Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”

No. 561
Memorandum Prepared by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 10, 1953.

Policy Implications of Stalin’s Death

i

The great menace to the United States and its interests has been the control exercised by a hand-full of men in the Kremlin over some 800 million people. In past circumstances, this group of men therefore could, without previous warning, involve the totality of the Soviet or Soviet-controlled empire in an attack on the United States. The death of Stalin may offer, with the progress of time, opportunities to weaken and disrupt the cohesiveness of this bloc and in particular the direct control of the Kremlin over the Eastern European satellites and its influence over Communist China. The impulses of nationalism would seem to be the chief element working against the continuance of² Soviet control over the non-Soviet countries in this bloc.

The mystique and symbolism of Stalin’s name assiduously cultivated by the Soviet propaganda machine was a very important factor in the Soviet system of control. His connection with the original revolution and association with Lenin, and the continuous buildup as an individual enjoying super-human qualities, not only facilitated the original imposition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and in the establishment of primary influence in Communist China but was also a vital factor in its perpetuation. The manner in which the name of Stalin facilitated Soviet control was subtle but nonetheless real. It is doubtful if the mystique of his name had any effect on the attitude of the peoples of the countries concerned but it was, however, of considerable assistance to the local Communist leaders who could reconcile more easily whatever nationalist feeling they may have possessed with the fact of Soviet domination by reason of the international revolutionary heritage associated with the name of Stalin. It may be anticipated that the natural force of nationalism which was in part diluted by the prestige of Stalin will begin increasingly to assert itself against straight Russian domination. Neither Malenkov, nor Molotov, nor Beria enjoy any prestige comparable to that of Stalin. Our policy in all its aspects should keep this factor very much in mind.

In short, it may be stated that the death of Stalin will remove one of the elements which was able to confuse and disguise to some extent the reality of naked Soviet imperialism in the Eastern European countries. It must be recognized, however, that the element of straight Soviet control is so powerful within these Eastern European countries that the process of increased nationalism may be a very long-term process. It is doubtful if any of the present leaders in the satellite countries command sufficient following among their people on a nationalist basis to act as representatives of national sentiment in any attempt to break away from Soviet control. It is improbable moreover that the people themselves will be able to take any action or exercise any important influence until this control is weakened if not broken.

Our policy in all its aspects should be constantly alert to the possibility of the emergence of nationalism as a force in Eastern Europe and China and be prepared to encourage and support any such indications in the manner best designed to be effective in hastening the disintegration of the Soviet empire. It is doubtful, however, if at this particular period or in the immediate future direct foreign exhortation or instigation would be wise as it might assist the Soviet Union in the process of consolidation which it is our central aim to prevent and possibly diminish or at least postpone the emergence of the natural forces making for dissension within that empire.

Possibly the most effective area for exploitation will be in the field of the Soviet-Communist Chinese relationship. Since it is doubtful that Soviet control over Communist China is anywhere near as complete as it is in the case of the European satellite countries, there should logically be greater opportunity for independent Chinese action. Furthermore, in the field of ideological leadership, Mao Tse-tung may have been willing to play the part of younger brother to Stalin but will most certainly not accept willingly any subordinate role in this field to Malenkov. The proper political or psychological exploitation of this possibility will of necessity involve the consideration of our relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government. If the possibility of a rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China becomes a real possibility and not a theory, as it must remain at present, the question of the Chinese Nationalist Government and our relation to it will be immediately brought to the fore. It is, however, premature to deal with this problem at this time and it would be most unwise to do so.

ii

Soviet Policy

There are no indications as yet that there are great opportunities for exploitation insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned. The USSR presents a special problem and the considerations of nationalism are not as directly visible in the case of that country.

The long-term implications of Stalin’s death will undoubtedly be extremely important in their effect upon Soviet foreign policy. At the moment, however, the following facts may be noted:

1. We have no indications that the situation is not well in the hands of the new rulers. It is true that the instructions of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers refer to the difficult situation and “the prevention of any kind of disarray and panic”. These would appear to be less expressions of concern at possible disturbances or troubles in the country as a whole than a call for unity and possibly a discreet note of warning to certain party organizations.

2. At this stage, at any rate, the Russian people are not directly involved in that they are playing no part in the transfer of power.

3. It is to be expected that the first preoccupation of the new leadership will be to close ranks and present a united front, both to the country and particularly to the outside world. There will be an increase of the normal tendency of dictators to avoid any sign of weakness vis-à-vis their external enemies, in this case primarily the United States.

4. This preoccupation against any show of weakness will probably be accompanied by great prudence and caution in regard to any new Soviet adventures or aggressive actions. Any measures on Soviet initiative which would run the serious risk of war would obviously be dangerous for the new regime. However, by the same token the new leadership will almost certainly be prepared to take great risks to avoid the physical loss of any territories or areas they have inherited from Stalin. Thus, Soviet foreign policy for a considerable period would appear to remain virtually unchanged from the last phase in which Stalin was alive. It may become even more truculent in speech but in all probability, unless the defense of a previous position is involved, cautious in initiating new and risky adventures.

iii

Policy Guides

While it is not possible to predict accurately developments, the following, at this juncture, might be accepted as sound guides to our policy:

1. We must stand resolutely and firmly on all present positions and not be deflected in any of the policies for the increase of strength and unity in the free world. Any sign of weakness on our part would be most dangerously interpreted by the new leadership.

2. Failing some sign of internal disorder or loss of control, either in the Soviet Union or over the satellites, of which up to the present there have been no signs, there would appear to be little advantage in stepping up cold war pressures, since increased expressions of hostility would probably materially assist the new leadership in the consolidation of its position and postpone the growth of dissensions and rivalries which are certainly latent in Soviet-satellite and Soviet-Chinese relationship as well as within the Soviet ruling group itself.

3. The Department of State is examining urgently the possibility of some initiative on the part of the West which might confront the new leadership with a new situation regarding decisions not previously made under Stalin.

1. A notation on the source text reads: “Prepared by Mr. Bohlen (rec’d 3/10/53)”. The source text also indicates this memorandum was seen by Nitze and Phillip Watts of S/P. An identical copy is in Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, “Misc Memoranda, Letters 1953.” This memorandum is in the same PPS files as Nitze’s memorandum, supra, and was presumably used in the same context as that memorandum.
2. The handwritten word “unilateral” is inserted in the source text at this point.