Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

123 Kennan, George F.: Telegram

No. 524
The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State¹

confidential
niact

London, September 26, 1952—5 p.m.

1782. I have just seen somewhat garbled but generally legible text of Pravda attack on myself² and wish to give Dept at once following initial reactions:

1. Press stories which were evidently immediate hinge of Soviet attack were apparently ones based on statements made by myself to reporters present at Berlin airport on Sept 19 when my plane touched there en route Moscow to London.³ These remarks were not volunteered but were made in reply to inquiries of reports as to whether there had been any relaxation in position of the foreign diplomats in Moscow and treatment accorded them. I replied frankly and unhesitatingly to this query because I have never considered that there was anything secret from our standpoint about details of regime of isolation applied to foreign diplomatic corps by Soviet Govt and because I feel it, in fact, essential to proper understanding of Soviet-American relations by our people and world public that they realize position in which foreign representatives in Moscow are held. I have only seen one press account based on these statements, namely that of the Paris Herald Tribune, which struck me as unfortunately worded and giving somewhat sensationalized version of what I had said, but basically not incorrect.

2. In addition to reply to questions about isolation of foreign diplomats, I told correspondents that I had seen no evidence as yet of any Soviet desire to improve our relations and felt that as long as violent anti-American campaign continues and there was no cease-fire in Korea, we had to assume that no such desire was present. This statement, I may note, was in accordance with line which I had informed the President, in recent letter to him,⁴ that I proposed to take. From ticker story, Pravda did not mention this statement implications of which were really of much greater importance than one they seized upon.

3. Dept can depend upon it that this sort of attack has background far deeper than particular interview in question and reflects ulterior motives. These statements are little different from ones that I and other Ambassadors have made on many occasions without any public reaction whatsoever from Soviets. Had this story not been seized upon by them, it wld have, and in fact already had, passed practically unnoticed in world opinion. On question of where real motivation this attack must be sought, suggest following reflections:

a. There is good reason to suppose, and some evidence to support supposition, that my acceptance as Ambassador was originally strongly controversial question within Soviet hierarchy, and was finally carried through over opposition of certain powerful elements.

b. It is plain that some elements in hierarchy, probably police, have never forgiven me for humiliation they suffered on V–E Day 1945 when US Embassy, of which I was then in charge, became subject of fourteen hour uninterrupted enthusiastic popular demonstration which police proved powerless to disperse. This is reflected in raking out Parker’s familiar story in present attack.⁵

c. Incident which occurred in June, in which I was approached by obvious provocateur, made it evident that even at that early date certain circles had not reconciled themselves to my presence in Moscow, and were resorting to characteristic means in attempting to compromise me.⁶

d. Soviets are resentful of what they feel to have been vigorous reaction on my part to anti-American propaganda campaign.

e. They resent position I occupy in Moscow diplomatic corps and extent to which other chiefs of mission look to me for guidance and interpretation.

f. In general, they are uncomfortable about having in their minds anyone with long background and experience in Soviet affairs whose memories and acquaintances go back farther than it is wise for even Soviet memories and acquaintances to go.

g. Most important, I am reasonably confident, on basis of series of clues and indications, that my presence in Moscow was unwelcome in some quarters precisely for the reason that my position was known to be relatively moderate and conciliatory one, against which political line now being followed by Soviet regime wld in long run prove not effective, and this was regarded with alarm by elements now dominant in party, who had committed themselves extensively to this line. These people want me out of Moscow because they feel that if time shld come when I wld have occasion to talk to Stalin the results of such discussions wld not only prove disrupting to policies they have been urging, but wld also reveal extent to which they have consistently misinformed him about outside world over course of several years. In other words, I am unfortunately convinced, and I think other observers in Moscow wld bear me out in this, that my presence in Moscow has been all along a domestic issue within Soviet hierarchy and has recently been placing strain on present policy lines which dominant group is unwilling to tolerate further.

