Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215
No. 445
Memorandum by the Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the
Secretary of State1
In my judgment we have reached the point of the Conference where we can reasonably accept that:
- (a)
- the fundamentals of the Soviet policy with respect to Germany and the Far East are unaltered.
- (b)
- Molotov has in all probability shown his full hand on the Five Power Conference and Germany. (He is still incompletely tested on Austria but the combination of the revelation of his position on the major issues and informal conversations indicate that it is improbable we can get at this time from Russia an Austrian State Treaty).
- (c)
- we are entering the period of diminishing returns on the Conference in terms of world public opinion (by Friday night2 I think Molotov must have recognized, as well as we did, that he had placed himself in the worst possible position vis-à-vis not only German, but world opinion on the central question of the reunification of Germany. He must realize, what seems to me obvious, namely, that he cannot hope to gain and may lose by his prolonging the debate on Germany).
On the Five Power Conference, I believe we are in a situation wherein protraction of the discussion will be confusing to American public opinion and conducive to further erosion of Mr. Bidault’s and Mr. Eden’s resolution.
The disarmament issue seems to me simple and one that can be satisfactorily knocked off in a half hour. It poses no real difficulty.
It goes without saying that we should avoid restricted meetings as we would the plague. In the absence of any real possibility of a drawing together of the position of the Soviets and the West, these meetings can produce only a ferment of rumors and a field day for [Page 1006] Soviet propaganda. In this conference our position is so unassailable that we should really try to keep it in a goldfish bowl.
From the foregoing I have reached the conclusion that we should now concentrate on breaking off the conference at the earliest possible moment. Obviously, we must first test the Russians on Austria. Two days of discussion of this agenda item at the most should be sufficient to ascertain whether or not they are so anxious for an agreement on something that they are prepared to conclude an Austrian State Treaty.
I urge that we now invoke the agreement reached in Bermuda on December 7, which was to the effect that after two weeks or so at Berlin the three Western Foreign Ministers would consult as to the utility of continuing the Berlin Conference.
I strongly recommend that at noon today you raise this question with Eden and Bidault.3 If you do not raise it today and reach agreement thereafter among the three of you I think we may well lose a week of everybody’s time. I recommend that you summarize the general position as you see it and express the belief that the three of you should now direct your primary attention to the tactics of disengagement. My impression is that Adenauer is also convinced that the sooner the conference is ended, the better. Insofar as American public opinion is concerned, I see no problem in this regard. I think our aim should be to wind up by the middle of next week unless, by the most improbable chance, we find that the Soviets are seriously interested in concluding the Austrian Treaty.
I do not think we should permit ourselves to be diverted from a clear cut conclusion of the conference by any suggestion that, in the absence of agreeing on major issues, we should seek to find agreement on minor measures of relaxation of East-West tensions in Germany, such as lowering the barriers between East and West Germany. If such a proposal should be made here by Molotov or our Allies, I recommend that you refuse to become involved in the discussion but suggest that the Four High Commissioners in normal course discuss among themselves possible alleviations. I think it even more important that no vestigial elements be left behind at this conference, other than the High Commissioners. I also feel strongly that the Conference should end not on the note of a final break nor on any agreement for a reconvocation of the Four Ministers on any fixed future date. The last note, I believe, should be one which expressed some usefulness in the exchange of views, the recognition under existing circumstances that the positions of the two sides were irreconcilable, and that at some future unannounced [Page 1007] date it might be useful for the Ministers to meet again to again exchange views.
- Copies were also sent to MacArthur, Bowie, Conant, Bruce, and Bohlen. Notations on the source text indicate that Secretary Dulles saw it and that MacArthur and C. D. Jackson agreed with its substance.↩
- Feb. 5.↩
- Regarding the Foreign Ministers noon meeting, see footnote 2, supra.↩