Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1/12–553

No. 289
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret
official eyes only

Bad Godesberg, December 5, 1953.

Dear Foster: This brief note I trust will reach you before you leave for Paris. I am writing to supplement my cable of last night in which I stated that the Chancellor had changed his mind about the date of the four-power conference.² I further added the suggestion that you and he might meet in Paris on the 12th or 13th of this month. He is going to have an opportunity to see Eden just before or just after that time and I am sure it would be of great help to the Chancellor if you could see him in Paris.³

I found him yesterday looking very worried and in one of his depressed moods. Your conversation with Hallstein and Gerstenmeier had been already transmitted to him by Hallstein and had obviously made a profound effect.⁴ Hallstein told me later that the Chancellor had not slept the night before because he had been so worried. I think the danger of a few weeks ago that he and some of his advisers and colleagues believed that a German-American solution to their problems could be found has now disappeared. Your strong letter⁵ and General Gruenther’s plain talk, I think, have cancelled out the bad effects of some ill-considered statements by traveling Americans during the first days of this Fall. I now find a mood of great anxiety among the leading German politicians that I meet.

I think the Chancellor may originally have desired a postponement of the four-power conference for reasons of domestic German politics. He has to have a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag in order to change the constitution to get around the issue now before the Constitutional Court. At the same time some of the elements in his coalition government have undoubtedly been causing trouble on the Saar question. Therefore, his time table may well have been a constitutional change by the first of February (it apparently will take that long, as the details are subject to considerable debate) and then talks on the Saar in February. The postponement of a four-power conference might have provided a good excuse for this delay. Whether or not I am right about this surmise, he is now completely changed as a result of your arguments transmitted through Professor Hallstein. He is in favor of a four power conference as soon as possible, only hopes it will be brief and conclusive in the sense that it will persuade the French that they must proceed with ratification of EDC. He is worried about the French attitude in this conference and others I have spoken to are worried lest either the conference be long drawn out or that the German problem be “solved” by some deal between the French and the Russians. If the Chancellor shares these worries I am sure a conversation between you and the Chancellor in Paris will remove all his anxiety on this score.

May I venture an opinion on a matter of fundamental policy which will perhaps have been given a new turn in Bermuda before you read these words. Despite the discouragements of the last few weeks, I am more than ever convinced that EDC, as part of European integration, is basic to successful American foreign policy in this part of the world. I believe that there are so many forces working in Europe for European integration that the long range prospects are by no means discouraging. This being the case, one can only hope that public opinion in the United States and in Germany may be kept sufficiently in check to allow us to ride through this difficult period in which, by one method or another, the French are brought to ratification of EDC. Unless instructed otherwise, I shall continue to be an unregenerate optimist about EDC ratification.

I am, of course, at your service to come to Paris, if you desire my presence at any time during your stay.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Jim

1. A notation on the source text indicates that this letter was seen by Secretary Dulles, but that there would be no answer.
2. On Dec. 4 Conant had cabled that Adenauer had changed his mind and was now in favor of a four-power meeting as soon as possible provided it was short. (Telegram 1856 from Bonn, 740.5/12–453)
3. Regarding Dulles’ meeting with Adenauer on Dec. 13 at Paris, see Document 236.
4. Regarding Dulles’ meeting with Hallstein on Dec. 1, see footnote 3, Document 287.
5. Not further identified.