Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–3054: Telegram

No. 391
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

priority

Berlin, January 30, 1954.

Secto 55. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary Dulles’ statement in sixth plenary session, January 30, on Germany:²

“This second item of our agenda deals with “The German Question” and also “The problem of insuring European security”. History compels us to treat these two matters together. From this very city where we are, still largely in ruins, have been launched two world wars. Two of our four countries, France and the Soviet Union, have suffered land invasion both in World War I and World War II. The United Kingdom was invaded by air. All four of us have twice had to marshall to the full our human and material resources in order to withstand and finally to throw back the tides of German aggression. Surely we have a vital interest to do all that is in our power to make sure that such aggressions should never occur again. Indeed, that concern is shared by the German people themselves who have suffered cruelly from militarism and tyranny from some of their own people.

The sacrifices which have been made during these two world wars have now placed in our hands a large measure of power to influence the future, for better or for worse, and to determine whether the coming years will preface a durable peace or another disastrous war.

Nine years have now elapsed since the German armistice and peace is still unmade. In many ways, that delay is a reproach to us. But there is another side to the matter. The immediate aftermath of a bitter and exhausting war usually finds that reason is submerged by sentiments of hatred and revenge. The instinctive reaction at that time is to turn to repression as a means to future safety. But the lapse of time restores reason to its proper place and now, nine years having passed, we should be able to invoke wisdom and statesmanship to be our guides.

The problem that we face here has two major aspects. First, there is the taks of uniting Germany; and secondly, there is the task of insuring that united Germany shall be a peaceful Germany. I shall first speak of the problem of German reunification.

The partition of Germany creates a basic source of instability, and there is little merit in our talking about peace if at the same time we are perpetuating conditions which endanger the peace.

I am firmly convinced that a free and united Germany is essential to stable peace in Europe and that it is in the interest of all four nations which are represented here around this table.

How did it come to pass that there is this disunity—this disunity of Germany which is, as I say, a danger to peace? We here are not free from responsibility in that respect, because it is the disagreement of our four nations which has created the present division of Germany. It is the disagreement of our four nations which perpetuates the present division of Germany; and, it is only we who can end this division of Germany. As I pointed out in some earlier remarks that I made, that fact—the fact that we four have a unique responsibility in Germany—should make this German problem a central theme of our work here. It can be the test as to whether or not we are really qualified to work together for peace.

There exists this partition of Germany which is a threat to the peace if it is in our power to end it. All that is needed to end it is that we should have the will to end it. If we do not have that will, then I say we may be peace-loving nations, but we are not peace-seeking nations. Mr. Eden yesterday submitted a precise and a detailed plan³ to achieve the unification and freedom of Germany by an orderly series of actions that would start with free elections. It seems to us that this British proposal is clear, is reasonable and is well designed to achieve at the earliest practical moment a full German settlement, including a German peace treaty.

I have no doubt that our discussions here around the table, as we debate this intricate matter, may suggest the desirability of some modifications in detail of the plan which Mr. Eden has submitted and perhaps some clarifications. Certainly, I think we must all have an open mind on that, and I certainly have an open mind. But I do say that in general, I endorse the proposal that has been submitted on behalf of the United Kingdom and associate myself with it.

There are one or two observations which I would make particularly suggested by some remarks that have been made by Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov has, for example, suggested that the proposal of the United Kingdom would be in essence an attempt on the part of the four occupying powers to impose unification upon Germany rather than letting the Germans work out their own affairs. As I read Mr. Eden’s project, it would be just the contrary.

Under his proposal, the essential steps in the entire unification process, including their timing, are left up to the freely-elected representatives of the German people. Who is it under this plan who will draft the new constitution? It will be the freely-elected German national assembly. Who will set up a provisional all-German authority and later on the all-German government? The all-German national assembly. Who decides when powers shall be transferred from the existing regimes in Eastern and Western Germany to the all-German government, and what international rights and obligations it shall assume? Again, the national assembly and the all-German government. As I read the plan, the entire emphasis seems to be on enabling freely elected German authorities to make the crucial decisions all along the road to a final German settlement. That observation brings me to comment on another point upon which Mr. Molotov has commented, namely, this problem of free elections. Any proper plan for German reunification must provide adequate safeguards of election freedoms. This, it seems, is covered by the proposal that we are considering. Conditions of genuine freedom must exist not only on election day itself, but for a reasonable period of time before the votes are cast, and also after the elections, in order to insure that there shall be no reprisals, and that everyone may safely vote his convictions.

