663.001/9–2952: Telegram
No. 820
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Embassy in the
United Kingdom1
39. At a mtg with the acting British and French HICOMs and myself this evening Gruber outlined the Aust views on the reply which they felt shld be made to the latest Russian note2 as follows: He felt it shld begin by relating the history of the negots simply and clearly pointing out that the interruption of direct negots on the initial treaty draft was due to the fact that the Russians failed to appear at the conference of deputies in Jan 1952 and that they attempted to justify their absence by raising the question of Trieste [Page 1786] which had no relation to the Aust state treaty. It shld state that the abbreviated treaty was put forward through diplomatic channels as another means of carrying out the Moscow declaration of 1943 and releasing Aust from the onerous and unjust burden of occupation which was the purpose of the negots for a state treaty. The note shld point out that the Russians seemed to be making a sine qua non to the resumption of negots the settlement of the Trieste question which is completely foreign to the state treaty. It is therefore important to know whether the Russians do in fact insist on this condition.3
Foregoing is an agreed statement of the Aust position which was worked out in Gruber’s office after a considerable discussion in which Gruber emphasized the importance of Aust public opinion. He said the Russians had succeeded in confusing the Aust public by making it seem as though the abbreviated treaty was the cause for the breakdown in negots and it was therefore important to make the record clear. He said that while it was very important to make every effort to get the Russians to the conference table he thought it was clear that they were not now prepared seriously to negotiate a treaty.
- Repeated to Paris and Washington. The source text is the copy in Department of State files.↩
- Regarding the Soviet note of Sept. 27, see footnote 2, supra.↩
- According to telegram 1858 from London, Sept. 30, the Foreign Office did not agree with Gruber’s views on posing a direct question to the Soviets inquiring whether they were making the Trieste settlement a sine qua non to the resumption of the Austrian negotiations. The Foreign Office felt that this might imply a possible swap and might increase the difficulties in the Trieste negotiations. (663.001/9–3052)↩