Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

No. 465
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

Berlin, February 12, 1954.

Secto 126. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary’s statement, fifteenth session Foreign Ministers’ meeting, February 12:²

We are here today in a meeting which may have historic consequences. From it may come the kind of accomplishment which the whole world has been expecting of this conference; but which after nearly three weeks has not yet been forthcoming.

Some may explain and even excuse our failure to date on the ground that the problems and tasks we have previously undertaken have been vast and complex. Such is not the case today.

In agenda item No. 3—the conclusion of an Austrian state treaty—we have a problem of completely manageable magnitude.

In the occasional moments of mediation which this conference has permitted, I have given thought to the dilemmas which seem to confront our Soviet colleagues. I try to see their problems from their viewpoint, and I admit that they face hard problems.

But no stretch of philosophical speculation can bring me to believe that Austria constitutes a really hard problem. Surely the mighty Soviet empire cannot really fear lest 7 million peace-loving Austrians should have freedom. Nor can I believe that the economy of the 800 million people within the Soviet-dominated bloc depends upon being able to continue to bleed the economy of the small and naturally poor Austrian state. It seems incredible that a Soviet grocer’s bill for some dried peas should have stood in the way of honoring the 1943 signature of the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Moscow declaration of Austria’s independence.

We have just heard the statement of the Austrian Foreign Minister.³

We agree that the Austrian problem does not simply call for eventual solution, it cries aloud for immediate solution, no matter what measurement of politics or economics or humanity or international decency is applied to it. What is asked for is nothing more than what was solemnly promised over 10 years ago—the rights of sovereignty we all insist upon for ourselves. Furthermore, the gap which separates the Austrian Minister’s plea from realization is so small that this treaty could be signed here and now, if all four of us had the will to sign it. I for one do have that will, and I note that each of us has in statements at this conference recognized our obligation to act and act quickly. Mr. Molotov put it well when on January 25, 1954, he said “the interests of strengthening peace in Europe and the need to assure the national rights of the Austrian people demand the earliest re-establishment of a free and independent Austria”.⁴ The call of the Austrian Foreign Minister is a call to action to which we must respond quickly for many reasons.

Austria was the first victim of Hitler’s aggression and if we have, as we say and know we have, a responsibility for re-making the Europe which Hitler so largely destroyed, the liberation of Austria from the bondage of occupation still stands after nine years at the head of the list of actions we should take.

We should also respond quickly because only in that way can we eradicate the sorry record of past negotiations on the Austrian state treaty.

I have no wish at this time to enumerate the long and shabby story of delay, disillusion and lack of candor which has thus far characterized the Soviet negotiations on Austria.

This time there should be a clear-cut end to all of that. Can we sit here as the Foreign Ministers of our four countries solemnly and seriously addressing ourselves to agenda item No. 3 and dare admit that the 374 previous discussions on this one item over a seven-year period have not explored every conceivable nook and cranny of the Austrian state treaty?

We should also respond quickly in recognition of the extraordinary performance of the Austrians themselves. Compare the Austria of today with the Austria that met our eyes in the spring of 1945.

At that time a provisional government struggled in the ruins left by Hitler. The economy—there was no economy. Today the Austrian people pursue their daily lives peacefully and industriously under the protection of their democratic constitution.

Few governments in the world today can present a record of real achievement comparable to that of the Austrian Government installed in 1945 after free elections and twice freely re-elected since then. This Austrian Government has brought the Austrian economy to a state of productivity and stability which it has not enjoyed for decades, despite the syphoning off, for the benefit of Soviet Russia, of the products of East Austria. To be sure foreign aid has helped—and I am proud that much of it has been contributed by the United States—but foreign aid without national will could not have produced the Austria of today.

It can truly be said that the harmony of Austria’s internal and external relations, created in nine years out of the ruins of aggression, is a model of what can be done when there is a will to do it. And yet despite this abundantly apparent demonstration of political maturity, democratic institutions, social peace and economic well-being, the Austrian people remain under the burden of occupation and exploitation. Some sixty thousand foreign troops, over 2/3 of them under Soviet command, garrison Austria. That is practically one soldier for every 100 inhabitants.

We should also respond quickly because of the shameful economic burden which has been imposed upon Austria during the past five years by the delay on the treaty. Since 1949 the Soviet Union has extracted from so-called “German assets” in its zone of Austria at least 200 million dollars in net profits. This is a sum larger than the lump-sum indemnity which in 1949 was set by the Soviet Union as the price for the return to Austria of only some of these assets. This is reason enough for acting on the Austrian Foreign Minister’s request for alleviation of Article 35.

Austria was not an aggressor—Austria is not a defeated enemy.

Austria was a victim of aggression. Austria is, by our own statement in the Moscow declaration of November 1, 1943, a liberated and not an enemy country. As Dr. Figl has said, it is ironical that we have long since concluded treaties with all but one of the European nations which were our enemies.

In a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna in March 1945 the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, said, “The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops, and the liberation of Austria. The Red Army backs the Moscow declaration of the allied powers on the independence of Austria”.

To fulfill the pledge of the Moscow declaration, so eloquently underscored by Marshal Tolbukhin and reinforced by innumerable statements, declarations and resolutions since then, requires pathetically little. That was also true in 1949.

All that lies between the Austria of today and Austria we promised in 1943 is agreement on 5 articles—actually only parts of 5 articles—of the present draft treaty, and consideration of Article 35 in the light of the Austrian Foreign Minister’s statement today.

The American delegation supports Mr. Eden’s proposal listing the few points which need to be settled in order to reach the goal of an Austrian state treaty.⁵ After 374 discussions and ten years of unfilled pledges, I believe my colleagues will agree with me that these and only these steps need to be taken, not other issues are relevant to our task.

Last April President Eisenhower spoke to the world on the subject of world tensions.⁶ At that time he called for deeds, not words, to prove the will to peace, and, in fact, he cited the Austrian state treaty as just such a deed—a deed requiring only the simple will to do it. That deed will shine in a world which has become darkened by fear and disillusionment. If the Soviet Union will join us in doing this deed, the whole world will rejoice in the demonstration that our four nations can indeed cooperate to serve the cause of peace and justice. Out of that beginning, greater things could come.

1. Repeated to New York, Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.
2. For a record of the fifteenth plenary, see Secto 129, supra.
3. For a summary of Figl’s statement, see Secto 129, supra.
4. For a summary of Molotov’s statement on Jan. 25, see Secto 17, Document 355.
5. For Eden’s proposal, see Secto 129, supra.
6. See footnote 2, Document 182.