Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “October 1954”

No. 255
Memorandum of Discussion Between the Secretary of State and Chancellor Adenauer, October 28, 1954, 11 a.m.

confidential

Washington, undated.

• Others Present
  • United States
    • Mr. Murphy
    • Mr. Conant
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Elbrick
    • Mr. Lyon
    • Mr. Reinstein
  • Federal Republic
    • Professor Hallstein
    • Ambassador Krekeler
    • Mr. von Herwarth
    • Mr. Federer
    • Mr. Pauls
    • Mr. Kilb
  • Interpreters
    • Mr. Weber
    • Mrs. Lejins

The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming the Chancellor. He observed that the conversations which were about to begin would be continued a little later with the President and resumed again the following day.¹

Joint Statement by the President and the Chancellor²

The Secretary suggested that the most important immediate problem was that of the joint communiqué to be issued by the President of the United States and the Chancellor and proposed that the text be reviewed.

A number of changes were made in the draft text which had been prepared by representatives of the Department and the Federal Government.³ The Chancellor remarked that he felt the emphasis of the draft language regarding the latest Soviet note was wrong.⁴ The wording which had been suggested might give the impression that the main objection to the Soviet note was the manner in which it dealt with the question of free elections and that other aspects of the note might be acceptable. He personally felt that the main point of the Soviet note was the proposal with regard to a collective security system for Europe which would include the Soviet Union but exclude the United States. The Chancellor’s first reaction was to suggest that some language should be included with regard to the question of collective security. The Secretary pointed out that, while it would be appropriate for the President and the Chancellor to make comments on the bearing of the note on Germany, the question of collective security arrangements concerned the United Kingdom and France and the President might be reluctant to refer to matters on which other governments might feel that consultation with them was necessary. The Chancellor said he quite agreed with this point and proposed that the problem be dealt with by the deletion of any comment on the substance of the election issue.

German Assets (Section IV of Statement)

In connection with the subject of German assets in the United States, the Chancellor expressed the desire for inclusion of a reference to Dr. Conant’s aide-mémoire of August 8, 1954 in which it had been stated that the United States Government would be willing to engage in exploratory discussions with the Federal Government.⁵ He also asked that the communiqué indicate the conversations on the subject of German assets in the United States would begin between representatives of the two Governments immediately. When the Chancellor suggested omitting certain sentences which included reference to our willingness to explore problem while Germans studied question of American claims, Secretary disagreed pointing out that mention had also been made in the aide-mémoire of comparable problems with regard to unsatisfied American war claims against Germany and that the expression of American willingness to enter into discussions had related to both subjects. The Chancellor said that he understood this point. In agreeing to the language in the communiqué stating that the conversations between representatives of the two Governments would begin soon, the Secretary said that it would be necessary to have additional discussions within the United States Government before intergovernmental conversations could usefully be commenced. The Chancellor indicated he was aware there were differences of opinion on the subject within the United States Government.

The Saar Agreement

The Chancellor referred to the provision of the Saar Agreement⁶ in which the Federal Government and the French Government had agreed to request the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to guarantee the Saar settlement. He said that, according to press reports, the United Kingdom Government had expressed willingness to give such a guarantee. He attached great importance to the issuance of a statement by the United States Government of its willingness to do likewise and expressed the hope that the matter might also be referred to in a communiqué. The Chancellor said that guarantee of the Saar settlement implies many things. It implies that France and the Federal Republic should conduct their affairs in accordance with the Agreement until there is a peace treaty. He said that there was one main point which he had in mind in this connection. In the first conversation which had taken place with the French, the French had proposed that the Saar Agreement should not be subject to criticism within the Saar.⁷ He had agreed that the Federal Republic and France should abstain from criticism of the Agreement, but he could not agree that there should not be such criticism in the Saar.

The Chancellor said that the French had finally given in on this point in the negotiation of the Saar Agreement. He did not think that the present Prime Minister of France would think of preventing the Saar population from criticizing the Saar Agreement. However, governments change and the Agreement is one of indefinite duration. He attached great importance to a guarantee which might include an undertaking to make representations if the free expression of the wishes of the population of the Saar were prohibited.

The Secretary said that he did not feel that it would be practical to make a statement on the subject while the Chancellor was in Washington.

The Chancellor said that he had not had this in mind.

The Secretary said that the problem of giving guarantees is more difficult from a constitutional standpoint in the United States than it apparently is in Great Britain. He observed that many weeks had been spent in discussing the form of the Security Declaration made by the United States Government in relation to the Declaration of the Federal Government on this subject at the recent London Conference, and that finding appropriate wording for this Declaration had given rise to much difficulty.⁸ He said that he did not think it would be practical in the case of the Saar (as in the case of the Security Declaration), to cast any statement made by the United States in a form which goes beyond the President’s power and which would require action by the Senate. He did think that, if it were the joint desire of the Federal Republic and of France (as the Chancellor had indicated) to obtain an indication of continuing American concern regarding the Saar, and if the United Kingdom Government were disposed to go along, it would be possible to find some formula which would meet to a measurable extent the German and French wishes. However, the wording would have to be dealt with very carefully to avoid a challenge by the Senate to the Declaration as an infringement of its constitutional authority.

The Secretary asked what bearing possible undertakings under Article 8 of the Saar Agreement would have on Article 2 of the Agreement which makes the European Commissioner responsible for the representation of the Saar’s interests in the field of foreign affairs. He asked whether dealings on this subject would be with the Commissioner or whether the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union would have responsibility in this matter. The Chancellor responded that the Council has no direct responsibility, but that the Commissioner is responsible to the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union. It was therefore only at a second level that the Council is responsible.

