396.1 BE/1–1654: Telegram
No. 337
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to
the Department of State1
2647. As far as France is concerned, we believe West goes to Berlin meeting with more favorable basis than we can recall at four-power meetings in past, of tripartite agreement which is both broad in scope and result of real meeting of minds. Furthermore, Bidault has had long experience in conferences with Russians, is shrewd operator, shares our views as to importance of determining and if necessary exposing real Soviet position and intentions as prelude to action on EDC, and is apparently in personal agreement with practically all of preparatory tripartite work.
We must remember, however, that problem of public opinion with respect to meeting is, in France as elsewhere in western Europe, markedly different from that in United States. Following is our appraisal of prevailing attitude here toward Berlin conference.
- 1.
- For French parliamentary and public opinion, conference will be taking place in atmosphere of “détente”. Fear of Soviet aggression has steadily declined since early 1951, although confidence in Soviet peaceful intentions has not correspondingly increased; but desire for a meeting with Soviets has been strong for some time and interest in news about the conference will be considerable, at least initially. Few Frenchmen expect important results from the Berlin conference, but the testing of Soviet intentions appears to public and parliamentary opinion as an important and not necessarily futile business. There is real hope that with judicious handling, the present “détente” can somehow become accentuated.
- 2.
- Rightly or wrongly, the United States is believed to have very different attitude. Many Frenchmen believe that the United States considers neither that “détente” exists now nor that one is possible in immediately foreseeable future. There is some suspicion, judiciously fostered by Communists and other enemies of European integration, that United States is going to Berlin with purpose of having conference fail because such failure would be favorable to EDC ratification. Important elements of public opinion fear that United States may desire to break off talks at relatively early stage, before testing of Soviet intentions has been really conclusive; and because of considerations in foregoing paragraph, French views of what is conclusive will probably differ from that of other participants and observers.
- 3.
- It need hardly be pointed out that government representing France at Berlin will be neither strong nor united, nor supported [Page 769] by cohesive parliamentary majority. Due to the impending decision regarding EDC, due to rightist policies pursued by the present coalition (which are displeasing, not only to opposition, but also to important elements of the coalition), and due to increasingly clever and unorthodox Communist tactics, the parliamentary situation here is more fluid and confused than it has been for some time; but on the basic need for Western solidarity vis-à-vis Soviets, the coalition is fairly united and still well supported in both houses of Parliament.
- 4.
- As the decision regarding EDC approaches, there is frantic casting-about on the part of certain opponents of treaty, for some alternative means of controlling Germany. Those who believe in bilateral deal with Soviets are distinct minority, however, and most of them are Communists or discredited fellow-travelers. Nevertheless, some are Gaullists represented in government, and one of principal preoccupations of government is to keep the present coalition intact. This concern may give rise to some ambiguities in government’s position, as it has during recent reinvestiture debate, but we do not believe present government would, or could, go any appreciable distance in possible bilateral dealings with Soviets regarding Germany.
- 5.
- Same is not true regarding Indochina, however. No French Government can at present time refuse to listen and give serious attention to any Soviet proposals regarding Indochina, any more than United States Government could refuse to listen and give serious attention to Soviet proposals regarding Korean war when it was still in progress. Even if French Government were not willing to give such attention, public and parliamentary opinion would exert such pressure that refusal to explore a Soviet initiative regarding Indochina could lead to government crisis. Since Laniel government is from our point of view the best possible government (among likely alternatives) to conduct any negotiations regarding Indochina, it may be unwise for us to discourage, or hinder, its representatives in Berlin if bilateral soundings take place between them and Soviets on this subject. We are satisfied, however, that French will not take initiative.
- 6.
- One important point on which Soviet propaganda has made some headway in France recently has been ventilation of Oder-Neisse question by fellow-travelers, on basis of a correct appraisal that Frenchmen in general have little interest in German unity and still less in seeing Germany attempt to regain its lost territories in the East. For this reason, question of security guarantees to Soviets, which has as yet been little discussed in public here, is likely to attract particular attention when it is raised. Soviet blandishments to France, when they are as direct and crude as they were in Pravda editorial in December, are probably counter-productive; but in security guarantee question Soviets have important opportunity for exploiting any possible divergences between Western allies.
- 7.
- There is some relationship between this question and the more basic one whether the United States, unlike France, is perhaps devoted to dynamic policy of anti-Communism looking to eventual destruction of the Soviet system rather than peaceful coexistence [Page 770] and, at best, disintegration from within of totalitarian Communism. Berlin conference can thus furnish important arguments to proponents or opponents of EDC in connection with question whether we view German contribution as entirely defensive in character. The present and likely succeeding French governments will probably continue to accept our moral thesis that we cannot bargain away enslaved peoples in an attempt to bolster our own security; but French opinion will critically analyze our reaction to any proposal of additional assurances to Soviets against future German warlike action.
- Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, Frankfurt, and Rome.↩