede rather than advance. Allen thought armies were always more cautious than politicians, and they might want an armistice. It is his theory that it would be an awful gamble but that an armistice would remove one of the pressures—and he would like to stall for a couple of weeks, Orientals are good at that. If there is a serious breakdown it might pay off. The Secretary could not see how Korea offers us any chances right now. Allen said that he had a new cable in on the German situation which he would have Emory show to MacArthur, it predicts that the workers are planning another blowup there. The Secretary mentioned his decision on Bohlen,³ he said he was embarrassed by his being in Paris on vacation after actually predicting that this might happen, it would appear that he knew nothing about it.

1. Prepared by Burnita O’Day, personal secretary to Secretary Dulles.
2. See Document 603. The “Russian thing” presumably refers to the announced downfall of Beriya.

3. Earlier in the afternoon (at 12:10 p.m.) Secretary Dulles called Senator William Knowland of California. The record of the conversation reads as follows:

   “The Secretary telephoned the Senator and said in view of the Russian development he would like to have Bohlen come to Washington for the Foreign Ministers’ meetings. He had actually cabled us that this was likely to happen, and since he is fresh from the spot it would be useful. Would it have any adverse political possibilities on the Hill? Knowland did not think so, but thought as an antidote we ought to bring in Radford or Ridgway too.”

   “The Secretary also spoke to the Vice President about this—who agreed with Knowland’s judgment and offered the idea of planting the story that Bohlen had predicted this, in several places, to build Bohlen up and prove that it was a good appointment. The Secretary said we were doing so but to go ahead too.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)

   This same record also indicates that Assistant Secretary Merchant was instructed to telephone Bohlen in Paris.

   Bohlen’s recollection of his conversations with Washington at this time and the request that he return for consultation is described in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 355–356. This recollection, not confirmed by any documentation in Department of State files, includes a late evening conversation between Bohlen and the Secretary at the latter’s home.