Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

No. 348
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret eyes only

Berlin, January 24, 1954.

1. Malaya. Mr. Eden said the situation there was deteriorating and causing them considerable concern. Open hostilities were diminishing but were being replaced by more subtle methods of infiltration which were more difficult to cope with.

2. Atomic Talks. Mr. Eden indicated he was personally well disposed toward the program I outlined of preparing a plan and then having simultaneous exchange with the Soviet plan. However, before definite committal, he wanted to communicate with London. He indicated that he thought the United Kingdom and Canada should be the only countries to participate with the United States in the work which would precede the drafting of our plan, with the understanding that France and possibly Belgium, South Africa and Australia would be brought in and given an opportunity to see and comment on the plan prior to its actual transmittal to the Soviet Union. He said he thought his government would be prepared promptly to send the necessary experts to Washington.²

3. United Nations Assembly. He expressed the view that we were committed to holding a resumed session of the General Assembly. He thought some assurances in this respect had been given India when they agreed to recess the regular session at the end of December. I asked what he thought the Assembly would do. He thought it would do little except pass a resolution expressing appreciation to India and others for their work in handling the POW’s. I said that I felt that it was probable that they would pass a resolution seeking to impose their ideas regarding a political conference. I said I saw little prospect of great success from a political conference and felt strongly we were not justified in paying a large price to get such a conference. As such a “large price”, I cited agreement to treat the Soviet Union as a neutral and without blame in the Korean affair, and the elevation of India to a leading role in Asia. I said that I felt that a majority of the Assembly which had little responsibility might be willing to try to impose such terms in an effort to get a political conference. This I said might mean an open break with the U.S. on the subject. I said the U.S. had on the whole discharged its responsibilities satisfactorily. We had obtained the Armistice. The prisoners of war desiring to be repatriated had been returned. The prisoners not wanting to be repatriated had been given their choice. President Rhee had not broken the Armistice, and it seemed unlikely that the Communists would do so. We were spending large sums to develop the economy of South Korea, and make it viable. Against this background, others having no comparable responsibility were seeking to impose their views because they thought that it would be “nice” to have a political conference. I hoped that the U.K. would not play that game.

Mr. Eden seemed impressed by this presentation, and indicated that he had not realized that there was any such hazard in the meeting. I said that if he could get assurance that the adjourned General Assembly would limit itself to innocuous action and not attempt to impose its views as to the terms of a political conference, then I thought no harm would be done. He said he would explore the situation and let me know his further views.

4. Middle East. Mr. Eden indicated very considerable interest in the idea of a regional grouping to include Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. He indicated that the Indians were annoyed that U.K. was not trying to oppose this. He expressed a special hope that Iraq could be brought in. I got the impression that he wanted an Arab state in with a view to teaching a lesson to Egypt and making them realize that they were not necessarily the heart of the Middle East defense project. He said he thought matters were moving well in relation to Iran, and that he hoped there could shortly be an oil settlement. He indicated discouragement over the possibility of a Suez agreement with Egypt, although he still talked of such an agreement as a possibility.

5. Soviet Union. Mr. Eden indicated great eagerness to have a bilateral talk with Molotov. He had already suggested this at the afternoon meeting,³ and he renewed this suggestion with strong emphasis. He hoped we would not object. He thought that out of such bilateral talks some positive results might come. The thought was that each of us should entertain Molotov separately. I said I would like to give this further thought. I was fearful that this would give Molotov a good opportunity to sow seeds of dissension—particularly in talks with the French.⁴

1. This conversation took place following dinner at the residence of the British High Commissioner on Jan. 23. A brief summary of the conversation was transmitted to President Eisenhower and Acting Secretary Smith on Jan. 24 in Dulte 3. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)
2. The verbatim text of this paragraph was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 2, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)
3. For a record of the afternoon tripartite meeting, see Secto 12, supra.
4. The verbatim text of this paragraph was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 1, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)