To take care of this latter point, the United Kingdom plan would maintain the supervisory machinery in operation until the all-German government assumes full control and is able to assure democratic freedoms throughout Germany in accordance with its constitution.

We can be sure that the fifty million inhabitants of Western Germany are willing and anxious to cooperate to insure such free elections. The same can be said for my government and also, I believe, for the French and British Governments. The eighteen million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone deserve the same kind of assurances, and I trust that my Soviet colleague will agree to the importance of providing those assurances.

Mr. Molotov has made some observations about the pending proposal, which seem to me to imply a lack of full understanding of that proposal, or possibly, I might suggest, the need of further clarification of the proposal. I will not attempt to go into those matters myself, because I am confident that Mr. Eden, who submitted the plan, will himself deal with these matters. But as I read the plan, it is not subject to the type of objections which Mr. Molotov has indicated, and I hope that, on the basis of further clarifications, he would find that the plan itself, at least in its broad outlines, is reasonable and one that we could proceed to adopt as providing a way of bringing an end to this dangerous condition of the continued partition of Germany. Let me turn to what I referred to as the second aspect of this problem, that is the problem of security. We want Germany united, but we also want to be sure that a united Germany will be a peaceful Germany. As I have said, the elapsed time since the armistice should enable us now calmly—and I hope wisely—to consider how best to achieve this indispensable result.

On this point, history has much to teach us. It teaches us that a stable peace cannot be achieved by some countries imposing upon other countries discriminatory restrictions. These methods fail by their very nature. They fail because they present a direct challenge to the spirit of nationalism, and themselves. They provoke efforts to demonstrate sovereign equality. The very provisions which are designed to create controls, in themselves breed international lawlessness and violence. The tragic failures of the past should warn us not to resort here to the methods that have so often been tried and as often failed. If we do not want a revival of German militarism and excesses of nationalism, we must ourselves admit the natural and proper desire of the German people to be equals in the family of nations. We must enable them to contribute to a system of security, which, threatening none, defends all.

Our problem consists, most of all, in finding a worthy outlet for the great energy and the vitality of the German people. Whether we like it or not, that vitality is a fact. It is a fact that cannot be forcibly repressed for long, and it is a fact which need not destroy the welfare of all of Europe, but which can be brought to serve that welfare.

The essential thing is to find a way in which the energies of all of the European countries which form a natural community will be pooled in common constructive tasks rather than perverted to struggles by one to dominate the other. That vision is already being translated into reality. Under the leadership of France, six nations of continental Europe are establishing a community. Already, the Coal and Steel Community exists. The same six countries have signed a treaty to create a defense community, and other aspects of community association are being actively explored.

We have welcomed the steps which the United Kingdom has taken to associate itself with and support this community. The United States also, although not itself a European power, would associate itself durably with the community through the North Atlantic Treaty, which, I recall, is much more than a mere military alliance.

The Soviet Union professes to fear that this community which is being born might be dangerous to it. This community, it is true, will make Europe healthy, more prosperous and in that sense more strong, but that is nothing to fear if at the same time Europe is made more peaceful. That is the purpose and that would be the sure result.

No more will there be national armies to fight each other and to invade others in a quest for national triumphs. There will be only the common army so interlocked so that no single member of the community could in practice commit armed aggression. There would be no more German Army. There would be no German General Staff, and the military service of individual Germans would be closely restricted.

Such a European Army could go into action only in response to great and pressing needs of self-defense. It could not be used without the concurrence of countries which themselves have had bitter experience with German militarism and which could never be a party to its revival.

The West German Republic, representing over two-thirds of the German people, has eagerly turned toward the building of a European community in which its own nationalism would be submerged.

It is indeed a historic moment when the Germans have come to realize the danger to themselves and to all of Europe if their energies are confined to nationalistic channels and if their future success must be measured only in terms of national grandeur.

The German desire to bury the excesses of German nationalism is a desire that cannot be repulsed without grave hazards for the future.

Surely, this is a matter which the four of us ought to be able to consider together with a feeling that we are bound together by the same interests. The United States credits the Soviet Union with a sincere desire to achieve security in Europe. Certainly that is our own desire.

It would be a tragedy if a division between us on this matter created the very insecurity which we all would banish.

My plea is, therefore, that we explore this matter not in any sense as representing opposing sides, but as a group of countries which, with the Germans, seek a single goal—the transforming of Europe from a cockpit of war to a home of abiding peace.”

1. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. For a record of the sixth plenary meeting of the conference, see Secto 56, supra. Secretary Dulles’ statement was circulated as FPM(54)18 in the records of the conference.
3. For the British plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.