Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/6–2354

No. 243
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)

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Washington, June 23, 1954.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Krekeler with the Secretary, June 23, 3:30 p.m.

• Participants: The Secretary of State
• Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador, Chargé d’Affaires, German Diplomatic Mission
• Mr. Cecil B. Lyon—GER

After an exchange of greetings, Dr. Krekeler indicated that he would be departing Friday, June 25th, for Germany on three months’ leave, and before doing so he wished to pay his respects to the Secretary.

The first subject which Dr. Krekeler discussed was the desire of Chancellor Adenauer to obtain favorable US official reaction to the Chancellor’s Dusseldorf speech wherein the Chancellor indicated that if ratification of EDC was delayed further Germany could not be kept waiting indefinitely for the return of its freedom and sovereignty.

The Secretary stated that this certainly represented the view of the US Government and asked whether his indicating this to Dr. Krekeler would be sufficient. Dr. Krekeler said that what the Chancellor really wanted was a public statement to this effect which he could use in this connection with the North Rhine Westphalia elections which are to take place on Sunday, June 27. After a discussion as to how the Secretary might do this, the Secretary decided upon a press release to be issued following Dr. Krekeler’s visit. The Secretary thereupon dictated a press communiqué, copy of which is attached.

Dr. Krekeler was highly pleased with the statement and said that he knew the Chancellor would be also. He thanked the Secretary for this statement which he felt would be very helpful in Germany.

Dr. Krekeler next took up the question of a letter which Chancellor Adenauer proposed sending to President Eisenhower with regard to German assets in the US (copy attached). Dr. Krekeler explained that he knew the Secretary’s views, which had been expressed over a period of many years, against seizing of foreign assets in time of war. The Secretary said that he had expressed these views as far back as the Conference of Versailles in 1919 and that in his opinion, except where large corporations were obviously serving as shields for government operations, it was against our interest to seize enemy assets. The Secretary also explained that his sympathy was particularly with the small individual claimant, the holder of an insurance policy or the inheritor of a small estate, the loss of which constituted a serious proposition. He said that although he understood that Dr. Krekeler was well aware of the many problems which the Dirkson Bill presented, he wanted to emphasize to the Ambassador some of these complications; for example, certain people in this country feel that we are duty bound to carry out our commitments not to return these assets, the administrative costs of taking any action with respect to these smaller claimants were said to be prohibitive, the return of the assets would undoubtedly require large appropriations and it is not at all certain that Congress would be prepared to appropriate these funds, and also as Dr. Krekeler knew, these assets had been placed in a common pot and certain claims against the Japanese had been paid therefrom. All these made the problem a difficult one, but we should be glad to study the Chancellor’s letter, copy of which he had given to Mr. Conant and which we had also received, and we shall reply through Mr. Conant as to our views on this matter.

It was pointed out to Dr. Krekeler that the Chancellor might wish to consider the fact that if he wrote to the President and made his letter public and then no action was forthcoming with regard to this legislation this might redound unfavorably to the Chancellor.

Dr. Krekeler made clear that he understood the difficulties in this whole matter.

Before leaving Dr. Krekeler again reverted to the question of what would be done in the case of failure of French Parliament to ratify EDC before adjournment for the summer and said that the Chancellor was anxious that we have some plan to put into action right away. He inquired whether with the U.S. Senate adjourned such a move would be possible. The Secretary indicated that he had already sounded out the Senate on this matter and that he felt that there would perhaps be a few weeks in which the Senate could take some action, which the Secretary did not anticipate would require too much time. The Secretary added that about the 1st of July we should give the matter another and careful look. During this discussion the Secretary explained that we found ourselves in an unusual position where oddly enough there is actually a better attitude toward EDC in France at this moment than there has been at any time since the Treaty was signed, and if it could only be got to a vote there is a very strong possibility that it would be approved.

In answer to a direct question, the Secretary said that these matters would be discussed at the forthcoming meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill.¹

[Attachment 1]

Press Release No. 345

Washington, June 23, 1954.

Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler called today upon Secretary of State Dulles with a view to an exchange of views prior to Dr. Krekeler’s return to Germany. Among other things, he brought to Secretary Dulles’ attention the portion of Chancellor Adenauer’s speech before the Christian Democratic Union in Dusseldorf, Germany, on June 20, 1954. In that speech, he said the Chancellor expressed the view that the German people cannot wait indefinitely to have their sovereignty restored, and that if the ratification of the EDC Treaty is much further delayed, this delay should not keep deferring the return to the German people of their freedom and sovereignty.

Secretary Dulles told Dr. Krekeler that the view thus expressed by Chancellor Adenauer was fully shared by the Government of the United States. The United States Government, he said, believes that there is a good prospect of an early completion of the ratifications of the European Defense Treaty. If, however, this hope and expectation should not be realized, it would, in the opinion of the United States Secretary of State, be necessary that there should be prompt consideration to the restoration of sovereignty to the West German Republic.

[Attachment 2—Translation]

Draft Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower

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[Bonn?, undated.]

Mr. President: The Federal Government is following with the greatest interest the efforts in the United States Congress to find a solution for the problem of the confiscated German assets in the United States.

In spite of the favorable development of the relations between our two nations, this problem still remains unsolved. My Government greatly desires a solution. I noted with great satisfaction that you expressed the same wish at a press conference. The final report of the Senate Sub-committee investigating the alien-property administration also was received by my Government with great satisfaction.

For many thousands of Germans in poor circumstances, for old people and people living on small pensions, for people insured by American insurance companies, for the heirs of property in the United States, for all these people the return of their former property would mean economic security and freedom from want. It is noteworthy that especially those people were affected by the confiscation who for many years through personal and commercial relations with the United States helped to establish the friendship between our two nations.

In the opinion of the Federal Government and of the German people the Federal Republic by recognizing in the London Agreement on Foreign Debts the foreign obligations of Germany,² by ratifying the Bonn and Paris Treaties, by concluding the treaty with Israel, and by the German restitution legislation demonstrated the will to work out its reconstruction on the common foundations of the Western world.

I have the well-founded hope that an early solution of this problem by the Government of the United States would strengthen the feeling of security and the morale of the German people. In addition, a solution would greatly strengthen the friendship between our two nations which is now developing so encouragingly.

1. See Document 245.
2. For text of the Agreement on German External Debts, signed at London Feb. 27, 1953, and entered into force on Sept. 16, 1953, see TIAS No. 2792.