Office of the Historian

611.00/4–2553: Telegram

No. 588
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State1

top secret
niact
Moscow, April 25, 1953—6 p.m.

1527. The full page statement on President’s speech and the publication of the speech itself2 without deletions or any attempt to soften the vigor of the comment on Soviet policies are in themselves events of great importance and in my experience unparalleled in the Soviet Union since the institution of the Stalinist dictatorship. The article itself will require further careful study.

The following preliminary comments are those which on first examination appear to us to merit special mention in addition to points mentioned in Embassy telegram 1526:

1.
A great deal of thought and care have obviously gone into the preparation of this article and it is not surprising from its contents that it took a week to compose although possibly the timing of the publication may have been fixed to coincide with the end of the NATO meeting in Paris.3
2.
It bears evidence of a group composition. Certain variations in style as well as the construction of some sentences appear to reflect the work of several individuals.
3.
The name of Stalin does not appear and in describing the Soviet Government the words “Soviet leaders” in the plural are most frequently used.
4.
The article is cautious and wary even to the point of indecision and may reflect either the uncertainty of the present leadership or a compromise of differing views with it.
5.
The document is not primarily designed for mass propaganda purposes. It is too long and subtle for effective and simple exploitation. Individual phrases (although these are also surprisingly few) can and probably will be selected for emphasis and exploitation by the Soviet and Communist propaganda.

In general the article appears to be designed to serve the following main purposes:

a.
To avoid the appearance of throwing cold water on any prospects of peaceful solution and improved relations initiated by President.
b.
An attempt to shift the onus placed on the Soviet Union by the President’s remarks for the present state of the world back on to the US and its allies. The weakness and, in Soviet terms, mildness of the rebuttal (with the exception of the attacks on the Secretary) plus the publication in full of the President’s accurate and trenchant criticism of Soviet policies are striking in the light of past Soviet reaction to any criticism.
c.
An attempt to toss the ball back to the United States by declaring that the “Soviet leaders would welcome any step from the US Government” etc., and a rather clear preference for the use of diplomatic channels over those of the United Nations.
d.
As already reported, the article gives no new information or clue concerning future Soviet positions in regard to specific subjects listed by President.

It is the Embassy’s opinion and also of members of Diplomatic Corps with whom we have had an opportunity to discuss the subject that in this public exchange the United States has come out distinctly the winner. Some reaction from the US Government will of course be necessary without too long a delay. However, in our view while obviously the Soviet reply to the President’s speech is not satisfactory or sufficiently definite to give any clear indication of their future policies, we believe it desirable to avoid having this exchange degenerate except by Soviet choice into a propaganda battle, especially since as matters now stand the advantage seems to us to lie with us. We believe it would keep the present Soviet leadership more off-balance and help force them to reveal more of their real purposes if US official comment continues to follow present line inaugurated by President’s speech.

Department repeat to other posts in its discretion.

Bohlen
  1. Repeated for information to Secretary Dulles in Paris.↩
  2. See telegram 1526, supra.↩
  3. Reference is to the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, Apr. 23–27; for documentation, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 368 ff.↩