4. I naturally regret that this has happened and feel in some measure to blame for having perhaps provided Soviet leaders with handle more convenient than they wld otherwise have had to make my position there impossible; but feel that against this background, emergence of some such story and attack wld probably have been only matter of time. Actually, pretext seized on by them was extremely thin one, for statements they cite against me will be recognized by everyone in Moscow, including Soviet citizens, as notoriously and grimly true. Present really fantastic regime of isolation of resident foreigners has evidently been encountering palpable objection and resistance from some internal Soviet circles as well as from foreigners themselves and I suspect its sponsors are under some strain to maintain it. They may well recognize me as focal point for this strain, and feel that if I remain there I will continue to increase their discomfort on this point.

5. In light this attack, I think I shld certainly not return to Moscow at this time but shld be ordered back, on completion of my present series of consultations in W Europe, for purposes of consultation with Dept. My absence cld then be prolonged as long as might be deemed desirable. This wld not be in any way unusual from Moscow end, since many chiefs of mission there spend extended periods away from their posts and not more than half of chiefs of mission are normally in residence at any one time. I see no reason for haste about any of this. Emb is in reasonably good shape and can be ably handled by officers now assigned there. My presence there is not required for any purpose of liaison with Sov Govt. Formal retention of my status as Amb will render unnecessary any further decisions for time being about filling post. Remaining questions can be discussed in Wash after smoke has cleared away.

6. If I am not to return on Oct 7, it will be necessary for me to have my family also leave Moscow temporarily as problems of occupying space in present circumstances are too much for them to handle over longer period without my help. Their departure will cause some press comment, but I think we can easily ride it out by saying their future plans will depend on my own. Whether I shld go back and fetch them or whether I had better not return at all even for short visit is something on which my mind is open and I wld appreciate Dept’s views.

7. My own immediate plans call for me to proceed Sunday⁷ to Bonn for consultations with Donnelly and others on Berlin; Tuesday and Wednesday in Paris for consultation with Bohlen and Ridgway; latter part of next week in Geneva, where I had planned to meet Thompson to discuss Austrian situation, after which I had expected to make return journey to Moscow, Oct 6 and 7. Unless Dept desires it otherwise, I shall proceed with these plans up to and including Geneva. As to plans for return to Moscow, I shall await Dept’s instructions.

8. Separate message fols on press coverage.⁸

Kennan

1. Transmitted via the facilities of the Embassy in the United Kingdom; repeated for information to Moscow. Ambassador Kennan was in London for the Chiefs of Mission meeting.

2. Pravda, on Sept. 26, carried an article which was highly critical of Ambassador Kennan. The text of the article was transmitted in telegram 566, Sept. 26, repeated to London as 77. In telegram 567 from Moscow, Sept. 26, repeated to London as 78, Chargé McSweeney commented as follows:

   “Superfluous for me to comment on long-term significance vis-à-vis Sov West relations publication attack on you today. That it is result highest level decision and probably authorship confirmed by fact the Shapiro stories which remarked that attack on Amb still accredited and active is unprecedented passed Sov censorship in fifteen seconds. This, of course, cld only happen if authoritative specific instrs had been issued in advance.” (123 Kennan, George F.)

   At his press and radio news conference on Sept. 26, Secretary Acheson commented on the Pravda article. The official record of the conference reads as follows:

   “A correspondent informed the Secretary that the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda had devoted a column today to the denunciation of Ambassador Kennan, who was now in London. Then he asked if that had been taken into consideration in his return to Moscow. Mr. Acheson said that the article had been read to him just about five minutes ago. He stated that it seemed to him a wholly unjustified and improper attack on Ambassador Kennan. He went on to say that what Ambassador Kennan had said was a very calm description of what life was like in Moscow, a condition which the Ambassador and all other diplomats deeply regretted.” (Secretary of State—1952, Press Conferences)

   An unedited version of Acheson’s comments were transmitted in telegram 2202 to London, Sept. 26, for Kennan, and repeated to Moscow as 354.

3. For the Ambassador’s personal account of the interview at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1950–1963, pp. 158–159.
4. Presumably a reference to Document 518.
5. Regarding this incident, including the role of the English journalist, Ralph Parker, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, pp. 240–245.
6. Presumably reference is to an incident in July 1952, reported upon in telegram 41 from Moscow, July 6. (761.00/7–652)
7. Sept. 27.
8. Telegram 1781 from London, Sept. 26, concluded that the Secretary of State’s statement (see footnote 2, above) disposed of the need for any further comment on the Pravda article. (123 Kennan, George F.)