Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

JCS files, CCS 385 (6–4–46) SCC. 70

No. 216
Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret

Washington, undated.

Guidance for the Peacetime Conduct of Military Activities in Support of U.S. National Strategy With Respect to Germany

I. Purpose

1. To provide guidance to USCINCEUR for the conduct of military activities with respect to Germany, during peacetime or during the “cold war” period, in order to effect maximum military contribution toward the achievement of our national objectives which pertain to:

a. The integration of Western Germany into Western Europe;

b. The reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany;

c. The achievement of German unity; and

d. The role of unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

II. Assumptions

2. General. Short of global war, the USSR will pursue and intensify its strategy of political warfare and local aggressive actions, so long as it believes Soviet objectives are being achieved by such means.

3. Integration. The process of integrating the Federal Republic with the Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the Contractual Agreements, the Council of Europe, and similar instrumentalities will be impeded by oppositionist elements within the Federal Republic and by the Soviet Union.

4. German Unity and the Peace Treaty. It will not be possible in the foreseeable future to agree with the Soviet Union on a formula guaranteeing a satisfactory basis for the unification of Germany and for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

5. Berlin:

a. The Soviets will continue to exert pressures and impose harassments designed to probe and weaken Allied prestige, firmness and unity of purpose as well as to threaten our right to access to Berlin.

b. The Soviets will not deliberately provoke or run a major risk of war for the sake of Berlin alone.

6. Soviet Zone and East Berlin. The population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally opposed to communism, but the Soviet Union, through its East German puppet authorities, will continue to tighten its controls, isolate East Germany from the West, and proceed with its attempts to set up a satellite state with an army of its own.

7. German Military Potential. The build-up of an integrated German military force in the Federal Republic will proceed substantially as contemplated, but will require pressure from the West, especially since the required draft legislation and the actual organization of the forces will be subject to continued criticism and resistance by the opposition; also, any rearmament in the Federal Republic will be accompanied or preceded by a build-up of an East German army, designed to instill apprehensions of civil war and to cancel out the Federal Republic’s military contribution to Western defense.

8. Western Europe. Attempts to promote Federal Republic integration into Western Europe will be inadequate unless they are supported by, and closely coordinated with, parallel attempts to promote the integration of Western Europe, particularly France, into a community capable of accepting the Federal Republic as a partner.

9. France. The Federal Republic’s capability for leadership within a unified Western European community will be feared by France, unless potential German predominance in a united Europe is compensated by closer and more organic ties between Europe and the United States, within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community, as provided by U.S. existing policies.

10. Eastern Europe. The Soviet-orbit countries are firmly under Soviet control now and will be in the foreseeable future; their liberation will come about only as a result of a major change in the existing relationships between the USSR and the Western Powers; and their peoples generally entertain hopes for eventual liberation from Soviet domination but, especially in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, fear a possible renewal of German domination.

III. Objectives Prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board Based on U.S. Policies Reflecting the Present World Situation

11. Concerning the Federal Republic:

a. To maintain and develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

b. To encourage and facilitate effective participation by the Federal Republic on a basis of equality in the European Community, included in a developing Atlantic Community, and a contribution by the Federal Republic to the political, economic, and social welfare, as well as to the defense structure, necessary to a strong and durable Europe.

c. In the event of unification on terms acceptable to the West, the above objectives will apply to all of Germany.

12. Concerning West Berlin:

To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and psychological position in Western sectors of Berlin, and to exploit that position in furtherance of U.S. national interests.

13. Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:

To maintain contact with the population in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin in order to stiffen their spirit of resistance to Soviet-communist rule and thus (a) to weaken the political, economic, and military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the groundwork for eventual incorporation in the free Western Community.

14. Concerning German Unity:

To demonstrate U.S. support of German unity attained by peaceful means; and to frustrate Soviet-communist efforts to obtain control of all of Germany and eventually to bring about Soviet withdrawal from Germany.

15. Concerning Eastern Europe:

To maintain contact with the people of Germany’s Eastern European neighbors in order (a) to stiffen their spirit of resistance and thus weaken the Soviet system of political, economic, and military control of these countries; and (b) to sustain their hopes for eventual liberation and inclusion in an all-European Community free of domination by Germany, the USSR or any other Power.