The Chancellor said that he did not wish to press the matter of a United States declaration further at this time, since there would be ample time to go into the subject. He reiterated that he attached great importance to an American guarantee of the Saar settlement.

The Secretary asked if an indication of the American position would be of importance in relation to the Chancellor’s parliamentary situation in Germany and whether it would be necessary or useful to have this indication prior to ratification of the Saar Agreement.

The Chancellor said that it would.

The Secretary asked what was the Chancellor’s time schedule for parliamentary action.

The Chancellor said that he planned to take the agreements up in the German parliament in November and December. He wanted to get action as soon as possible, although he recognized that action by the American Senate would not be taken until January. He asked whether it would be possible for him to say in the German parliament that he had discussed the subject of an American guarantee with the Secretary and that an American statement on this subject could be anticipated. The Secretary said it would be necessary to agree on the exact wording which the Chancellor should say. He doubted that it would be possible to use the word “guarantee” which has many meanings.

The Chancellor suggested that the matter might be left in this position. If he saw in the course of the parliamentary debates in Germany that a statement by the United States would be helpful, that he would get in touch with the Secretary and appropriate language could be agreed upon at that time.

The Secretary remarked that, to the extent that he had been able to give thought to the subject, he felt that what the President could do in terms of a statement on the Saar would be limited to the sort of statement made in London on security. In effect, the President could perhaps say that the United States would regard any breach of the Agreement as a disturbance of peace and security; that it would, in the event of a breach, enter into discussions as to what action should be taken; and that it would regard the violator as having forfeited its right to the benefit of the collective security arrangements.

The Chancellor said this would be very much.

The Secretary asked if the Saar Agreement (which he observed he had as yet only seen in the newspapers) was a definitive Agreement or whether it was to be further elaborated.

The Chancellor said that the Agreement signed at Paris would be submitted to the German parliament. Further detailed agreements would be necessary to implement the Agreement, but these would be of an administrative character. The Secretary said he assumed that the United States Government would be able to receive official copies of the Saar Agreement either from the Federal Government or from the French Government.

United States Relationship to the Western European Union

The Chancellor asked that the Secretary give some thought to the relationship between the United States and the Western European Union. He said that he remembered that the subject had been lightly touched on in previous discussions and that the Secretary had remarked that this would not be the last time he attended a discussion of the subject. The Chancellor hoped that the Secretary would in fact continue to participate in meetings on the subject. He thought there was much to be done and that it would be a long time before it would be safe to leave the Europeans to deal with the problem alone. He said there were a number of questions to be considered in the Western European Union which would affect the security of the United States and would affect NATO. He cited as an example the arms control arrangements. He said that the United States had made a beginning in establishing a relationship and that he hoped it would be continued. He pointed out that there is an American official mission to the European Coal and Steel Community, and said that he would welcome it if the United States could establish an official mission to the Western European Union as soon as possible. Possibly this mission could be the same as that to the CSC.

The Secretary said he was flattered to observe that the Chancellor had remembered what he had said on the subject. All Ministers did not have equally good memories. As far as relations with the Council of Western European Union are concerned, he thought that the United States would be disposed to respond to an invitation, if one were extended, to establish a mission accredited to the Council which would keep in touch with the Council to the extent the Council desired it. He said the matter was somewhat complicated from a practical viewpoint, since the Council would have its seat in London and the Arms Control Agency would be located in Paris. No doubt this problem could be solved if the Council wanted it solved. He thought that the American Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the logical person to deal with the Arms Control Agency, since the work of the Agency would be closely related to the work of NATO.

Cyprus

The Chancellor said he had no further matters to raise, but that there was one point he wished to comment on. Before leaving Paris he had had a talk with the Greek Prime Minister regarding Cyprus. M. Papagos told him that if the matter came before the United Nations there would be an open breach on the subject which could only benefit the Russians. M. Papagos had expressed the urgent wish that something be done to avoid such a clash. The Secretary said he also had a talk with M. Papagos in Paris. All he could say on the subject was that he wished the Greek Government had had these same thoughts two months ago. He remarked that the Greek Government had started something which it did not know how to finish. The Chancellor remarked this often happened in life.

The Secretary told the Chancellor that the United States would use its good offices to try to avoid a clash which would benefit the Russians and injure NATO.

1. A memorandum of Chancellor Adenauer’s conversation with President Eisenhower is printed infra. No record of any further conversation with Secretary Dulles has been found in Department of State files.
2. For text of this statement see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680–681.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. For text of the Soviet note, Oct. 23, calling for a four-power conference on Germany to be held in November, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 902–905; an extract is printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 96–101.
5. Adenauer is referring to an aide-mémoire which was delivered to him along with a letter from President Eisenhower, dated Aug. 7, concerning the settlement of the question of German assets in the United States. For text of the President’s letter and a letter from the Chancellor, dated July 17, to which it was a reply, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, pp. 269–270. A copy of the aide-mémoire, dated Aug. 9, rather than Aug. 8, is in file 033.62A11/10–2554, as an attachment to a briefing memorandum from Merchant to Secretary Dulles.
6. For text of the Franco-German Agreement on the Saar, signed Oct. 23, 1954, at Paris, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 116–118.
7. Regarding the talks at Paris between Adenauer and the French on the Saar, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1294.
8. For documentation on the London Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.