Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

103 MSA/5–853: Telegram

No. 577
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Bonn, May 8, 1953—8 p.m.

4868. Pass MSA. Immediate attention of the Secretary and Mr. Stassen. I understand from recent telecon with Washington¹ that no appropriation for Berlin is contemplated for FY 54. Political effects of this decision are in my judgment of even greater importance than the economic effects described in Bonn to Washington Tomus 671² which represents considered judgment HICOG and MSA Mission. Harris and I have carefully reviewed this telegram and fully agree with it. Despite what might be said about undisbursed amounts in the pipeline or the presently unprogrammed amount of DM 111 million, which will be committed before July 1, it is my view that our action will, nevertheless, be interpreted in Berlin and elsewhere as a decline in American interest in Berlin. Aid funds for refugees (which will be much less than Chancellor anticipated and has publicly implied would be received as a result Washington conversations³) will be spent in Federal Republic area and not in Berlin. Continuation of aid to Berlin has never to my knowledge been questioned previously; on contrary, all our public statements (as well as internal projections) have clearly set forth our intention to assist in supporting Berlin’s economy. The most recent expression of our view was the communiqué on the talks with the Chancellor.⁴

In my discussion Bureau Budget and Mr. Ohly in Washington in April,⁵ basic policy of continued MSA aid to Berlin was never challenged, so I had no chance to explore alternatives. If we now have to tell Berlin authorities amount available for programming FY 54 will be so much less than this year the political shock of this substantial reduction may be very serious. You will appreciate we have had no time to prepare the Federal Republic and Berliners for any such drastic reduction; on contrary, we have constantly reassured them of our continued support.

Urgently request NSC reconsider and allow at least equivalent of additional 150 million DM from new appropriation for programming FY 54 and proceed to careful exploration all alternatives for support Berlin industry and alleviation unemployment problems for FY 55.

There is no need to restate the importance of Berlin to the Western World and its bearing upon the future of our policy in Germany. Despite their own remarkable determination Berliners instinctively understand that, cut off as they are, their ability to survive depends on the continued support of the West and particularly of the US. Although unemployment is still 25 percent of labor force, morale has remained high because there has been steady economic progress, hope in the future, and faith that the US will assist the Berliners own efforts to reduce unemployment to a more bearable level. I know of no other case in the West in which unemployment has been of such serious proportions without having given rise to internal disillusionment normally expressed by an increase in Communist strength. The effects of unemployment in Berlin, serious enough in themselves, are compounded by unceasing political pressures. US economic assistance is essential in itself, but, more important, it is the most tangible evidence of our continued support of Berlin and holds out to the Berliners definitive hope in their economic future.

It seems to me contradictory on the one hand to assure our physical position by stockpiling and on the other to risk weakening the Berliners moral strength through the elimination of aid. Moreover, contrast of large sums appropriated for stockpiling (which is not popular or fully appreciated by Germans), as against no aid appropriation, can create impression here that we regard blockade as imminent and are concentrating on making provision therefor, instead of provision for normal economic development of Berlin. (This is not to imply my opposition to stockpiling program.)

I fully appreciate the problems you are facing budgetary-wise, but I hope you will agree that we must find some way to appropriate a sum which, even though it may be relatively small, will give evidence of the continuation of our economic support for Berlin.⁶

Conant

1. Not further identified.
2. Supra.
3. Regarding Chancellor Adenauer’s visit to the United States in April, see Documents 177 ff.
4. Document 185.
5. No record of this discussion has been found in Department of State files.
6. On May 11 Secretary Dulles replied that at his urging the NSC had added $50 million for industrial stockpiling to $15 million for refugees in the allocation for Berlin. He added that since West Germany was in the best shape of the Western Allies, and since drastic cuts were being made in the U.S. defense budget, it was “quite impractical” to get Congressional approval for a contribution to the normal economic development of Berlin which West Germany was able to provide. (Telegram 5156 to Bonn, 103 MSA/5–853)