Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/9–1253: Telegram

No. 748
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Berlin, September 11, 1953—7 p.m.

396. From EAD. Based available overt indications both prior and following Federal Republic elections, is not believed there will be in near future any important changes in basic GDR political and economic policy, internal or external, as set forth initially in SED Politburo decisions June 9 and clarified in central committee’s 15th session, July 24–26 (see D–105 August 17²) and more recently in Soviet note August 15 and subsequent agreements concluded between USSR and GDR Governments.³ Re latter, believe phrase contained TASS statement September 4 to effect “if goal should actually be achieved of bringing through agreements of Paris and Bonn and to proceed with their implementation …”⁴ (see paragraph 3 EAD telegram, September 5 sent Bonn 373, repeated Department 328⁵) may be significant. It suggests that not re-election of Adenauer coalition irrespective its voting majority, but full ratification EDC or West agreement on some equally effective alternative is key factor for Soviets; and that until forced deal with such reality, they see no need change basic elements their strategy and tactics as laid down prior September 6 election.

Discounting future Western initiatives, which could naturally have effect on policy in GDR, do not anticipate Soviets will appreciably harden or soften current policy, which we interpret as being aimed enable them proceed at pace of their choosing to develop GDR in manner which will facilitate its incorporation eastern orbit, not irrevocably prevent or appreciably increase difficulties its reunification with Federal Republic beyond point to which such difficulties already exist. Should West obtain ratification EDC, anticipate rapid shift Soviet policy in direction accelerating absorption GDR in Soviet orbit. In other words, believe from that point forward, remainder TASS statement quoted reference telegram means what it says and may have to be taken at face value by West.

Foregoing analysis does not exclude possibility Communists resorting such tactics as outlined EAD D–125 August 25,⁶ which might be interpreted as illustrative of soft policy, but which in effect are simply tactics calculated affect favorably Soviet control unity theme and do not affect basic Soviet policies in GDR.

Lyon

1. Transmitted to Washington in telegram 1010 from Bonn, Sept. 12.
2. Despatch 105 reported that the SED Central Committee, meeting July 24–26, had reaffirmed the New Course policy undertaken by the GDR Government on June 9 (see telegram 1757 from Berlin to Bonn, Document 711) and had sought to identify scapegoats for the June riots. (762B.00/8–1753)
3. For the Soviet note of Aug. 15, see Document 264. The agreements negotiated during the course of a visit to Moscow of a delegation from the German Democratic Republic, Aug. 20–22, were contained in a joint communiqué of Aug. 23 and a protocol of Aug. 22, both of which are printed in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik der Sowjetunion, pp. 345 ff. The agreements consisted of a decision by the Soviet Union to relieve the German Democratic Republic of its reparations burden, to return confiscated industries, to supply economic aid, to grant currency credits, and to reduce sentences for German war prisoners. Reports on the negotiations and their results were contained in telegrams 242, Aug. 21, and 263, Aug. 24, from Moscow, and 265 from Berlin, Aug. 23. (661.62B/8–2153 and /8–2453, and 762B.00/8–2353)
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. Telegram 373 reported the TASS article under reference. (396.1/9–553)
6. Not printed. In despatch 125 Barnes speculated on possible Soviet concessions in the German Democratic Republic designed to demonstrate the sincerity of the New Course. (762B.00/8–2553)