Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.0221/9–1653

No. 891
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 3, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you requested in your letter of September16,² I have discussed with the British and French Ambassadors the problem of withdrawal of their forces from Austria. Attached is a copy of a memorandum reporting the conversation.

I will, of course, inform you as soon as responses are received from the two governments but, in the meantime, would appreciate your views as to the appropriate military channels in which the discussion that I requested of the British and French might take place.

It is my suggestion that representatives of our two Departments discuss the situation in which the United States will find itself in Austria should, as I expect, the British and French maintain their decisions to reduce their forces to symbolic strength.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

[Attachment]

Memorandum by Richard B. Freund of the Office of Western European Affairs

top secret

[Washington, October 1, 1953.]

Subject:

• Discussions between the Secretary of State and the British and French Ambassadors in regard to the United Kingdom and French Forces in Austria.³

In accordance with Mr. Cutler’s memorandum to Secretary Dulles of September 21,⁴ containing the views of the President, and Secretary Wilson’s letter of September 16 regarding the withdrawal of French and U.K. forces from Austria, Secretary Dulles discussed the problem with the British and French Ambassadors on September 29. In expressing the concern felt by the United States Government over the unilateral decisions that had been made by the other two Governments, Secretary Dulles

(a) stressed the breach in the principle of prior consultation, not only in this case where it would clearly have been desirable but for the future, pointing out that there are, however, no hard and fast rules in our view with regard to such consultations;

(b) pointed out the exposed position in which the U.S. forces in Austria would be left;

(c) expressed regret that the decisions had been taken without consideration for the effect on SACEUR’s plans; and

(d) asked the two Ambassadors to communicate to their Governments his request that their decisions not be considered definitive until there had been an opportunity for discussion between our respective military representatives.

Neither Ambassador endeavored to argue that prior consultation was not called for, although Sir Roger Makins did say that his Government had, on several occasions, indicated that they were contemplating a reduction of forces in Austria. Ambassador Bonnet merely remarked that the French forces, to be withdrawn from Austria, would be needed to help train cadres in Germany and France as a result of the sending of additional French battalions to Indo-China. Both Ambassadors commented that the forces would remain available to SACEUR, but Secretary Dulles pointed out that SACEUR was entitled to consultation concerning the location of forces which were included in his defense plans.

1. Drafted by Freund on Oct. 1.
2. Document 888.
3. The memorandum of this conversation between Secretary Dulles, British Ambassador Makins, French Ambassador Bonnet, and Bonbright, on which Freund’s memorandum is presumably based, is in Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “September 1953”. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to Paris in telegram 1222 of Sept. 30, repeated to London and Vienna. (763.0221/9–3053)
4. This memorandum briefly noted that President Eisenhower thought the Department of State should take this matter up promptly with the French and British. The President emphasized the importance of the unilaterality of the action and the political and psychological aspects that it entailed. (763.0221/9–2153) A copy of the memorandum printed here was sent to Cutler on Oct. 1 as a response to his memorandum of Sept. 21. (763.0221/9–1653)