Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.0221/8–453: Telegram

No. 580
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bonn, August 4, 1953—6 p.m.

511. Re: Department to Bonn 76, repeated Berlin 18.² We fully agree with policy objectives on Berlin’s relations with Federal Republic and Allies as outlined A–1529 and A–1891³ and ably discussed and argumented in Berlin D–1053.⁴

While agreeing to these objectives, their promotion presents problem of proper tactical handling and timing. In this respect factors to be considered are (1) political and psychological pressure from German and Berlin authorities, (2) possible impact of changes on Allied-West German relations and (3) effect of changes on Franco-German relations. These raise following considerations. Events and developments of most recent past and immediate future have and will distract attention even of most interested Berliners from problem. With expected increase West German pressure to put all or part of contractuals into effect prior to ratification, consideration should be given to what extent some of advocated measures in Berlin might furnish political arguments in Federal Republic. Finally, because of expectation that post election period will be devoted to renewed effort to bring about solution of some major issues of Franco-German relations, e.g., Saar, EDC, we are inclined to subordinate for time being Berlin matters to over-all Franco-German problem, whereby we might have to decide from time to time whether avoiding or applying pressure on French in Berlin may prove to be more effective tactics.

In order to achieve all recommendations of Berlin D–1053 two ways appear to be open;

1. Fundamental review of Berlin’s status and related problems with our Allies which, in order to be at all successful, would have to be initiated on government level.

2. Piecemeal approach to be handled on Kommandatura and high commercial level.

We favor second approach for time being and even there we feel that we should proceed with caution in view of above consideration.

Two aspects of Berlin problem will definitely come before High Commission in immediate future: Application of postal law and constitutional court question. On both we expect to have fight with French but eventually hope to come to agreement. In addition to these problems which will be brought to us we suggest pushing question of revised rules of Kommandatura procedure at least in order to have it referred from Kommandatura to High Commissioner level where it can be either resolved or held as possible bargaining weapon with French on other major issues due to arise this fall. Revised rules of procedure has advantage of being “internal” matter and not as apt to be associated with contractuals as declaration. It would alleviate some red tape in Kommandatura and in Senat-Kommandatura relations. It would not eliminate French veto but would make it politically less feasible. If carried through now might later help argument in favor of a fundamental revision of declaration.

We suggest to leave other problems in abeyance for time being.⁵

Conant

1. Repeated to Berlin.
2. Telegram 76 asked whether HICOG had any comments or recommendations on the fundamental aspects of U.S. policy with respect to Berlin. (762A.0221/6–2253)
3. Documents 574 and 578.
4. This 12-page despatch transmitted some observations on certain problems relating to Berlin’s future political status and enclosed a three-page paper giving the background on the Tripartite Declaration of Intent. (762A.0221/6–2253)
5. On Aug. 12 the Department of State concurred in the piecemeal approach advocated in this telegram, and stated further that the question of the Tripartite Declaration on Berlin was still under consideration although it seemed inadvisable to try to put it into effect at that time. (Airgram CA–706 to Bonn, 762A.0221/8–1253)