Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/9–153: Telegram

No. 220
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, September 8, 1953—12:44 p.m.

790. Despite further comments contained urtel 873,² Department somewhat concerned re new pronouncement (urtel 841³) indicating certain SPD party leaders publicly advocating neutralized Germany. If this done formally and by top party leaders, this would presumably have serious implications re our position on German unification and peace treaty.

Would appreciate it if you could personally, or have Dowling or Steere, see Ollenhauer (or other top SPD leader) now that elections are over, and inquire whether views expressed by Eichler and Erler in fact represent party’s official and considered position. You should point out we have until now understood that while certain elements within party favored such position, top leaders had been conscious of its obvious dangers and hence opposed it. Please also emphasize US Government has always considered such neutrality solution extremely dangerous for Germany’s safety and future, and inquire whether SPD thinks that in such case US Government would really be prepared to guarantee such weak Germany from attack with powerful Red Army remaining at or close to eastern frontier while much or even bulk of US forces now in Germany might have to be removed from Continent. Moreover, does SPD believe NATO powers could develop effective strategy with available armed forces backed up to Channel and confined to France and Low Countries?

Ollenhauer may reply that SPD might support neutralist solution on purely opportunistic basis as only way to get Soviets out of eastern Germany, and would expect Germany could before long throw off this shackle on its sovereignty and join western defense alliance. In such case, you should point out US could hardly be expected to participate in international agreement which it knew in advance one party to it (i.e., Germany) intended to violate at early opportunity, and also when it realized such violation might well provoke Soviets into drastic action.

We trust this latest development in fact only result of heated election atmosphere and does not represent considered SPD views.

Our purpose in making such approach to SPD would of course be to try and head off tendencies within this party toward adoption of neutralist position. We shall also continue to bear in mind possibility of a public statement on same subject by President or Secretary at some appropriate opportunity, as suggested by HICOG on several occasions in last few months, which would be aimed at affecting public opinion on this important issue.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by Morris and cleared by Bonbright and Barbour. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 873 reported that the Eichler–Erler press conference (see footnote 3 below) seemed to be a last minute attempt to appeal to neutralist sentiment in Germany and was inconsistent with the general SPD line. (762A.00/9–153)
3. Telegram 841 reported that at a press conference on Aug. 28 Erler and Eichler had outlined their proposal for a neutral Germany, but that it was not as yet clear whether their position was espoused by the leadership of the SPD. (762A.00/8–2953)
4. On Sept. 9 HICOG replied that it had talked with Heine, an SPD party leader, on that day. Heine said that he had just come from an Executive Committee meeting at which the statements by Erler and Eichler had been unanimously condemned. HICOG “strongly” recommended that no statement be made on the subject of neutralism. (Telegram 972 from Bonn, 762A.00/9–953) The Department of State concurred in telegram 828 to Bonn, Sept. 10. (762A.00/9–953)