Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/5–554: Telegram

No. 240
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bonn, May 5, 1954—8 p.m.

3395. Limited distribution. We have long foreseen time when German patience with occupied status would disappear. We think turning point has come and we are in last weeks of period at end of which alternative must be found to hold German cooperation if EDC not meanwhile ratified.

Shift in climate evidenced in several ways. Debate on Saar and foreign policy (ourtel 3350 to Dept²) and Chancellor’s unprecedented difficulty in forcing coalition support (not completely successful) is one illustration. Another is almost complete desertion by normally pro-Government, pro-Western press of support for western (US) policy generally and Adenauer foreign policy specifically. Papers which have consistently supported EDC and European integration are now almost wholly agreed that EDC has no chance and substitute must be found. They turn to some variation of German national army idea. Coupled with this is general dissatisfaction directed at alleged FedRep and western inflexibility toward Soviets and DDR. None suggest DDR recognition but criticism of western legalism in contrast East-West realties.

Saar presents extra difficulty. To French Saar settlement may be precondition to EDC; from here it seems progress on EDC has now become precondition to Saar settlement. In other words, Chancellor’s ability to make compromise has been limited by French inaction on EDC.

Danger that wave of support for Chancellor in Sept election is about to recede unless he can have quick and striking victory re foreign policy. This recession likely to show itself in Land elections beginning Nord Rhine in June.

Discussing Saar, Blankenhorn made point yesterday with which we agree, that Chancellor cannot himself propose substitute for EDC since this would antagonize other western countries and lead them to charge Germany with bad faith, revival of nationalism, etc.

We assume Chancellor can keep these issues out of Bundestag and hold coalition together until summer recess unless completely unforeseen development but if EDC defeated or again postponed, he will have to abandon his previous policy publicly in order to save coalition unless three occupying powers can come up with some immediate action to support him.³

Conant

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Telegram 3350 reported that after a series of false starts which demonstrated that the coalition was functioning very stiffly, the Bundestag had on Apr. 30 approved a resolution commending the Chancellor’s European policy. (762A.00/5–154)

3. On May 15 HICOG reported that Blankenhorn had been instructed to request the U.S. High Commissioner to inform the Department of State as follows:

   “He [Chancellor] is finding himself under increasing pressure of party leaders and public opinion as result of political developments in France, lack of progress and discouraging outlook on Paris and Bonn agreements, and growing confusion and uncertainty in international situation. He is doubtful of his ability to continue to hold the line with Western Allies on present basis their relations with Germany for more than few months. Present indications are that he will be forced to raise these questions later this summer.” (Telegram 3536 from Bonn, 762A.00/5–1554)