Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/5–2354: Telegram

No. 689
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Paris, May 23, 1954—7 p.m.

4500. Re Embtel 4498.² I talked to Maurice Schumann briefly yesterday afternoon regarding the Saar. He had just finished a long talk with Teitgen. He said that while the negotiations at Strasbourg had marked a real advance, the Strasbourg draft (Coled 251³) could not be considered final. He pointed out two or three problems in the draft. First, in Article 12, paragraph C, the Strasbourg draft provides that German trade with the Saar should not be such as to upset the French balance of payments. Schumann pointed out that it had always been understood that what was not to be upset was the French balance of payments with Germany. Strasbourg draft apparently applies only to over-all French balance of payments which are very large and which naturally could not be materially affected by any amount of German trade with the Saar. Secondly, he had some objections to the wording of the paragraph regarding the powers of the European commissioner who, according to the Strasbourg draft, would have the right to regulate all the clauses of the Saar statute. This he felt gave too much authority to the European commissioner and took away all rights from the Saar Government. He said this language went much further than anything which had previously been proposed. He then pointed out that the guarantee provisions in Article 19 of the Strasbourg draft did not seem to coincide with new Article 1. He indicated that the draft for Article 19 states that the guarantee would cover the European status of the Saar whereas Article 1 says that the European status does not begin until the creation of the EPC. Thus the guarantee would not seem to apply to the first two stages which are the two most important stages in the eyes of the French. Schumann said that he made these observations just to point out why the Strasbourg draft text needed improving. He said that he would speak to me further on Monday or Tuesday when he had had the time really to study the matter closely. He also said that agreement should not be finally reached on the Saar until immediately after the Socialist Party Congress. If agreement was reached sooner and became public he was very afraid that it would not be accepted by the French Cabinet. However, if the Socialist Party Congress took a favorable decision on EDC he felt sure that the present French Cabinet would then accept a Saar settlement and proceed to debate the EDC.

While I pointed out the great importance we attach to a Saar settlement now and that this is the crucial test of French intentions (to which Schumann agreed) I did not express my views on the points he raised.

Study of his remarks and Strasbourg text give rise to following observations:

(1) Paragraph C Article 12. We do not believe this should be a serious substantive point and note that Strasbourg language departs from original Van Naters English text (Article 12 paragraph 3). Hope Schumann will be able obtain German concurrence to clarification this point along lines original Van Naters text. HICOG’s views this point would be appreciated. (In this connection we have just noted error in translation Article 12 paragraph 3 Council of Europe document AS 225⁴ which sets forth Van Naters report as approved April 26. French text speaks of French or German balance of payments whereas English text speaks of French German balance, etc.)

(2) Re powers of European commissioner. While it is again true that Strasbourg text departs from Van Naters language it nevertheless is decidedly better from French point of view than language suggested by Germans earlier (see Dulte 44 to Department repeated Bonn 46⁵). Strasbourg text does not mention “regulation” but uses milder language veille a l’observation et a l’execution of the statute. I am not clear how serious the point is, but will urge Schumann to accept this language as a concession.

(3) Article 19. This appears on the surface to be a case of poor drafting. I would assume that it was the intention of all concerned at Strasbourg that guarantees would apply to all three stages as outlined in new paragraph 1, and not just to stage 3. If in fact this is the case there should be no problem in making necessary technical changes to clarify the language. For instance if guarantee read to cover “the provisions of this agreement” all would be solved. This problem can only become serious if in fact Germans intended guarantees only to apply to stage 3. Then it would be most serious as it would strike at roots of French insistence that settlement be definitive. HICOG’s comments requested on this point.

Copy this message being given Jebb who has had similar conversation with Schumann and is I believe generally in agreement, but who may be commenting separately.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, Strasbourg, and Geneva.
2. Telegram 4498 reported that the timing of the release of the agreement on the Saar was dependent on the political situation in France and until the French Socialist Party Congress on May 31 was held, the Quai d’Orsay would have to continue to deny that an agreement had been reached. (762.022/5–2254)
3. Coled 251 transmitted the French text of the Strasbourg draft. (762.022/5–2154) For the English text of the draft, see Coled 249, supra.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Document 680.