PPS flies, lot 64 D 563, “Chronological—1953”
No. 889
Memorandum by Jacob D. Beam of
the Policy Planning Staff to the Acting Director of the Office
of Western European Affairs (Knight)1
Subject:
- Neutralization of Austria
The following are some further thoughts about Austrian neutralization. It is assumed that we would not particularly care whether Austria gave an undertaking not to join any military alliance, as it would probably be prepared to do in order to obtain a treaty, but that we oppose the incorporation of such an undertaking in a state treaty, because it might serve as a precedent for the German peace treaty and prevent a united Germany from joining EDC, as we presume might be Germany’s desire and intent.
It is possible that the Soviet may not insist on a neutralization provision in the Austrian treaty, since from a long-term point of view it would preclude Austria’s joining the satellite bloc, which the Russians may still be hopeful could occur under a communist take-over in Austria as a result of a world depression. It will be recalled that the Russian Foreign Office in its discussions with the Austrian Minister in Moscow merely mentioned that an undertaking by Austria not to engage in military alliances would be helpful but that there were several other things, (unspecified) which Russia would wish the Austrians to do.
We would be on sound ground in resisting a neutralization clause in the Austrian treaty, since the commitment would be undertaken only between Austria and the three great powers and would not cover the neighboring satellites. The neutralization of both Switzerland and Belgium was established by agreements between all the interested powers in Europe. Consequently, Austria’s neutralization by the state treaty alone could be represented as inadequate, although we might naturally be reluctant to propose the association of Austrian satellite neighbors with the treaty in order to cover this point. It is true that the Soviets might be dissatisfied [Page 1902] with a unilateral undertaking by Austria not to enter military alliances since it would only engage the present Austrian Government. On the other hand this might be as much as they wish at this time, since they may desire to leave open the possibility of a future Austrian Government joining the Soviet bloc. Thought might be given to an arrangement whereby Austria, if it so pleases, could give an undertaking, not within the treaty itself, but of a kind having treaty force. This might possibly be accomplished by an understanding that Austria would make a declaration to that effect in connection with its acceptance of UN membership.
The issue might be faced in a different manner. At present we are favoring a neutralization, plus a mutual guarantee, solution with respect to a united Korea. If we consider the conclusion of an Austrian treaty paramount, we might agree to a modest neutralization provision along the lines of the alternative suggested in our present working papers,2 even though this would be inadequate in omitting to cover the satellites. When it came to discussing Germany, we would say quite frankly that Germany’s neutralization neither fits the facts of history nor the realities of the European situation. On balance, however, it is believed we should resist Austria’s neutralization through the state treaty.
- Copies also sent to Moore, Morris, Kidd, and Thurston.↩
- Presumably a reference to the working papers being drafted for the proposed four-power talks at Lugano. See Document 905.↩