662A.00/5–852
No. 534
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of the
Army (Bendetsen) to the Secretary
of Defense (Lovett)1
Subject:
- Berlin
During our conference at Bonn, Germany, the afternoon of 8 May, 1952,2 with Mr. McCloy, he stated his deep concern regarding Berlin. There are firm indications that the Soviets are planning a number of moves and related demonstrations to terrorize the West Germans and embarrass the Allies in order to prevent either the signature of, or if signed, the ratification of the EDC Treaty and the contractual relations with Germany. Some of these moves and demonstrations have already occurred. For example: the attack upon the Air France Aircraft. Intelligence reports reaching McCloy apparently establish clearly others in the offing. Among these is the strong likelihood that the Soviets will destroy the bridge at Essen. This bridge is one of the connecting links in our line of communication for the support of Berlin. If it is sabotaged, we would have no means of supporting Berlin over the established line of communication now in use.
Mr. McCloy, with the strong concurrence of Frank Nash, requested me to lay this problem before you as a matter of extreme urgency. McCloy feels that the U.S. must develop and issue to him, and to the Joint Commander, immediate instructions as to the courses of action to be taken. McCloy feels that the Soviet would refuse a request from the Allies to provide us with an alternate routing through the Soviet Zone. They would merely say, in effect, “So Sorry”. It is McCloy’s feeling that the United States must accordingly be prepared either immediately to send a column through the Soviet Zone on an alternate routing without hesitation, or resort to the resumption of an air lift operation. As to the first point he feels [Page 1240] that any delay, however brief, after the sabotage of the Essen Bridge or some similar vital link, would be fatal if the first alternative were to be employed. As to the second alternative, the consensus of the meeting was that new problems have arisen which would make an airlift most difficult. Those mentioned were these:
- a.
- That it would no longer be practicable to operate through the night. Soviet restrictions and other developments affecting the employment of the Air Corridor to Berlin would apparently limit the operation to daylight;
- b.
- The economy of Berlin has so expanded since Airlift days that the requirements have risen sharply. I have no measurement or data on the influence of this factor;
- c.
- That air logistics support for the Far East Command would not, if maintained, give us the capability of providing again an airlift to the level previously established.
At the request of Mr. McCloy and the concurrence of Mr. Nash, a copy of this memorandum is being handed to the head of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State. Other copies are being distributed as below indicated.