Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–954: Telegram

No. 447
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret

Berlin, February 9, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 109. Department pass OSD. Following summary of 13th plenary session Ministers meeting, Tuesday, February 9.² Eden in chair.

1. Molotov opened with 91 minute speech essentially repeating points made last week.³ Principal points, in order of presentation, follow.

(a) USSR starts with assumption possible complete treaty this year but start needed immediately since nine years elapsed since end of war and Germans have right know where stand.

(b) But Western three have not put forward a treaty draft or said start should be made immediately; they should instruct their deputies proceed promptly to prepare a draft.

(c) All who took part in war against Germany should participate treaty negotiations.

(d) Representatives of Germany should participate all stages; only practical way to do this, there not now being a unified German government, is have representatives both Federal Republic and GDR participate, as suggested by USSR.

(e) Soviet delegate had made proposals re relieving Germany financial and economic obligations, e.g., reparations, occupation costs, etc.⁴ (there followed long résumé of proposal advanced 12th plenary); but Western delegates ignored or opposed and even Federal Republic showed no apparent interest relieving tax burden its citizens; Dulles’ comments ignored higher rates economic progress in East than in West Germany, and large unemployment Federal Republic.

(f) No merit in Western arguments that representatives of East and West Germany, standing for opposing types of regimes, cannot work together on practical tasks as four powers do around this conference table.

(g) No merit in argument coalition government (at least for temporary and limited functions) impossible.

(h) Fundamental principle Soviet approach is that Germans, not occupying powers, should bring about German unification; hence troop withdrawal proposal.

(i) Soviet draft emphasized Germany should not be free enter military alliance against any power victorious in anti-Hitler war; West rejects this and indeed (by EDC) is trying draw Germany into just such alliance.

(j) Since EDC stated to be not a transitory relationship; since fifty year duration; since peace treaty surely not to be postponed fifty years; and since after peace treaty Federal Republic will cease exist—it follows West intention is to bind unified Germany into EDC for fifty years.

(k) Remilitarized Western Germany within EDC is a threat to Europe’s peace; would restore aggression in heart of Europe; and would indefinitely postpone reunification since GDR cannot embrace a Federal Republic militarized “under Hitler’s generals.”

(l) Tripartite declaration 27 May 1952⁵ (supplement to Paris treaty) makes it clear that Western Germany, if unwilling continue adherence EDC, will be compelled by force of arms. Hence absurd claim Germany free adhere or reject EDC.

(m) Quadripartite objective should be security of all Europe, not just six nations which not even the whole of Western Europe. EDC not a means to European security but an instrument of North Atlantic military bloc pointed at USSR and East.

(n) In conclusion, do Western three have any proposals make re “European security” which in drafting of agenda was linked with German problem?

2. Dulles: Have heard nothing new, have nothing more to say.

3. Bidault: Brief statement re relief Germany from economic, financial obligations:

(a) Tempting but unprofitable extend comparison economic conditions and policies East and West Germany;

(b) Other countries have rights and interests in German reparations; hence this issue not properly discussed or settled here;

(c) Occupation costs will cease when occupation terminated, i.e., when independence and reunification Germany achieved; hence this our primary object.

4. Bidault continued with brief commentary on Molotov’s general statement; expressed regret no Western conciliatory efforts had changed the “unswerving rigour” of Soviet approach. Essence of problem is that there must be a unitary government of Germany to be represented at negotiations of peace treaty; hence there must first have been free elections.

Bidault next said he would answer briefly few of questions raised Molotov’s statement.

(a) Re EDC, Dulles had made statement confirmed by French and UK that united Germany could accept or reject obligations of Federal Republic and GDR. This is decisive; what more can be said?

(b) Molotov requests West do away with EDC. He does not propose to do away with anything.

(c) Molotov suggests that Foreign Ministers deputies pursue task. This foolish since deputies can do nothing where Ministers have failed.

Following summarizes second part of 13th plenary session, February 9:

Eden spoke first after 25 minute recess. He recalled that he had spoken on European security at both first and last plenary meeting and confirmed that offer he made then still stands. He said he regarded as irrelevant Soviet economic proposals for Germany. As regards reparations, UK has never taken any from current production and has taken none at all during last four years. On contrary, UK has furnished economic assistance valued at 200 million pounds to Federal Republic, and latter has freely agreed to repay part of debt. As far as internal occupation costs are concerned, people of West Germany understand very well comparisions between two German budgets on a percentage basis are entirely misleading. Commenting that discussions on German question have been long, if good-tempered, he noted that two views still remain diametrically opposed. Essence of Western proposals is free elections leading to formation of all-German government with which peace treaty can be negotiated. Soviet proposal for cooperation of two German governments, he regarded as impracticable and leading to great delay in bringing about free elections. Since discussion of recent days has not narrowed gap between two views or improved international understanding, he suggested conference face reality by recognizing it cannot now make progress on item two.

Speaking next, Molotov recalled that title of agenda item two is “German Question and Problem of Insuring European Security.” He had attempted today to show connection between German and European security. To be objective, one must admit that EDC does not offer solution to problem of European security as a whole for it relates to plans of only a few European countries. German question is related not only to EDC but also to security of all Europe. Unsuccessful Soviet efforts today to elicit US, UK and French comments on whole question of European security lead one to conclude that conference had not yet faced up to this problem and that Western Powers have nothing to offer on this subject.

Secretary’s reply is reported in separate telegram.⁶

Bidault recalled he already had spoken in detail of French views on European security and had stated Article 7 of Soviet proposal⁷ is unacceptable to France. Not only Germany, but also Eastern Europe, is important factor in question of European security. Since no compromise on subject is evident, Bidault thought meeting Wednesday should be restricted and should continue Monday’s unfinished business. Conference later could return to subject of European security.

Eden said he several times has tried to explain why a Germany linked to EDC is best protection against German militarism. Secretary, he recalled, has spoken of obligations set forth in UN Charter. Eden himself has several times expressed readiness to extend Anglo-Soviet Treaty or to examine other means to assuage Soviet fears for her security. Soviet proposal that Germany should again have national army, however, would repeat a great danger, well recognized by people of both Germany and Western Europe. He therefore, endorsed Bidault’s suggestion of restricted meeting on item one for Wednesday.

Molotov thought it would be premature to break off discussion of item two at this time, for it has not yet been completed. He preferred restricted meeting on item one in next few days. He has concrete proposal on European security which he wishes to present.

After several rounds of statements, conference accepted Eden’s suggestion that meeting on Wednesday be devoted to Molotov’s proposal on European security, restricted meeting on Thursday be devoted to item one, and Friday meeting be devoted to Austria.

Session adjourned at 1855.

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the thirteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/13, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.
3. For Molotov’s speech, circulated as FPM(54)43, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 101–107.
4. For this proposal, see FPM(54)38, Document 515.
5. For the Tripartite Declaration, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 686.
6. Secto 107 from Berlin, Feb. 9. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) In this statement Secretary Dulles reviewed his previous statements on European security, stressed the U.S. belief in the United Nations, and repeated his endorsement of Eden’s views. The full text is printed in Berlin Discussions, pp. 158–159.
7. FPM(54)24, Document 512.