Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.0221/1–2753: Telegram

No. 566
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Berlin, January 27, 1953—6 p.m.

1209. Since my return to Berlin I have been deeply impressed with what a tight little island Berlin has become. The sealing off of Western sectors from Soviet zone which began in earnest immediately following signing of contractuals has steadily progressed. In September I made a tour along our zonal border. At that time it still would have been easy for any German wishing to do so to walk across. I made a similar tour a few days ago and situation is today quite the reverse. Today there are only eight remaining points where persons may cross from Soviet zone into West Berlin and of these four may be used only by exclave residents and not by residents of Soviet zone (Berlin tel sent Bonn 1128, rptd Dept 1038²). The large number of refugees flocking into West Berlin (which on Jan 26 reached record high of 2,000 in one day) now travel almost entirely via East Berlin since there has as yet been no closing of the border between East Berlin and Soviet zone (although such has been rumored) between East and West sectors within Berlin. In fact Soviets have not yet begun take definite and final steps to split the city physically and hermetically seal it from Soviet zone. I cannot help feeling, however, that difficult though this aim may be to achieve, from Soviet point of view it must be accomplished. To a certain extent Soviets have already split Berlin by such measures as sporadic confiscation of goods, money and cars of West Berliners who enter Soviet sector. These acts are as effective as road blocks in keeping ordinary West Berliner out of East Berlin. As long, however, as Soviet zone and Soviet sector residents can enter West Berlin without too great difficulties, split in city not complete and Soviets are deterred from accomplishing their ultimate purpose in East Germany, namely complete subjugation of population.

I shall cite but one of numerous examples: During week-ends school children from Potsdam travel regularly to West Berlin in order attend movies. Obviously they return knowing that much they are taught in “workers paradise” is false. It seems to me only matter of time until Soviets are forced find some means of preventing such occurrences.

When acting US High Commissioner Reber talked with General Chuikov, Chief of SCC in Germany, Jan 16,³ latter stated in no uncertain terms that Allied traffic on Autobahn between Berlin and West Germany would not be interfered with. While I am not one to place reliance in such assertions by Soviet official, no matter how highly he may be placed, such a statement inevitably tends to substantiate feeling we have here that Soviets do not desire reimpose complete blockade in near future. Naturally it would not be prudent to rule out such a possibility completely. Situation in East Germany may become so desperate that Soviets may be forced divert attention therefrom by dramatic act such as blockade. Also we should not forget that in completely sealing West Berlin from Soviet zone, Soviets have placed themselves in a better position to render a blockade more effective. During last blockade considerable quantities of food continued to flow into Berlin from Soviet zone. Due to sealing of borders this would not be case in future. Moreover, I feel there is always possibility Soviets may decide on Berlin blockade in order to use this as counter in any international bargaining which they may undertake in future, for example in Korea. Nonetheless on whole I consider possibility of blockade in near future unlikely and I feel most emphatically possibility should in no way deter us from proceeding with plans to build up Berlin economically.

By above I do not desire give impression Soviets have no new difficulties in store for us. Acts of terror, measures of isolation, and constant harassment must be expected. In addition, from here it would seem we must begin to plan for increasing turnover of sovereignty to GDR Government by Soviets. I anticipate more and more attempts to force us into position of being dependent on goodwill of East Germans for our position in Berlin rather than quadripartite agreements. Ratification contractuals with resulting increase of sovereignty for FedRep will serve handy excuse for such moves. I believe we must begin plan how we will react to such efforts to undermine our position West Berlin.

In summary last three months have seen considerable tightening of West Berlin island; while total blockade does not appear imminent we must expect constant Soviet pressure to undermine our position West Berlin. Obviously we must be on alert for such pressures and rally our Allies to counter them.

Lyon

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Heidelberg, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Telegram 1128 reported that two more crossing points between the Soviet Zone and the Western Sectors of Berlin had been closed on Jan. 11. (762.0221/1–1253)
3. Regarding Reber’s meeting with Chuikov on Jan. 16, see telegram 1057, supra.