Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 LO/10–1653: Telegram

No. 299
The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

London, October 16, 1953—11 p.m.

Secto 10. There follows essentially British proposal for next step in Trieste matter. Secretary reserved until tomorrow expressing desire for careful consideration in Washington. Re manner in which soundings should be made alternate suggestion has been made to that appearing in following text: Three Foreign Ministers would receive Italian and Yugoslav Ambassadors London and Eden would act as spokesman. Fact that del Balzo now in London mentioned by British in support of this method. This first step would merely be intended to sound out Italians and Yugoslavs re five-power conference. The following first text was conceived as a proposal which could subsequently be handed to Italians and Yugoslavs. At this stage, however, the ideas would be set forth, no formal communication would be made and the text would not even be read as such.

Text of possible eventual proposal

• “1. On Oct 8 the governments of the US and of the UK decided on a step which was designed to lead to a solution of the vexed problem of the Free Territory of Trieste, which repeated attempts had failed to solve. They announced their decision to terminate the Allied Military Government in Zone A of the Free Territory, to withdraw their troops and to relinquish the administration of the Zone to the Italian Government. The first steps to give effect to this are proceeding.
• 2. The two governments recognize that there are problems arising out of their decision which require further consideration. They are accordingly prepared to hold discussions with the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia with a view to ensuring that the decision of October 8 is so applied as to bring about lasting peace in the area. In particular the conference should reach decisions re the protection of minorities in both Zones and re arrangements for facilities in the Port of Trieste and free access thereto so as best to serve the interests of neighboring countries.
• 3. The Governments of the US and of the UK have consulted on these matters with the Government of France who have signified their willingness to participate in a conference of the kind envisaged. The three governments accordingly invite the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia to a conference to be held on the ------ at ------.”

The following text was circulated covering procedure and arguments in support of a five-power conference to be used with Italian and Yugoslav Governments:

“Supporting arguments to be used by the Allied representatives in Rome would include the following: (I) The three governments consider that they have a duty attempt, with the Italian and Yugoslav Governments, to settle the question of Trieste, rather than allow it to be discussed in the Security Council at this stage (II) we are maintaining our decision of October 8 (III) we cannot assume that Tito is bluffing. We must, therefore, try to prevent a possible Italo-Yugoslav military clash (IV) our intention is that the settlement should be final. It is, of course, without prejudice to a bilateral settlement which might be arrived at by negotiation.

The Allied representatives in Belgrade should support the case for a conference with the following arguments: (I) The need to withdraw the question from the Security Council (II) we are agreeing to a conference (III) this conference will discuss priorities and port facilities (IV) repeat our intention that the settlement should be final and that we should give no support for further claims by either party. It is, of course, without prejudice to a bilateral settlement which might be arrived at by negotiation.

Procedure

Instructions should be sent tonight to the UK, US and French representatives in Rome and Belgrade to take immediate soundings of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to see whether those governments can be brought to acceptable proposal on the lines suggested. They should explain and advocate orally these views and ideas of the three governments but should not put them forward as a proposal at this stage. After concerting between themselves they should act separately and report back urgently the Yugoslav and Italian reactions. If the Yugoslav and Italian Governments react favorably, then our objective would be make the formal communication not later than Sunday so that it can appear in the communiqué which will be issued that evening in London.”

It was also agreed re paragraph two of proposal stating “…² is so applied as to bring about lasting peace in the area” that this refers to our refusal to countenance use of force by either party in achieving its aims and that this point should be made clear both in Rome and Belgrade. Secretary expressed strong feeling that a forceful presentation would be needed to gain Italian acceptance of proposal but this should be done and we should impress upon Italians that we intend to carry out this operation with their cooperation which is essential to its success; if they hold aloof (while on other hand Yugoslavs should respond favorably) it would be difficult to foresee consequences. Bidault expressed great skepticism of our obtaining favorable answer from either Italians or Yugoslavs but felt we must make the effort, and in any event there must be no doubt about our carrying through decision of October 8.

Eden and Bidault are requesting comments from British and French Ambassadors Rome and Belgrade. Rome and Belgrade pleased do likewise. Secretary desires Department’s views at morning London time.

1. Repeated to Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Belgrade.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.