Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 33
Memorandum of Discussion at the 151st
Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 25,
19531
eyes only
The following were present at the 151st meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Admiral Fechteler for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special [Page 66] Assistant to the President; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion concerning military requirements for atomic weapons, Project Solarium, the situation in Korea, United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Japan, and the Japanese Treaty islands.]
6. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
The Director of Central Intelligence said he had a number of brief comments on a variety of areas and events:
[Here follows discussion on Egypt, Libya, France, and Korea.]
Germany. Mr. Dulles then briefed the Council on the latest information with regard to the outbreaks in East Berlin and in fifteen other places in the Soviet Zone. His conclusions were that events had demonstrated the total failure of the East German Government and its tactics. This government, he thought, might very well be tossed out presently by the Russians and a more conservative regime installed in its place. Mr. Dulles also stressed the dilemma which confronted the Soviet Government, which, after announcing a soft policy, had encountered so serious an uprising. In any event, said Mr. Dulles, the Soviets had solved the problem of the free elections issue. The Soviets were clearly not in a position to advocate such free elections now, and we were.
. . . . . . .
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular reference to the situation in Egypt, Libya, France, Korea, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
7. United States Policies and Actions …in the Satellite States (NSC Action No. 817; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 24, 1953)2
Referring to the draft in the hands of the members of the Council, Mr. Jackson stated that the PSB had since the last meeting accomplished two tasks: The first was a summary listing of possible actions …which had been sent to the members of the Council. In addition, they had elaborated a more detailed plan3 which had not [Page 67] been circulated. The PSB had approved the summary except that the Deputy Secretary of Defense had been absent. Mr. Jackson said that he did not anticipate disapproval from Defense. Mr. Jackson also stressed the efforts of the PSB to avoid approaching their task in a starry-eyed and unrealistic fashion. Accordingly, they had divided their proposed actions into two phases: One covered actions which could be taken within the next 60 days. The other comprised actions thereafter if the situation developed favorably. Mr. Jackson then began to read the list of actions in the first phase.
When he had concluded, Secretary Dulles stated that he did not feel that the summary contained sufficient emphasis on passive, as opposed to active, resistance. The President expressed agreement with the views of Secretary Dulles.
. . . . . . .
Mr. Jackson then went on to point out the great importance of the free elections slogan which the German workers had now handed to us on a silver platter. He asked whether it would not be useful for the President or the Secretary of State to issue a statement on this point prior to their departure for Bermuda.4
Secretary Dulles expressed interest in this proposal, but warned that it needed to be carefully calculated from the standpoint of Chancellor Adenauer. We don’t want to issue any statement in favor of free elections in Germany which Chancellor Adenauer’s opposition could use to slow up the ratification of EDC, to which Chancellor Adenauer was so thoroughly committed.
As a solution to this problem, the President suggested that it might be possible to quote from Chancellor Adenauer’s own speech in Berlin on the subject, on June 17.
Secretary Dulles then spoke of the proposal to bring up in the UN the brutal Russian repression of the uprisings in East Germany. He pointed out the very great danger involved in the attempt to make the UN a propaganda forum when we could not hope for any concrete results. We castigate the Russians for this kind of behavior in the UN, and we must be careful not to open ourselves to the same charge by raising the repression issue.
While agreeing with the Secretary’s point, the President insisted that careful consideration be given to the question of raising this issue in the UN. Was it a “good issue” in itself, quite apart from [Page 68] the propaganda value which it offered? If is was a good substantive issue, we should certainly not hesitate to raise it.
. . . . . . .
The President then inquired as to what the United States was able to do to assist defectors from the satellites once they had found asylum with us.
Mr. Allen Dulles quickly said that whatever they were doing it was certainly not enough. The treatment of defectors was a major problem, which Mr. Jackson interposed to describe as a “shocking picture”.
The President was obviously concerned by these statements, and inquired whether the Administration ought not to take the problem up both with Congressional leaders and with our allies. Steps should be taken, said the President, to see to it that these defectors found asylum and jobs in various free world countries. Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were all countries which needed people. Would it not be possible to make some deal or treaty with them by which we paid for the transportation of these people from Europe and maintained them in their new homes until such time as they had found jobs and security?
There was then further comment on the inadequacy of provision, either by the UN or the U.S., of support for defectors, it being noted that here were so many different agencies involved in this attempt that not one of them, governmental or private, really felt responsibility for carrying through a reasonable program.
Mr. Stassen, however, pointed out that the Mutual Security Agency was already far advanced on plans for an integrated approach to solving the problem, and awaited only Congressional acceptance of the President’s reorganization plan to put its program into effect.
The National Security Council:
Approved the recommendations of the Psychological Strategy Board contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum, subject to:
- a.
- More emphasis being placed upon passive resistance in implementing paragraph 2–(a).
- b.
- Revision of paragraph 3-(b) to read: “Consider U.S. advocacy of (1) free elections in the satellites and association with the Western European community, with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation, and (2) subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany, Austria and the Satellites.”
Note: The report of the Psychological Strategy Board, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 158.
[Here follows discussion concerning United States actions in the Near East and the strengthening of the Korean economy.]
- Drafted by Gleason on June 26.↩
- For NSC Action No. 817, see footnote 2, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1590. The June 24 memorandum transmitted to the NSC the draft of the summary PSB plan. This draft, revised in accordance with the discussion recorded here, became NSC 158.↩
- Reference is to PSB D–45. (PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D–45 Series)↩
- For documentation on the Bermuda Conference which was planned for June and later rescheduled for Dec. 4–8, 1953, see vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.↩