Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

No. 394
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

Berlin, January 30, 1954.

The attitude and positions taken by Molotov at this conference during the first week I think provided useful and confirmatory indications of certain factors of a general nature which I believe play an important, if not controlling, part in Soviet actions at this conference. In the belief that to set them down might be useful for the planning of our strategy and tactics, I am briefly summarizing them in this memorandum.

1. The first point to bear in mind is that the Soviet Government did not desire a conference at this time but was against its will forced into it as the choice of the lesser evil. They did not desire a conference because I believe they were fully aware of their weakness on the German problem stemming from their inability or unwillingness to risk in any sense the East German Communist regime. On Austria, their position this summer was clearly revealed as a determination not to yield until something had been accomplished on Germany. I will come back to the question of Austria as it is barely possible that with proper strategy here we might be able to force them into giving on the Austrian Treaty.

2. Molotov has given a rather more clear expression to the basic contradiction confronting the Soviet Government at the present time—namely, on one hand, a real desire for some improvement in Soviet international relations stemming from domestic necessity as against an equal determination not to give up any territory acquired as a result of World War II. The very fact of these acquisitions resulting in the extension of Soviet control has severely limited the field of Soviet maneuver at international conferences.

3. As to strategy and tactics, at this meeting Molotov is clearly trying to pose as a European and to this end is visibly trying to avoid direct conflict with the British and French while inviting (i.e. first day’s developments), within limits, a conflict with the U.S. In other words, he would like to have the disputes develop in such a way as to appear that they are between the U.S. and the USSR, with the latter speaking in part at least for the concept of Europe. I believe this factor more than any other has resulted in his failure—unusual for a Soviet diplomat—to stick to certain initial positions, i.e., five-power conference item and disarmament conference proposal. I believe that he temporarily abandoned insistence on these points because he realized to do so would now, as in the past, have solidified the Western Powers against him. I think a clear recognition of the limitations imposed on Molotov by his desire to avoid conflict with the British and French could be very useful to use in planning our future course of action.

It is very probable that Molotov expects no concrete result of any kind from this conference but, on the other hand, does not desire it to end in a complete breakdown between East and West, or even in total sterility. He would prefer therefore that some indication of future tactics or negotiation should be made evident at this conference and this would appear to be what he had in mind in proposing two future conferences. We can expect to have certain variations on this theme such as an attempt to appoint Deputies etc.

In examining questions of substance before the conference it would appear that only Austria offered any hope of progress. Austria, as distinct from Germany, does not involve the Soviet Government with the abandonment of a Sovietized area; and while certainly up to the present the Soviet position is not to give on Austria, if confronted by the choice of absolutely nothing at this conference with the attendant risk of heightened international tension or doing something about Austria, there may be an outside chance that they would find the latter course less disadvantageous. I am not sanguine on this point, but I think it is worth keeping in mind.

4. As to the Far East, there would seem to be some indications that Molotov is hinting at the possibility of some serious business in regard to Indochina. These indications are still nebulous but there is a consistency about them which would indicate some purpose other than mere propaganda.

The foregoing brief outline is submitted to you in the hope that at some time in the near future it will be possible in a small group to consider what might be called the policy implications in the Soviet position as against the day-to-day tactics and procedures.

Charles E. Bohlen

1. Copies were also sent to Bowie and Bruce.