Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662 001/4–1252: Telegram

No. 85
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

secret

Bonn, April 12, 1952—2 p.m.

2368. From McCloy. Although Chancellor had proposed mtg yesterday with HICOMers for prelim exchange of views on Sov note,¹ François-Poncet’s instrs precluded his attendance. In place of mtg desired by Chancellor it was then decided that Kirkpatrick as chairman shld call on him to receive a prelim expression of FedRep’s views. Kirkpatrick has given us the fol memo of his conversation:

Verbatim text: “The Chancellor thought that the note, which he did not regard as very clever, was aimed primarily at Ger public opinion. It showed that the Sov Govt, after careful thought, had decided in no essential way to modify their previous proposals. But it wld obvious require the most careful exam, and, as it was not addressed to the Fed Govt, they certainly had no intention of [giving?] any opinion about it in public at this stage.

The Chancellor then gave his own prelim views on the treatment of the note. From the point of view of Ger public opinion, it wld be well to emphasize at the outset the intention of the West Powers to promote the reunification of Ger in freedom. Equally important, the West Powers must state that they are fully prepared to hold a Four-Power Conf, but that experience (e.g. over Austria and Korea) proved that a conf served little useful purpose when there was no approximation towards previous agrmt on important questions. In the case of Ger, there were at least three such important questions:

(1) The future full sovereignty of Ger with the right to conclude any alliances she pleased.

(2) Ger’s defense forces.

(3) Ger’s frontiers.

The Sov note did not help on any of these questions, about which there shld at least be an approach towards agrmt before a conf cld usefully be held. He advised that the above points shld appear at the beginning of the reply since they were points on which public opinion here was sound.

The question of all-Ger elections and the UN Comm, important though it was, shld from the point of view of Ger public opinion come at the end of the reply. It was essential not to give up all idea of using the UN Comm. UNO wld in the future be of great importance to Ger, as an internatl body she cld turn to in place of the Occupying Powers when the latter surrendered their rights after the conclusion of a treaty. Moreover, it was obvious that Four-Power control over the elections wld be a farce: The opinion of the Three West Powers which, as regards this question, were already known, wld be in clear conflict with that of the Russians. Finally, the Chancellor hoped that, in the West reply, the question of freedom and all-Ger elections on the one hand and of a peace treaty on the other, cld somehow be separated. There was the risk of them getting mixed up.”²

We plan to have mtg with Chancellor immediately fol Easter holiday and will explore matter further with particular ref to question raised in your tel 2518.³

My present feelings are, however, that we shld not lose this occasion to make a strong positive statement reaffirming our policy of West integration including a free unified Ger in it. It cld be said that the aim of such policy is to create a firm basis for peace in Eur and provide a strong def structure which will menace no peace-loving nation and prevent any possible rise of aggressive nationalism, thus giving a surer guarantee than the existence of natl armies. In making such an affirmation, it is important to underline that the freely-elected Ger Govt fully supports this policy as in the best interests of Ger as well as of Eur as a whole.

Emphasis shld also be laid upon conditions for free elections which are essential to the creation of an all-Ger Govt. The absence of any Sov response to the proposals made in respect of these both by the Allies and by the Bundestag shld likewise be noted and importance attached to this omission. Discussion of procedures for investigating pre-election conditions, however, seems premature at this stage.

McCloy

1. Document 82.
2. On Apr. 17 the Embassy in London transmitted a summary of this meeting which had been given to it by the Foreign Office. It is the same in substance as that printed here. (Telegram 4672, 662.001/4–1752)

3. Telegram 2518 asked for McCloy’s best judgment of the effect in Germany of a reply to the Soviet note along the following lines: (1) a strong reaffirmation of the policy of Western integration including Germany, or (2) willingness to have the High Commissioners or their representatives meet to consider preelection conditions assuming that the U.N. Commission would be used. (662.001/4–1052)

   On Apr. 16 McCloy reported that in a further conversation with Adenauer that day the Chancellor had added little to his preliminary views. (Telegram 2392 from Bonn, 662.001/4–1652) For Adenauer’s account of this conversation, see Erinnerungen, pp. 91–93.