Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 206
No. 504
United States Delegation Record of
the Sixth Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February
18, 1954, 11 a.m.
- Present: United States
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. Bohlen
- France
- Mr. Bidault
- Mr. Parodi
- Mr. De Margerie
- Mr. Andronikof
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Roberts
- Mr. Birse
- USSR
- Mr. Molotov
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Malik
- Mr. Troyanovski
Mr. Molotov was in the chair.
Mr. Bidault said that, as he stated yesterday, he wished to consult his Government concerning yesterday’s meeting and the paper they had discussed: that is, the United Kingdom resolution as amended by the Soviet Delegation.1 It seemed to the French Government that this was the result of a joint effort to deal with the problems and the French Government found it acceptable as a whole. As to the date, it was only three days before Easter which would be difficult and therefore he would suggest Monday, April 26 instead. He pointed out that the experts would meet to verify the text in all languages since it now existed in only one.
Mr. Molotov said he would like to examine the text and after study inquired whether the last paragraph was really necessary.
The Secretary said from the point of view of the United States it was indispensable.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered this text acceptable. They would like to think over the last paragraph before the plenary session this afternoon but he wished to express the hope that it would not cause any difficulty.
Mr. Eden recalled that at yesterday’s meeting Mr. Molotov had wished to think over the use of the word “representatives.”
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had gained a definite impression which he hoped was not merely subjective but was a reflection of objective reality. He said the Soviet Delegation understood they would meet in Geneva at least for the beginning. He said he felt this was important not so much from the point of view of interest of the Soviet Union but from the point of view of interest of the questions to be discussed. In reply to a question of the Secretary he stated that the date proposed by Mr. Bidault, namely, April 26, was acceptable.
[Page 1164]The Ministers then discussed the problem of inquiring of the Swiss Government whether they would be agreeable to having such a conference and it was decided that the French Delegation should communicate immediately by telephone with their Ambassador in Bern who is Doyen of the Corps there in an endeavor to obtain a reply from the Swiss Government today before this afternoon’s meeting.
Mr. Bidault then raised the question about the manner of sending invitations and proposed that the Soviet Government should transmit the invitation to the Chinese People’s Republic and to the North Korean Government; that the United States should invite the Republic of Korea and all other countries who participated in the war in Korea; and that France and Great Britain would merely invite themselves.
This proposal was accepted.2 The Ministers agreed that nothing would be given to the press on this morning’s meeting and that the agreed text would be tabled this afternoon.
Mr. Molotov again repeated that he hoped there would be no difficulty concerning the last paragraph.
At today’s closed session the Ministers discussed certain matters connected with the close of the conference. Mr. Molotov said that he would like to hear the views of his colleagues concerning the two proposals on Germany put in by the Soviet Delegation yesterday—namely, one on police and the other for the establishment of two committees.3 He said he did this since Mr. Dulles indicated that he would have to leave this evening and that possibly, if they exchanged views now, their experts might have something to work on before the afternoon session.
The Secretary said he was not in a position to express an opinion on these points at the moment. However, one of his advisers was studying it and he doubted that time would permit a decision on these questions; but, as he suggested yesterday, it could be pursued through diplomatic channels or as Mr. Eden stated by the High Commissioners. There were certain aspects of these questions which from our point of view at least would require reference to the Federal Government since some of these points were not within the competence of the High Commissioners.
Mr. Bidault said he was in the same situation and his advisers were working on a procedure as to how to handle these questions. He therefore couldn’t either take any decision on the matter now [Page 1165] or give any indication as to how these questions should be handled in the future.
Mr. Eden said he was also in the same position and that he expected to talk to his High Commissioner this morning. He inquired therefore whether it wouldn’t be best if the present meeting adjourned in order to give them time to consult with their experts before the afternoon session.
The Secretary then raised the question of a communiqué and stated that he thought it should really merely contain the agreements that they reached here, since he felt that to deal with other questions would merely raise the same differences that they had encountered at the conference.
Mr. Bidault agreed with this statement and said that he thought the agreements only should be registered in the final communiqué; that seemed to him more reasonable than attempting to deal with what had not been accomplished at the conference.
Mr. Eden also agreed and thought there was nothing to gain in trying to reproduce their arguments and differences.
Mr. Molotov said he agreed that the communiqué should register the agreements that they had reached and should not include statements of their differences or polemics. The chief part therefore would be the two agreements they reached on Item 1. As to the second point on Germany, if after consultation with their experts the heads of the delegations agreed on something, this should also be in the communiqué. He said each delegation would, of course, have an opportunity to express its views on any of the subjects under discussion at the conference. He was not sure, however, that the people that surrounded them, namely, the Germans, would understand if there was no mention in the final communiqué of the German problem. From the exchange of views on this subject, the Soviet Delegation believed that they might express the general idea which emerged from this exchange without referring to their disagreements. He had in mind a sentence somewhat as follows: “That the Governments of France, the United States, United Kingdom and USSR will continue their efforts for a satisfactory solution of the German question in the interest of strengthening peace and security in Europe.”
The Secretary said he was in general agreement with Mr. Molotov but not in detail. Under Item 1 they had two agreements, on an Asian Conference and on Disarmament, which would be in the communiqué. Under Item 2 they might have some agreement which would be reflected and something in any event might be said that they all recognized they had not discharged their responsibilities towards Germany and that they would continue their efforts to make possible the fulfillment of these responsibilities. He [Page 1166] thought Mr. Molotov’s wording was not acceptable since it seemed to imply a greater measure of common understanding on Germany than in fact existed. He felt it was very important not to create a sense of false illusion that there had been greater agreement here than in fact had taken place. On the third point, Austria, he had not abandoned all hope that the Soviet Union this afternoon would make it possible to conclude a treaty. But, if not, here again we should recognize that our responsibilities to Austria had not been discharged and some reference should be made to our intention to continue our efforts in that direction.
Mr. Bidault said he had no thoughts on the text but was in general agreement with Mr. Dulles. He felt that what they had done here would have more effect than any expression of hope. It would seem therefore wise to limit the communiqué to what has been done and possibly in regard to Germany give some modest but realistic indication of what might be done. He felt that the feelings of the people would be better satisfied by an honest indication of what had been done than by cloudy phrases of hope for the future. He said the German people know full well the extent of their disagreements and he doubted if any general words of hope would be well received.
Mr. Eden said he agreed with Mr. Bidault and suggested that their experts should be asked to give them a draft since in general he felt their views were not too far apart.
Mr. Molotov agreed with Mr. Dulles that we should not create the illusion of more results than had been achieved and also agreed that the formula on Germany would be very limited. He inquired whether they did or did not intend to continue their efforts on this question. He believed this was their intention and it therefore should be reflected in the communiqué. He said it is not enough merely to state that an agreement to hold a conference in Geneva had been reached but the conclusion should be drawn from the present conference which would facilitate the achievement of the desired results not only in Berlin but also in Geneva. As to Austria, the Soviet position is well known and the only point of importance that remains is to fix the period, which should be as short as possible, for which troops should be left in Austria after the conclusion of the treaty. He felt that the other questions presented no great obstacles.4
The Meeting then adjourned.
[Page 1167]- For a report on the fifth restricted session, see the U.S. Delegation record, document 495.↩
- This proposal is printed as an attachment below.↩
- For text of these Soviet proposals, see Secto 159 and FPM(54)75, Documents 498 and 524.↩
- For the final four-power communiqué of the Berlin Conference, see Document 525.↩