Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/3–1552: Telegram

No. 69
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret

Washington, March 15, 1952—1:50 p.m.

4525. 1. Draft reply to Sov note sent you in Deptel 4510, Mar 14, (rptd Paris 5437, Moscow 627, Bonn 2071²) will provide basis for your discussions Mon with Eden and Massigli. Its argumentation is very close to that contained in Brit draft and indeed incorporates all language of para 4 of Brit draft and much of language para 3.³

2. Such differences as exist, other than pure drafting differences, are chiefly of emphasis, rather than substance. We believe that in expressing our desire for a peace treaty, it is important to avoid overemphasis which might be interpreted in any way as acceptance of discussion of treaty now. Our draft stresses prematureness of such discussion now, which we think wld be deceptive and arouse false hopes in Ger and world opinion. This is position Sec took strongly at 1949 CFM.⁴

3. Our draft also tends to emphasize, slightly more than Brit draft, U.N. Commissions purpose and importance of Sov acceptance of it as first essential step.

4. You will note, too, rptd references in our draft to FedRep and Berlin Govts, and to our cooperation and consultation with them. (Brit draft does not mention Berlin in this connection). We believe this is important for Ger consumption.

5. We have devoted good deal of thought to desirability of including references to specific proposals made in past by western side (other than reference to Bundestag electoral law⁵), and sug of favorable Sov action on these as additional sign of sincerity. Finally considered this unwise as possibly tying us too closely to some outmoded proposals. Third and fourth sentences our para 5 designed particularly to give us flexibility on this point by sug we cld still discuss on basis past proposals but leaving us free to move away from them if we wish.

6. Finally we have included reference to Aust Treaty in para 3. We believe this will be helpful reminder in Ger and will strike responsive chord there as evidence by Ger views reported by Bonn’s 1964 Mar 13 (rptd Lon 527, Moscow 75, Paris 626.)⁶ Have so worded para as to stop short of setting Aust settlement as pre-condition. Believe this incidental reference will serve as useful follow up to our notes of Mar 13.

7. Dept considers that Reuter and Berlin Govt as well as Adenauer and FedRep Govt must be fully consulted on note when tripartite agreement reached.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Bohlen, Perkins, and Bonbright. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. Document 67.
3. A copy of this 4-paragraph draft was transmitted to London in telegram 4506, Mar. 14. (662.001/3–1452)
4. For documentation on the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris, May 23–June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 856 ff.
5. See footnote 6, Document 80.
6. Telegram 1964 reported the views of various governmental leaders concerning the Soviet note. Among these were the views of FDP leader Euler who felt the Soviet offer was insincere and that the best way to demonstrate its insincerity would be to insist on free all-German elections and immediate signing of an Austrian Treaty. (662.001/3–1352)