Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram
No. 506
The United States
Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State1
Secto 175. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary’s statement at closing session February 18.2
“As I speak for the last time at this conference, I cannot but record a large measure of regret. We have failed to satisfy the hopes which many throughout the world placed in us. I refer particularly to the peoples of East and West Germany and of Austria.
It seems to me that our failures are not however due to lack of effort, or to inadequacies of detail. Our failures are of a kind which could not have been avoided by mere diplomatic or negotiating skills at this conference. We encountered a fundamental difference between the views of the East and the West.
[Page 1173]This is not the time or the place to discuss philosophies or creeds. It is, however, important to observe that all of our basic differences here have revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed safe, to give man and nations a genuine freedom of choice.
The Western powers were willing to place trust in the German and Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not. Its delegation pointed out that the Germans, if given freedom, might again follow such warlike leadership as was presented by the Kaiser and by Hitler; and that the Austrians, if left alone, might not abide by their solemn engagement to maintain their independence and to avoid absorption by Germany.
The Western powers realize that no one can know with certainty the use to which men and nations will put their freedom. History records abuses of freedom. Doubtless it will do so again. Nevertheless, we are convinced that no social system has ever been invented which is better than that which puts its trust in human freedom, guided by education and by religion.
The Soviet delegation, in multiple ways, has made manifest its fears of freedom and its determination, through its occupation forces and its control of election processes, to try to make certain that freedom cannot be exercised in a way which might be prejudicial to it.
That is why, it seems, the Soviet Foreign Minister found it impossible to agree to the unification of Germany through genuinely free all-German elections, as we proposed, and why he has insisted that Soviet troops must remain indefinitely in Austria.
Our discussion of European security has revealed that the Soviet Union believes that its security depends upon maintaining such a huge preponderance of power that every other country of Europe will in fact be subject to its coercion. The Soviet Union opposes any integration of the Western European countries, or any association with the United States, which would create sufficient defensive strength so that the peoples of Western Europe would in fact feel that they are masters within their own homes and can develop their own distinctive ways of life.
The Atlantic Charter, to which we all subscribed, called for ‘freedom from fear’. Today, unhappily, the dominant note in much of the world is ‘fear of freedom’. It is the conflict between those two concepts which has made it impossible here to achieve any large measure of agreement.
We are confident that the impasse which we reached here will not be permanent. We do not believe that the peoples of Germany and Austria, or for that matter of other neighboring nations, need to bury their hopes. The Soviet leaders will surely come to see that freedom is not so greatly to be feared. It develops in men a basic [Page 1174] respect for the rights of others, a sense of human dignity, a longing for fellowship and community welfare, which are the most solid props of peace.
I am confident that if these basic realities become better understood by the Soviet Union, it will become possible to achieve the free and independent Austria which we promised in 1943, and the unified Germany which, we said in 1945, was a purpose of our occupation.
Despite our conflicts of basic principle, we have made some progress here.
The four of us have reached an agreement, which we hope will be acceptable to the others concerned, which will permit the holding of a Korean political conference.3 The possibility emerges of effecting the unification of Korea, in freedom, as had been promised.
There is also provided the chance, if Communist China wants it, of restoring peace and order in Indochina and thus enabling the three Associated [States] of Indochina to have freedom and enjoy it in security.
We have agreed to pursue the four power search of agreement on reduction of armaments, as recommended by the United Nations.4
We shall pursue means to alleviate the plight of peoples of Germany and of Austria.
In addition to what we have done here, we have learned much. That has a value which is not to be ignored. It makes it less likely that any of us should by inadvertence and miscalculation do what would risk another war.
This does not mean that the Western nations will suspend the doing of what strengthens freedom and makes apparent its glorious potentials. If this conference were to result in a paralysis of freedom, then indeed it would be a tragic failure.
The three Western Ministers, each acting freely for his sovereign and independent nation, have found agreement on every aspect of our work. Thus we have exemplified a society of consent. If, in that spirit, our nations go on with others of like mind, to build the strength of freedom, then we shall win, everywhere, respect. It will be shared by all who look to us for leadership, for we shall be guarding and serving their freedom, with our own.
Let me, in conclusion, say a personal word. I thank each of my three colleagues for the clarity and candor of their participations in this conference, and for the uniform courtesy and consideration which each has shown me.”
- Repeated to New York, London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.↩
- Circulated as FPM(54)83. For a record of the twenty-first (final) plenary, see Secto 176, supra.↩
- For this agreement, see part (a) of the final four-power communiqué, Document 525.↩
- For this agreement, see part (b) of the final four-power communiqué.↩