Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.13/11–3053: Telegram

No. 287
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Bonn, November 30, 1953—5 p.m.

1797. For the Secretary from Conant. I called on Chancellor this morning as chairman for month AHC, and inquired for three governments as to his opinion about the Russian note.² Chancellor said important part of note was last paragraph which insisted that Red China be brought in. He also pointed out that note again spoke harshly of EDC and wants European security to be discussed before German problem. He therefore thought answer should take into account order in which topics would be discussed at any possible four-power conference, although he wanted to avoid word agenda. He thought if some such phrase as “the order of procedure” could be used, our answer to note would not be contradictory to our previous notes. Chancellor felt very strongly that it would be dangerous in extreme for Bermuda meeting to agree to meeting of four foreign ministers in too near future and he pointed out that French Government was not in position to make firm commitments on European policy. He felt that for three Allies to meet with Russians before there was another three-power meeting with a French Government, which had been put in power after French presidential elections, would be foolish and might well be disastrous. His whole idea therefore was to write note now which would gain time. To this end he suggested that US might well point out that last paragraph was equivalent of their admitting that meeting with Red China was discussable, point which he understood we had been unwilling to concede in past. It might well be a condition of acceptance of four-power meeting that this matter of five-power conference not be open for discussion at that time. He also felt there was an implied agenda in an earlier paragraph which placed European security before solution of German problem and it should be clearly pointed out that order of procedure, when meeting occurred, would be for German problem to precede discussion of European security.

If French Government would want to take attitude that they were unwilling to have meeting until after new French Government were formed, that would be, of course, another matter on which he did not pass judgment. I asked him particularly whether note, which did not simply and immediately accept invitation, would not arouse hostile opinions here in Germany. He said he did not believe so and he undertook to support publicly in Germany position of note gaining time along the above lines.

On place of meeting, he said that officially as Chancellor he must, of course, agree to Berlin but that personally he had considerable doubts, particularly as it would provide an opportunity for propaganda between East and West sectors. If Berlin were accepted it should be in building of Allied Control Authority (in West Berlin) and in no other spot.³

Conant

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.
2. Document 284.
3. On Dec. 1 Hallstein, who was visiting the United States, met with Secretary Dulles and read him a message from Adenauer expressing the Chancellor’s views regarding the Soviet note. These views, as recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Merchant, were along the lines of those transmitted by Conant in this telegram. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Germany”) For a record of other matters discussed with the Chancellor, see telegram 1798, infra.