740.5/11–2553: Telegram
No. 659
The United States High Commissioner for
Germany (Conant)
to the Department of State
niact
1780. Eyes only for Secretary from Conant. I delivered your letter dated November 201 to Chancellor this afternoon at 4:30, explaining [Page 1479] before he read it general nature of communication and underlining anxiety of my government as to situation and of critical hour in which we lived. I had delayed presenting letter until last moment before his departure for Hague in hopes Paris situation would be clarified. At this hour it is not and our conversation turned at once on meeting tomorrow at Hague. Chancellor expressed view that he was of two minds—he was uncertain whether to go or not and expressed his suspicion that Bidault had on purpose drunk to excess so as to postpone whole debate and thus avoid appearing at Hague but be able to appear at Bermuda. He pursued same line further which he has been using recently about France, saying there was little use of getting further on with discussions with a man who would not be in power later, and raising other defeatist objections. At this point I quoted Bruce to effect that an agreement, if it could be reached between Chancellor and Bidault, would be of greatest importance even if Bidault played no further role in French affairs, for if such an agreement were reached and outlines put down in writing, fact that such an agreement had been found between Chancellor and a French Foreign Minister would have great effect on any subsequent government. It would not be necessary to publish the agreement but only a public statement that one had been reached.
Chancellor replied that he could not do this without consulting his Cabinet and leaders of Bundestag. I replied I saw no reason why he could not make an announcement of such an agreement, which from his personal point of view was satisfactory without committing his Cabinet and Bundestag leaders, saying question of getting it adopted would come later. He did not dissent too much from this proposal.
Specifically I said that if he would agree to go to Hague and stay through Saturday, I would recommend to my government in Washington that they do all in their power to see to it that Bidault came to Hague and would stay long enough to have a thorough talk with Chancellor on Saar problems. I am now making this as an urgent recommendation. Chancellor seemed to warm up to this proposal and became more cooperative in spirit. Said he would notify Bidault through French High Commissioner that he would be at Hague and be at his disposal on Saturday, but privately assured me he would stay until Sunday or Monday, if necessary. He further spoke at end of our conversation of possibility of an agreement or at least outlining the area of disagreement after the Hague conference with Bidault. I believe these next few days are critical in a critical period and if Bidault and Chancellor can be kept together long enough at Hague we will have made one step forward toward [Page 1480] a solution of Saar problem, though a later step may involve necessity of United States/United Kingdom intervention.
As to your letter, Chancellor assured me he agreed completely with your statement as to urgency and of problem and gravity of present moment. He told me he had spoken to Cabinet in this vein only this morning and they agreed with him. He had proposed to do everything in his power to find a solution to Saar problem and to expedite French ratification of EDC.
It is interesting that he did not challenge your first paragraph. If he had done so, I was prepared to give newspaper clipping of this morning as evidence of discussion in Germany of alternative to EDC.
Chancellor did not discuss with me difficulty some of us suspect here, namely, Chancellor will require two-thirds majority amending constitution and in order to insure that two-thirds majority he may have listened at least to some of the more intransigent elements in Bundestag on this matter of Saar problem. However, I have great confidence in Chancellor as a practical politician and believe he can, with our backing, get almost anything adopted here he personally desires. It is necessary, however, that he be placed in position where he cannot throw blame on French for delays and failure to cooperate on Saar problem.
Hallstein will leave Hague and fly to New York. Chancellor would like very much to have him report to you direct on outcome of Hague talks.2 I would recommend you see him with as little publicity as possible. I would recommend strongly against your seeing Gerstenmaier, chairman of Foreign Office committee, who will be in New York at UN at same time.
I have telegraphed Achilles and Bruce re Chancellor’s plans to go to Hague and be available there for talks with Bidault.
- Supra.↩
- Regarding Hallstein’s conversation with Secretary Dulles on Dec. 1, see footnote 4, infra.↩