Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–654: Telegram

No. 426
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, February 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 95. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes first part eleventh session February 5:²

Secretary spoke first. Statement reported by separate telegram.³

Bidault then stated⁴ he had studied carefully Soviet proposal⁵ which was devoid any possible practical application as based on idea establishment German provisional government of East and West before elections. Appeared to Bidault that main purpose Soviet delegation keep in force long as possible GDR. Impossible for two diametrically opposed regimes agree on text electoral law. Elections would be postponed indefinitely.

Soviet plan lays down six conditions before holding elections: (1) West must recognize legitimacy GDR; (2) Federal Government must associate itself with GDR; (3) Both governments must agree text electoral law it being understood no safeguards; (4) Federal Government must renounce Paris-Bonn agreements and disassociate itself from West; (5) Reforms must be introduced in West to break power of trusts and junkers; (6) Occupational troops must be withdrawn. All these conditions impossible.

Bidault then referred to militarized German units in East Zone and political and police organizations there. It is fact Soviets could easily send back troops if “anti-democratic” forces returned by elections. He then advocated international supervisory commission for elections. He considered Molotov’s proposal for provisional German Government as moving in direction of anarchy, as setting up type of permanent conference, in which GDR would have right of veto and which could say “either accept my concept democracy or I won’t move single step toward unity”. No agreement or compromise this plan possible. Western powers want unity, but unity in freedom. Unity of German people could never be attained from juxtaposition two regimes based on contrary political principles. Free elections must come first. View fundamental differences Eden Molotov Plans question arises whether any possible meeting of minds. Western spirit compromise inspires no counterpart and for moment nothing has happened to encourage patience and hope of West.

Eden then stated⁶ Molotov Plan based on distrust democratic and parliamentary institutions. His plan attempted to deal with problem of Germany divided into two incompatible political systems. Molotov Plan does not take this into consideration thus unworkable as agreement and common action between GDR and Federal Government impossible.

Eden then dwelt on advisability occupation authorities drawing up electoral law, adequate supervision and necessity to guard against Nazis revival. He felt Molotov unwilling run risks free elections which would sweep away regime in East. He did not want elections until he knew results. This not free elections. People decided results. Molotov statement could be summed up one sentence: “Soviet delegation convinced free elections great mistake.”

Eden continued withdrawal occupation forces unacceptable. Only German armed forces in East. None exist in West. West Germany would be denuded, left at mercy East, security of Western Europe destroyed and West Germany undefended. Molotov had referred to collapse democratic institutions in Germany in 30’s, but didn’t mention role German Communist Party. He didn’t mention failure democratic institutions Czechs to prevent Communists seizing power.

Eden concluded Molotov Plan direct conflict Eden Plan on three basic issues: (1) Occupation powers should forego their responsibility for insuring German people enabled freely express their will and decide their fate; (2) Future of Germany decided by provisional government which could not be brought into being and which not representative; (3) Future German Government not free external relations. Molotov Plan wholly unacceptable, negative and unconstructive.

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the eleventh plenary, USDEL PLEN/11, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 96, infra. The plenary began at 3 p.m.
3. Secto 92, Document 428.
4. For Bidault’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)36, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 89–92.
5. FPM(54)33, Document 514.
6. For Eden’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)37, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 92–95.