762A.00/7–854

No. 246
Memorandum of Conversation, by Coburn Kidd of the Office of German Affairs

secret

Subject: Chancellor Adenauer’s views on situation in Germany.

  • Participants: Herr Fabian von Schlabrendorff
  • G—Mr. Robert Murphy
  • GER—Mr. Geoffrey Lewis
  • GPA—Mr. Coburn Kidd

Herr Von Schlabrendorff said that he had with him a letter from the Chancellor to the Secretary, which he would like to hand to Mr. Murphy for transmission to the Secretary if permissible.1 He said that he was aware of the unorthodox nature of his request, which would ordinarily be a matter for diplomatic channels, but he had taken the liberty of laying the matter before Mr. Murphy, since he, Von Schlabrendorff, had been privileged to be closely associated with the Chancellor.

By way of introduction, Von Schlabrendorff said that he had been associated with anti-Nazi movements in Berlin before the war where he had practiced law. His activities became known to the Gestapo during the war, and he was arrested while serving on the Eastern Front. He was thereafter confined in one concentration camp after another—in Moravia, Flossenburg, Dachau, and finally a prison camp in North Italy, from which he was released by American forces toward the end of the war. He had shortly thereafter been brought into contact with Mr. Allen Dulles, with whom he had since remained in touch whenever he came to the United States. Through his activities in the CDU party since the war, he had become a member of the political circle close to the Chancellor and was authorized to convey the Chancellor’s personal views, if they would be of interest to Mr. Murphy.

He said that the Chancellor felt extraordinarily isolated at the present time. The Chancellor often dwelt upon the fact that he carried the whole responsibility of his pro-Western, pro-French (reconciliation with France) policy on his old shoulders. The Chancellor felt fairly confident about the strength of those shoulders, but foresaw nothing but trouble if he should die. He thought it would be a long time before the Western powers found another German political figure who would assume the responsibilities which he had—with [Page 582] respect to European integration, Schuman Plan, EDC, the Saar. He had gone much further on these matters than the German people were prepared to go of their own inclination. There was much distaste for the Saar settlement, through all classes from the working people, influential industrialists, to such personages as the Bishop of Trier, who was unwilling to publicly endorse what the Chancellor had done with respect to the Saar. There was general skepticism that the French would ratify EDC.

Von Schlabrendorff said that the Chancellor privately acknowledged that he had been mistaken in his judgment of France, and felt depressed at the consequences for the policies he had tried to follow in Germany. When these policies become discredited, there will be an inevitable drift towards a more independent policy and Germany’s traditional interest in the East.

The difficulties for the Chancellor arose from all sides.…

The coalition party, FDP, was full of discontented and restless elements. The Chancellor had not been particularly concerned about Pfleiderer’s outburst in recommending the resumption of trade and diplomatic relations with Russia. The Chancellor felt that he could keep Pfleiderer under control. But he literally trembled with anger at the thought of ex-Chancellor Bruening’s espousal of an independent policy and resumption of connections with the East. The impact of Pfleiderer’s and Bruening’s speeches should not be underestimated. A lot of people were impressed by their proposals in the face of continued stalemate for the Chancellor’s foreign policy.

Von Schlabrendorff said that in the Chancellor’s own party, the CDU, industrial figures, on whose contributions the party was dependent for election purposes, increasingly interposed the condition that the Chancellor do nothing which would cut off opportunities for trade with the East. Business circles were convinced that the British were doing a great deal of trade with the East; if the British could do it, the Germans saw no reason why they should not obtain their share.

All this added up, Von Schlabrendorff said, to produce the feeling of isolation which the Chancellor had. None of the leading personalities with whom he had to deal were particularly close to him. In fact the Chancellor felt closest to Washington so far as understanding and sympathy for his position and policy were concerned. He earnestly hoped, if the President and Secretary shared his view of the urgency of the situation, that Washington might make some “large gesture” on Germany’s behalf, which would effectively still the doubts being raised against the Chancellor’s policies.

When Von Schlabrendorff had asked what was meant by a “gesture”, the Chancellor said that this could only be determined from [Page 583] the perspective of Washington: he was not in the Secretary’s shoes. It was not for him to say the form which it should take: whether implementation of the Contractual Agreements, or rearmament of Germany in the near future, or a peace treaty. Whatever it was, he hoped that it might occur before the elections scheduled to take place in the autumn.

Mr. Murphy asked Von Schlabrendorff a number of questions with regard to the persons he had mentioned— … Pfleiderer, Bruening—and the general political situation. In thanking him for this expression of his views, Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Chancellor would be aware of the action being taken with regard to Germany since the EisenhowerChurchill decisions. A Working Party was at present engaged in discussions at London on plans which might amount to the “gesture” which the Chancellor hoped for. Mr. Murphy said that he would transmit to the Secretary the Chancellor’s letter (which authorized Von Schlabrendorff to participate in German assets negotiations and expressed the hope that the Secretary would give the matter of German assets his personal attention). Von Schlabrendorff would be informed if the Secretary wished to confer with him further.

  1. This letter has not been further identified.