16. For National tasks prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board in support of the above objectives see Annex hereto.

IV. Military Objective

17. Incident to the execution of the primary responsibilities of the armed forces, the military objective is to support and participate effectively in the attainment of the foregoing objectives prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board.

V. Plan of Action

18. General. In order to gain the most effective support for U.S. policies by the German public, our approach must be conceived and carried out in a manner which is both palatable and persuasive to the German people. We must adjust our approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions and impacts which various political, economic and cultural issues have on the German psychological climate. This will require a major effort of imagination on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective activities, and it implies a constant review of existing programs, in the light of their demonstrated effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

19. The peacetime existence, size, deployments, operations, state of readiness, composition, activities, discipline and day-to-day behavior of the Armed Forces have an orthodox and traditionally recognized impact on foreign governments, armed forces and peoples.

20. U.S. military activities which have an impact on Germany and Western Europe should be guided by the following principles:

a. While supporting programs endorsed by U.S. which promote European and Atlantic integration, e.g., the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, the European Defense Community, etc., we should avoid raising false expectations by committing the United States to a fixed timetable.

b. Care should be taken in the application of any official pressure to primarily domestic issues of European states, in order to avoid the impression of excessive U.S. intervention.

c. In official statements and news releases, avoid over-extending our objectives beyond established policies, thus arousing false, unlikely, or premature expectations.

d. Avoid artificially creating needs or desires for U.S. economic or financial aid.

e. In the furtherance of U.S. programs in the Federal Republic, indigenous relations should be utilized or created that will parallel and support the attainment of U.S. objectives, and at the same time instill in the Germans a sense of participation in the achievement of these objectives.

f. In fostering indigenous relations through official and unofficial support of private groups and organizations, the United States armed forces should:

(1) Concentrate on those groups and organizations sympathetic to our policy-objectives which manifest strong spontaneous motivation and are financially self-sustaining and avoid supporting organizations, groups, and individuals that are unable to win solid indigenous support.

(2) Concentrate to the greatest possible extent on established organizations and media, and avoid the use of imaginary sponsors in the Federal Republic.

g. In order to create a climate in which the new U.S.-German relationship will be more effective avoid emphasizing purely legal and formal aspects of this relationship.

h. Military propaganda activities should be tied to specific developments and concrete action designed to implement U.S. policies. Moreover, we should seek to express our aims, whenever appropriate, in the form of live demonstrations and special events which will effectively symbolize U.S. attitudes and intentions. We should encourage increased emphasis by German or other European organizations on constructive social and cultural activities, and on serious research.

i. In supporting German (or other West European) activities in promotion of European or Atlantic solidarity, we should give higher priority to those which actually establish institutional links with other countries than to those which merely publicize the idea within Germany or any single country.

21. In the absence of centralized direction in Germany of the U.S. effort encompassed in this guidance, the following will govern the responsibilities of USCINCEUR:

a. The conduct of news programs and overt propaganda operations directed at foreign governments and peoples in time of peace is, by Public Law 402, 80th Congress, a responsibility of the Secretary of State.

b. Department of State Foreign Information guidances currently being made available to appropriate military commands are binding on the armed forces and define the treatment desired by the U.S. Government on matters of international concern in official statements and in propaganda or public information releases abroad.

c. Mechanisms should be established by USCINCEUR in Europe whereby the appropriate Department of State representatives can be provided with a timely and continuing flow of information on current and impending military activities and on particular military situations which may have an impact on foreign attitudes and opinions.

d. The employment of armed forces radio and news outlets in the dissemination of news matters related to this guidance is authorized subject to such limitations as are prescribed by the Department of Defense. No existing instructions on I&E policy prescribed by the Department of Defense will be vitiated in the employment of Armed Forces radio and news outlets under this guidance.

e. No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy shall be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State or its authorized representative.

f. Military support for the covert operations aspects of this guidance will be provided to the Central Intelligence Agency under approved policies and conditions. The security aspects of military support to the Central Intelligence Agency will be coordinated to the end that such military support cannot be attributed to the armed forces.

