Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 864
Memorandum of Discussion at the 142d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 30, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

April 30, 1953

At the 141st [142d] meeting of the Council, held in the President’s office, the following were present: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

Austrian Treaty (NSC 38/6²)

In the absence of the Secretary of State, who had returned to his office pending the conclusion of the legislative briefing, the President called on General Vandenberg for an exposition of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problem.

General Vandenberg stated that the Joint Chiefs have been consistently concerned in the past with the following main points in regard to an Austrian treaty: (1) Austrian armed forces adequate to maintain internal security upon the withdrawal of occupation forces; (2) Soviet control of German assets in Austria (Article 35, long draft treaty); (3) a Western guaranty of Austrian integrity.

In summary, said General Vandenberg, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have two great fears with regard to the negotiation of an Austrian treaty. First, that the oil facilities in Austria, an important part of the Austrian economy, would fall into Russian hands. Secondly, that if we pull out our occupation forces prior to the time when Austria has security forces ready to take over, the Soviets might succeed in gaining control of the country.

The President inquired as to the character and size of the Austrian security forces.

. . . . . . .

At this point Secretary Dulles joined the meeting, and after the President had summarized General Vandenberg’s statement to him, he asked Secretary Dulles for his views as to the desirability of renegotiating Article 35 which accorded the Soviets power over the Austrian economy, about which the Joint Chiefs were fearful.

Secretary Dulles replied that if you were to enter into this business with the notion of renegotiating Article 35 at this point, you might just as well quit. Neither our British and French allies, nor the Austrians, would go along with such a proposal.

The President interrupted to inquire whether Article 35 did not in its present form give the Russians a stranglehold on the Austrian economy.

Secretary Dulles replied that it certainly did give them control of the Austrian oil fields, but it seemed to him better that they should have such limited control than to allow them, as at present, to control the whole Soviet Zone. If we should insist on scrapping the long draft treaty because of Article 35 and a number of other undesirable features which derived from the fact that the treaty was drafted just after the end of the war, the United States would find itself in an isolated position. Such insistence would completely destroy the impression of American sincerity which the President’s speech of April 16³ had so conspicuously emphasized. On the whole, the advantages of moving ahead with the long draft of the Austrian treaty outweighed the disadvantages. In general, the Defense position in the past had been that they would prefer to see an Austria divided and occupied by both Western and Soviet troops rather than a unified and unoccupied Austria. With this Defense position Secretary Dulles could not agree, and even if we were obliged to accept the long draft with the present Article 35, the Russians would have to give up a good deal in agreeing to it.

General Vandenberg stated the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs lest the Russians use the considerable number of armed guards now stationed at the oil facilities and elsewhere in the Soviet Zone, as the base for creating forces capable of subverting the Austrian Government when our own troops moved out.

The President inquired whether there was any guaranty in the treaty of Austrian neutrality or independence.

Secretary Dulles read the second Article of the treaty in order to reply to the President in the affirmative. Secretary Dulles then went on to say that he personally did not like the long draft treaty. It contained a great many loopholes, but in point of fact we were trapped, since the document had so long been agreed to by the British, French and Austrians. If we now went on to insist on a different treaty. Secretary Dulles repeated that we would find ourselves in isolation.⁴

The President asked whether Secretary Dulles had discussed this treaty with the Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary Dulles replied that he had done so at some length, and felt that its members understood the difficulties.⁵

Mr. Cutler explained that in the discussion of this problem at yesterday’s meeting of the Planning Board, it had been pointed out that the “appeasement” features of the treaty were likely to make it very difficult to sell to the Senate and might occasion serious domestic political problems. He then inquired whether the issue before the Council at the moment was whether or not to call for negotiations on an Austrian treaty, or whether it was to agree to accept the longer treaty as the basis for negotiations. Would it not be possible, inquired Mr. Cutler, to start out with the short treaty?

Secretary Dulles replied that we might very well start with the short treaty, but in very short order we would be confronted with demands that it be dropped and that negotiations be based on the longer draft.

The President observed that once again we find ourselves in one of the straitjackets which we have inherited from the past Administration.

Mr. Stassen then inquired as to the prospects for an adequate defense of Austrian independence after the treaty was signed.

Secretary Dulles replied that what with the provision that the treaty would go into effect ninety days after its signature and that further delays in securing congressional ratification, and so forth, would lengthen the interval to practically nine months, he believed that we would have a considerable time in which to build up the Austrian army. This seemed to him far more important and desirable than that we should stand alone in world opinion against the long treaty and Article 35.

The President expressed agreement with the views of Secretary Dulles, and then inquired as to the possibility of preparing an economic and trade treaty with Austria which would go into effect the moment that the Austrian peace treaty was signed. He believed that this would be very helpful in supporting the Austrian economy and aligning that country with the West.

Secretary Dulles seemed hospitable to this suggestion, and pointed out recent instances, in Hungary in particular, of anxiety among the satellites for stepping up trade with the West. He felt that the pressures we were applying were having a strong effect, and that these pressures might very well snowball with very considerable advantages to ourselves.

The President replied that this was very good news, but that we had better be sure that we were educating Congress on these matters.

Secretary Dulles then suggested a possible action by the Council which was discussed and amended by the President.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted an oral report by General Vandenberg for the Chairman, JCS, of the following points which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be included in the U.S. position on an Austrian treaty:

(1) The commitment of the Austrian Government to immediate post-ratification creation of armed forces numbering 28,000 and acceptance of Western assistance in the formation of these forces.

(2) A concurrent Western guaranty of Austrian integrity.

(3) Renegotiation of Article 35 of the long draft treaty so as to preclude acceptance of any occupation termination arrangement permitting agencies of the USSR to remain in Austria in control of a large segment of Austrian industry.

b. Noted the following views of the Secretary of State with regard to an Austrian treaty:

(1) While he did not like the terms of the long draft treaty, he thought that the United States would be isolated if we should insist on renegotiating this draft because it was desired by the Austrians, the British, and the French. Such an isolated U.S. position would cast serious doubt upon the sincerity of the proposals made by the President in his April 16 address.

(2) On balance, the advantage of ending Soviet occupation of its zone in Austria and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria, outweighed the disadvantages of continued Soviet control of certain segments of Austrian industry as provided in Article 35 of the long draft treaty.

c. Agreed that the Department of State should be authorized to enter into negotiations for an Austrian treaty, if necessary on the basis of the long draft treaty.

d. Noted that the time required to put any treaty which might be negotiated into effect will provide ample opportunity to establish Austrian armed forces reasonably adequate to maintain internal security.

Note: The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

1. Drafted by Gleason.
2. See the editorial Note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 397.
3. See footnote 3, Document 860.
4. On Apr. 28 Bonbright sent a memorandum to Dulles concerning the Austrian Treaty in which he recommended that if the British, French, Austrians, and Soviets all agree to the long treaty draft and the Soviet version of the unagreed articles, the United States would have to go along but need not tell them so in advance. This memorandum bears the notation “Sec saw.” (663.001/4–2853) A second memorandum concerning the treaty was sent to Dulles by Bonbright on Apr. 29 in which he enclosed a memorandum summarizing the outstanding provisions of the draft treaty which were unfavorable to U.S. interests and a résumé of the Defense Department’s position on the Austrian Treaty. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 38 Series)
5. For a record of Dulles’ meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 29, see the memorandum by MacArthur, supra.