Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

No. 389
Memorandum of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 30, 1954, 10:30 a.m.¹

top secret

Berlin, January 30, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

• Participants: UK Delegation
  • Sir Frank Roberts
  • Mr. Denis Allen
• French Delegation
  • M. de Margerie
  • M. Seydoux
  • M. Roux
• U.S. Delegation
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Thurston
  • Mr. McConaughy

Subject: Five-Power Conference Issue

Mr. MacArthur said he would give the group a capsule account of Mr. Dulles’ dinner with Molotov last evening.² Following routine dinner conversation and toasts, Mr. Molotov had engaged Mr. Dulles in an after dinner conversation on the subject of China. Mr. Molotov took the initiative in raising this subject and stayed on it exclusively. It lasted about fifty minutes. Molotov stressed the importance of “recognizing facts” and emphasized “China’s important role in world affairs.” He did not mention Indochina, nor did he raise any European questions for discussion.

It has been arranged for the Secretary and Molotov to meet briefly in the small room of the ACA Building today to discuss procedures relating to talks on the President’s proposal for use of atomic energy.³

Sir Frank Roberts remarked on the contrast in the conversational tactics employed by Molotov at the three dinners for the Western Foreign Ministers. He had talked Indochina with Bidault,⁴ had taken no initiative with British, obliging Eden to raise all the topics of discussion,⁵ and had broached the subject of China with Mr. Dulles. Roberts said that he was having lunch with Malik today.

De Margerie said that at luncheon the other day Vinogradov had mentioned a recent article in a French newspaper written by Pierre de Gaulle in opposition to EDC. Vinogradov had wanted to know if Pierre de Gaulle was considered the spokesman for his illustrious brother, General de Gaulle?

Mr. MacArthur then said that the Secretary had given much thought to the Five-Power Conference question. The Secretary wanted to find some means of taking an initiative on the issue. He had been casting about for some constructive step which might be taken. It has to be remembered that the question of public opinion had to be considered by us, as well as by the French and British. Mr. MacArthur then passed around copies of the top secret memorandum dated January 30.⁶ He asked the British and French representatives to treat this as exceedingly sensitive and hold it very closely. Mr. MacArthur said it should be clearly understood that there was absolutely no water or fat in the proposal. It represented the utmost limit that the Secretary could see in trying to come up with a new and constructive approach. He did not think that it would be possible for us to go any further or to accept much tampering and changing of the fundamental elements contained in this idea.

Mr. MacArthur pointed out that it had something in common with the unagreed French “second position,” but that it called for the inclusion of additional countries. There was provision for extension of the conference to deal with Indochina, with different composition from discussions on Korea. Some people in the United States undoubtedly would not like the proposal. It was tentative at this stage. But the Secretary wanted to get the French and British reactions as soon as they had had time to study the document.

Mr. Allen said after a quick reading that he took the proposal to be a new approach to the problem of convening a Political Conference on Korea, and that neutrals would be excluded from the Conference by the terms of the proposal. Mr. MacArthur confirmed this, and remarked that it seemed necessary to find a formula which would keep India out of the Conference, since the Republic of Korea was inflexibly opposed to the participation of India.

Roberts and de Margerie said that their principals and the advisers would give most careful study to the draft proposal which they found of great interest. They said some of the French had been thinking on somewhat similar lines. They hoped their Ministers would be able to comment soon.

Mr. MacArthur suggested that the three Ministers should get together in the next few days to talk about this and in the meantime it was agreed that the Tripartite Working Group could meet again if this seemed desirable.

A copy of the memorandum is attached.

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared by the United States Delegation

top secret

Berlin, January 30, 1954.

1. We absolutely reject the concept of a Council including Chinese Communists as proposed by Molotov which would deal generally with world problems and in effect constitute permanent world organization replacing United Nations.

2. Where, as in Korea, Chinese Communists are necessarily involved we deal with them without diplomatic recognition.

3. Accordingly we are willing that the Four Foreign Ministers attending this Berlin Conference here should invite Communist China, North Korea, Republic of Korea and other countries which have participated in the Korean War to meet with these four countries to settle the Korean problem at a place and on a date which Four Foreign Ministers here will now fix.

4. Growing out of that Conference, if Red China wants it, could come an end of aggression and the restoration of peace in Indochina. This would, of course, involve an appropriate change in the countries participating.⁷

1. Drafted by McConaughy. For a record of other subjects discussed at the meeting, see BER MIN–7, supra.
2. For records of the dinner with Molotov, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.
3. For a record of the discussion on atomic energy, see Dulte 23, Document 393.
4. For a report on Bidault’s dinner meeting with Molotov, see the memorandum of conversation by Bohlen, Document 361.
5. For a report on Eden’s dinner with Molotov, see Secto 38, Document 371.
6. Printed as an attachment below.
7. The text of this memorandum was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 20, Jan. 30 (396.1 BE/1–3054), together with a summary of the initial British and French reaction to it.