Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

760.5/7–1754: Telegram

No. 353
The Chargé in Italy (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Rome, July 17, 1954—2 p.m.

224. Following are important points in separate discussions night with Zoppi, Del Balzo and Casardi.

1. Carried out instructions Deptel 155² emphasizing need get on with Trieste solution in order open greater vistas for Italy in various matters. Expressed deep concern tenor news articles particularly Messaggiero Washington story stating US responsible delay Balkan pact signing in order it could be signed simultaneously with Trieste accord (Embtel 215³). Emphasized no direct connection between two, that US not directly involved Balkan pact which being worked out by three powers and any inference US trying delay pact signing because Italian concern might well convince Tito this true and cause him be more adamant in giving favorable consideration Italian counterproposals re Trieste. Zoppi agreed Washington news story not helpful and would do best counteract impression given.

2. Made it clear Italians should seek information Ankara or Athens rather than Washington. This led Zoppi and others express concern re London big three meeting re pact. I reiterated points Deptel 171⁴ that no six power or other meeting taking place, merely informal big three discussions London. They nevertheless apparently have fairly good idea of extent London big three consultations which they afraid may mean we are working out final text of pact which will being presented NAC on more or less take it or leave it basis. I reiterated that as they know text being worked out by pact partners, that we did not have either full or final text which still being worked on and they should seek information in Ankara and Athens not Washington.

3. All three then indicated as their personal thoughts and added Foreign Office and government had not yet made up mind, that consideration being given to formally asking US if they could not be consulted very confidentially re text of pact.

Explained that in view of somewhat extreme statements made by government in past re veto in NATO or pact which were now regretted, government had to find some formula to get off the hook, i.e., to explain to public why they no longer feel as strongly against pact as they had indicated several weeks ago and thus open road to their eventual adherence. Zoppi reiterated Foreign Office still very anxious Italy join pact but some of government not too enthusiastic basically since do not see how they can condone pact now when in all probability Trieste will not be solved before signing. Again expressing personal ideas, thought would be helpful if later on they could say they had been consulted in strict confidence re pact before finalization and therefore government had changed its attitude. I replied that Italy and all other NATO countries would have opportunity to discuss pact in NAC. They did not think this would be sufficient to explain government change of attitude since they believed NAC would be more or less perfunctory discussion of already agreed text. They pointed out Italy being neighbor Yugoslavia had more stake in pact than other NATO powers and again expressed hope they be consulted more by big three re matter of vital interest to Italy. They added it would be most embarrassing if it should become known that big three consultations were taking place London without others being in on discussions. I again expounded idea that such consultation would take place in NAC. Was then asked on purely personal basis whether US still wanted Italy be member of pact adding they had had impression US had been favorable in past but British somewhat lukewarm. Replied reason we had made so many efforts settle Trieste was to make it possible for Italy and Yugoslavia cooperate more fully in all matters including military and that if Trieste settled Italy would have freer hand in many matters including joining pact. While all believed possibility joining as original member out, they expressed hope that in announcement of pact would be helpful if it could be made quite clear that “here is a chair labelled Italy”. This would help sell idea in Italy where distrust of Tito still persists. Replied I understood provision would be made for other adherents. Did not encourage them believe Italy would be urged join. Since matters discussed in this section were told me in strictest confidence and I was urged most strongly to “keep it to myself” inasmuch as government has not made up mind, would appreciate addressees assuring that this part of report be held as US eyes only.

4. Casardi and Del Balzo quite worried about Communist plans to block Trieste and pact agreements by possible riots and embarrassing parliamentary tactics both aimed primarily to embarrass government on EDC.

5. Re Trieste all were not too worried, they had not expected Yugoslavia to cheer about their counterproposals as Italians had not cheered about Yugoslav proposals. Very pleased to note conciliatory tone of Trieste statement by Yugoslav mouthpiece Drasovic July 15. They promised to do all they could to control press attitude here.

Durbrow

1. Repeated for information to London, Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, and Paris.
2. Telegram 155, July 14, instructed the Embassy in Rome to encourage the Italians to negotiate directly with the Balkan Pact parties for possible association with the Pact so that the United States did not appear to be acting as the agent of the Italian Government. (760.5/7–1454)
3. Not printed. (965.61/7–1654)
4. Not printed. (760.5/7–1554)