Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/8–353: Telegram

No. 880
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State¹

secret

Vienna, August 3, 1953—7 p.m.

296. West HICOMs met this morning with Gruber and Kreisky and subsequently with Raab, Helmer and Graf in addition. Gruber stated Cabinet meeting set for tomorrow to consider Austrian position on reply Soviet note.² Gruber’s thought is that West powers should reply first withdrawing short draft which would enable Austrian reply merely refer that fact. Substantive portion of draft reply which Gruber proposes Raab submit to Cabinet tomorrow is as follows: “The Government of Austria is also convinced that Austrian Parliament will agree to four power decision on Austria in the confidence and on condition that this agreement shall protect both freedom and independence of Austria as well as her economic ability to exist. This is only criterion applied by Government of Austria and entire Austrian people in considering negotiations and decisions of four powers on Austrian question”. To offset failure Austrian Government to renounce its opposition long draft Gruber would include language to effect in view armistice Korea and other developments Austria has reached new evaluation international situation.

At meeting with Raab Austrians specifically requested West powers to withdraw short draft, both Austrian parties arguing that failure to do so would leave us in hopeless propaganda position and make position Austrian Government most difficult. Gruber had earlier gone far to suggest Austria would in such event have to make her position clear.

I expressed concern that meeting of Cabinet before West powers views made known was dangerous procedure and pointed out that despite my conversation with Raab and Helmer on Saturday,³ latter had already publicly come out for withdrawal short draft. Since Cabinet meeting already announced impossible secure cancellation, but Raab undertook that communiqué would be cleared with West powers and suggested that it would merely state Cabinet had considered matter and that details were being worked out. Kreisky suggested Austria wished to give appearance of formulating independent decision while in fact fully coordinating with us.

Announcement Cabinet meeting puts Austrians on spot for early reply and Gruber pressed for decision this week. We stated this clearly impossible but agreed to meet at latest August 13. Necessary fix date since Austrian officials concerned will all be on holiday and obliged return this purpose.

Austrians recognized was matter for West powers to decide what procedure should be proposed for further negotiations whether Foreign Ministers or deputies.

Raab did not again raise question Austrian participation and has apparently dropped idea.

In subsequent meeting with French and British HICOMs both stated they believed no practical alternative to dropping short draft and are so recommending their governments. While PP and Socialists have divergent views on best tactics dealing with Russians both are firmly of opinion short draft should be withdrawn and in event our failure do so I do not believe we could maintain common front with Austrians. Even should we through greatest pressure prevent government from taking this position would be impossible restrain individual officials. Disadvantage allowing Soviets drive this wedge and raising real question in minds Austrians US objectives outweigh, I believe, any weakening our tactical position caused by withdrawal short draft.

While I presented arguments against withdrawal short draft and endeavored keep position open, I did not reveal to Austrians position taken in Deptel 369⁴ out of concern that Austrians might be tempted publicly reveal their position in effort force issue. Strongly urge reconsideration our position.

Thompson

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. Reference to the Soviet note of July 29 which requested that the Austrian Government withdraw its support of the abbreviated treaty. See Document 872.
3. For a record of this meeting on Saturday, Aug. 1, see telegram 282, supra.
4. Telegram 369 recommended that in light of the recent Soviet note of July 29, the United States should try to redirect the subject of the note toward a four-power meeting while not giving the appearance of rebuffing the “limited Soviet overture.” It also reported that the Department of State continued to believe that the formal withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty was undesirable on the grounds that concessions made before the meeting would limit the bargaining position, particularly when the solution of the problem was apparently not dependent on concessions in Austria. (663.001/8–153)