762A.00/12–1253: Telegram
No. 235
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Germany (Steere) to the Department of State1
1938. Following is our evaluation of Chancellor’s political strength in coming crucial months.
Emergence of Chancellor’s own party from September 6 elections with unprecedented absolute majority in Bundestag, great increase in total coalition strength, and formation of new coalition with two-thirds majority in both Houses, led many to assumption Chancellor’s strength increased proportionately. Actually, although he is without rival in eyes of German people as political leader and statesman, his position vis-à-vis Bundestag and party is somewhat weakened. In old Bundestag, coalition margin so narrow parties hung together against SPD threat and supported Chancellor even when his policies unacceptable, e.g., co-determination. Today, parties and many individual deputies feel there is room for maneuver on specific issues and smaller coalition parties, who suffered in elections from Chancellor’s personal prestige, attempt to recoup their position by asserting independence on even crucial issues such as Saar and constitutional amendment for defense. Moreover CSU insists it is separate party (from CDU) and is seeking alliances, especially in Bundesrat, to protect federalist principles against anticipated centralism of Chancellor.
Issues in domestic field have not yet developed sufficiently to indicate how serious are difficulties which lie ahead for him. Larger federal share in income tax may be first hurdle, followed by possible difficulties on federal police, federal participation in education, stronger federal administrative control over land offices executing federal powers, family law, constitutional court reorganization and perhaps labor legislation.
Altered situation is reflected even more strongly in foreign affairs. French procrastination in EDC has created increasing frustration and discouragement about integration with West simultaneously with rise new questions about other foreign relations. For example, business and industrial groups are increasingly restive with competitive free economy policies of Minister Erhard and a sharp struggle over economic policies may develop. These same groups are concerned regarding Federal Republic’s lack of progress [Page 564] in obtaining concessions in such economic fields as E–W trade (particularly Red China and impression that German trade interests to East, including GDR not fully appreciated), German external assets, industrial controls, and German property interests in Saar. Finally, realities of cost military buildup not yet faced and when apparent sharp clash between military and finance authorities likely.
All these factors have some adverse effect on Chancellor’s position and his power to put through his foreign policy particularly in the European field. For example, his ability to reach agreement on Saar, i.e., make sufficient concessions to assure French acceptance, depends largely on German estimate of French willingness to proceed with EDC, EPC and Franco-German rapprochement in general. Important elements in coalition, it would appear, can be forced to swallow certain details of a Saar settlement (objectionable to them but acceptable to Chancellor) only if they are convinced French will proceed with their part of bargain, not only now but for future as well. It must be emphasized that French action and attitude on European integration really determine Chancellor’s ability to deal on Saar.
Position regarding reunification is even more confused because Soviet concessions, real or apparent, both weaken Chancellor’s ability to force through concessions which are involved in his foreign policy, and at same time probably weaken ability of French Government to assure French Assembly action which is only quid pro quo acceptable to Germans. Adenauer is still convinced Soviets intend no real concessions and no unification and wants to push forward with European plan including Saar settlement. He cannot, however, reject any opportunity to test Soviet intentions. Soviets have ability therefore to lead Chancellor step by step into situation threatening success of his foreign policy and therefore his whole position.
We believe Chancellor too skillful a politician to run serious risk of defeat on domestic issues. His coalition may fall out among themselves on specific issues but we believe self-interest of office holders will keep it going and because parties really have nowhere else to go. This situation could conceivably change but such change not presently on horizon.
In foreign policy field, danger more serious because of French weakness and possible Soviet moves. Best thing for Adenauer would be four-power conference which shows conclusively Soviet unwillingness to make real concessions and agree to reunification, which sufficiently strengthens French resolve to produce EDC ratification and EPC progress, and which removes issue of Soviet intentions inside Germany. If these events do not come to pass, Chancellor [Page 565] will be confronted, before many months, with failure of major thesis his foreign policy and the need to find substitute.
- Repeated to London, Moscow, Berlin, Vienna, and to Paris for Conant, who was attending the North Atlantic Council meeting, Dec. 14–16.↩