Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

750G.00/5–2454: Telegram

No. 193
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Belgrade, May 24, 1954—7 p.m.

1252. 1. As I was reading London’s 5289 to Department,² Foreign Secretary requested me to call this afternoon to receive reply our démarche re Balkan entente and Trieste. Reply to démarche in immediately following telegram.³

2. In order dispel any misapprehension should make clear that we have maintained unremitting pressure on Yugoslav Government since the interview Mallet and I had with Foreign Secretary on March 31 (Embtel 1061⁴). This pressure has been applied primarily to territorial questions, aid, autonomy, and more recently on the definitive aspects of Trieste settlement. Belgrade is small capital in which principals in this affair meet frequently and no opportunity has been missed to support Thompson and Department’s instructions to the fullest. If I have contented myself with merely outlining the general line of my argumentation, it is because I am mindful of Department’s admonitions on telegraph expense and to avoid interminably long messages. My interview with Popovic on May 22⁵ was case in point and in this long wrangle I covered in effect every suggestion made by Thompson in London’s 5289. To particularize, I have reproached Bebler for his indiscretions as have the British. I have reminded Yugoslav Government disclosures would make settlement more difficult. I have told Popovic in plain words that Velebit had taken a position earlier which did not correspond to what he said to me. I have reiterated and emphasized our willingness to regard settlement as de facto permanent and cited our declaration of nonsupport. I have told both Bebler and Foreign Secretary that Italian ratification is out of the question. I have reproached Popovic for having given out information on additional economic aid and have wrangled with him on entire aid question for hours at a time. As to our promises on definitive nature of settlement, I can only refer to Department’s most precise instructions to me before London meeting was convoked.⁶ My opinion is that Yugoslav Government does not believe us when we say we have not discussed London negotiations with Italians but I have done my best to convince Foreign Secretary.

3. I fully realize how wearing London negotiations must be but Trieste is a matter which involves deep national feelings not easily overcome. When I recall that negotiations Kehl⁷ consumed over a year with none of the animosities involved in Trieste, I do not become discouraged over the four months devoted to the London negotiations. It seems to me that we are now approaching agreement with Yugoslav Government that so resembles October 8 as to make Italian acceptance at least theoretically possible, although I recognize that some difficult hurdles remain. This is a consummation so devoutly to be desired that no effort will be spared by us to accomplish this end.

4. The argument with Foreign Secretary on May 22 re Trieste negotiations was exhaustive and exhausting. I did not recede one inch from positions that Thompson had taken in London and we fought over every important point with considerable bitterness on his side and firmness on mine. Feeling that perhaps this interview was crucial, I marshalled the entire array of our arguments and perhaps left him with the impression that the negotiations were about to break down. At one point I told him that it was thanks to our foresight and to our generosity that Yugoslavia was not experiencing a food crisis today and I reminded him that such attitude was hardly consistent with his charges of Italian influence on US policy. I cite this merely as examples of what has gone on in this long and difficult negotiation.

5. At interview this afternoon Foreign Secretary informed me that Velebit has now been instructed to accept latest formula proposed by US–UK. As I am not entirely certain of exact wording on which Thompson and Harrison have agreed, I was not in position to discuss text. I did, however, ask if this meant that question of Italian ratification had been dropped and Popovic replied in the affirmative. I asked if these latest instructions in his opinion would allow us to conclude London negotiations promptly and he said he thought we were at the end.⁸

Riddleberger

1. Also sent to London and repeated for information to Rome and Trieste.
2. supra.
3. The text of the Yugoslav reply was transmitted in telegram 1253 from Belgrade, May 24. (750G.00/5–2454)
4. Document 179.
5. See footnote 2, supra.
6. No record of these instructions has been found in Department of State files.
7. For documentation concerning the Kehl negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
8. In telegram 5343 from London, May 25, Thompson reported that agreement was reached at a meeting with Velebit that day on all points except the description of the new boundary. (750G.00/5–2554) In telegram 5319 from London, May 25, repeated to Belgrade, Rome, and Trieste, Thompson said that he greatly appreciated the support he had from all concerned and expressed regret that his recent telegrams were open to the interpretation that he was criticizing the handling of matters in Belgrade. He explained that these telegrams were meant to convey his opposition to what he considered unjustified Yugoslav demands and tactics likely to jeopardize the possibility of obtaining final agreement by Italy. (750G.00/5–2554)