Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

INR–NIE files

No. 590
Special Estimate¹

secret
SE–44

[Washington,] 30 April 1953.

The Soviet Statement of 25 April 1953 in Reply to President Eisenhower’s Speech on 16 April 1953

The Problem

To estimate the significance of the Soviet statement of 25 April 1953.

Estimate

1. The Soviet statement of 25 April 1953² is a defense of Soviet policy and of the world Communist movement, and a condemnation of US policy. The statement gives no indication that the rulers of the USSR will modify their stand on any of the issues outstanding between East and West.

2. The publication of the full text of President Eisenhower’s speech³ is an unusual but not unprecedented act. The Soviet press has occasionally published the speeches and writings of “capitalist” statesmen when such action could serve as the basis for a reply. In this case, one motive for publication may have been the conviction that the speech could be represented to the Soviet people as a demand for the surrender by the USSR of the gains of World War II, and of Communist principles, as the price of peace with the US. Probably also the Soviet rulers hoped by publishing the President’s speech to convince world opinion of the sincerity of current Soviet “peace” tactics.

3. While Soviet and world Communist policies and actions are consistently defended in the statement as serving peace and justice, there is an intimation that areas such as Korea, Germany, and Austria, and subjects such as East-West trade and disarmament, are open for discussion. In each case, the rectitude of past Soviet positions is affirmed, with the suggestion that it is up to the US to make the first step towards a settlement. However, the territories now in the Bloc, as well as the “national liberation movement” in the colonial and semi-colonial areas of Asia, are excluded from discussion.

4. The over-all impression left by the statement is that it is a skillful effort to promote dissension within the US Government, between the US Government and the American people, and above all, between the US and the rest of the non-Communist world. The statement suggests that the rulers of the USSR envisage a prolonged political warfare campaign exploiting the “peace” theme and that, whether or not there is an internal struggle for power, they are united on questions of foreign policy. The statement gives no indication that they are prepared to make substantial concessions.

1. Regarding Special Estimates, see footnote 1, Document 552.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further records that the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Apr. 28.

2. See Document 587.
3. Document 583.