VI. Tasks

22. Provide appropriate Department of State representatives in Europe, for exploitation by the Foreign Information Program, a timely and continuing flow of information on current and impending military activities and on military situations which may have an impact on foreign attitudes and opinions.

23. In order to exploit the potential for propaganda inherent in the employment and contacts of indigenous peoples with the armed forces, assist the Department of State, as appropriate, by the dissemination of official Foreign Information periodicals, exhibition of movies and displays, and other similar actions.

24. In close coordination and collaboration with proper State Department representatives, publicize appropriate content materiel through radio and printed media under the control of the armed forces, and through speeches and public statements by military personnel. Examples of content which may be considered appropriate are the following:

a. Actions by U.S. and other governmental representatives which lend substance to the new relationship between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

b. U.S. determination to honor its NATO commitments in defending Europe, the growing strength and strategic superiority of the West, and any weakening of the Soviet political, psychological, and strategic military position.

c. The political, economic security, and cultural benefits accruing to the Federal Republic through integration.

d. Information calculated to help create a climate conducive to disaffection in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.

e. Pertinent factual, unbiased, uncolored news of world events.

f. Evidence of U.S. and Western determination to achieve German unity on suitable terms.

g. Soviet measures, such as border control, diplomatic actions, and militarization of Soviet Zone, which belie Soviet unification assertions.

25. Provide, as appropriate, for the timely employment of armed forces facilities, materiel and units in the conduct of search and rescue, disaster and flood relief and other humane missions for the benefit of friendly foreign governments and peoples.

26. Continue and accelerate, as appropriate, indoctrination of armed forces personnel and their dependents aimed at improving their behavior and attitudes toward the forces and people of the Federal Republic.

27. Except where required for military purposes, remove symbolic reminders of the occupation. (Example—Foreign language signs.)

28. Encourage and facilitate, where appropriate, reciprocal armed forces-Federal Republic coordination in social, cultural and technical activities in order to reduce frictions and minimize German antagonisms toward the use of the Federal Republic as a base for western operations.

29. Consider and recommend, as appropriate, the exchange of military personnel and technical military experts between the Federal Republic and other western countries through attendance at allied military schools, exchange of observers, etc.

30. Demonstrate U.S. and European military strength through suitable military displays, and through excellence of military discipline of U.S. forces.

31. Afford military support to the Central Intelligence Agency in their conduct of covert operations in pursuit of the objectives of this guidance (Section III above) under policies established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to SM–792–52, dated 26 March 1952.^*

Annex

National Tasks

The following are the Tasks of our psychological strategy in support of the achievement of our objectives:

1. Concerning the Federal Republic:

a. To facilitate the transformation of the Allied-German relationship on the diplomatic, political, and economic as well as military levels from the occupation status toward that of equal partners and allies.

b. To foster, encourage, support and facilitate efforts of the population and the Government of the Federal Republic toward the integration of their political, economic, cultural, and military interests with those of the European Community and the Atlantic Community; to help pave the way for acceptance by other governments and peoples (particularly French) for participation by the Federal Republic in the development of the European and Atlantic Communities.

c. To support the development in the Federal Republic of democratic institutions, and to assist the German democratic elements in their opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements.

d. To gain the support of the German people and government for U.S. policies, and to strengthen their will to resist and their confidence in the ability of the U.S. (and the West) to frustrate Soviet-communist aggression.

e. To stimulate maximum Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased military and economic strength in Western Europe.

f. To convince the Germans of the need to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities by impeding the flow of strategic materials to East Germany and the Soviet bloc; and to provide Western markets and raw materials to the Federal Republic.

2. Concerning Berlin:

a. Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.

Tasks

(1) To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French position in the Western sectors of Berlin and to buttress the morale of West Berlin.

(2) To deter and neutralize Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassing tactics.

(3) To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the morale of the free world and its determination to resist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.

b. Contingency B. Serious harassment short of a full blockade.

Task. To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face of increased Soviet pressures.

c. Contingency C. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed.

Task. To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation of the aggressive nature of Soviet actions.

d. Contingency D. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable.

Task. To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use of Allied military force in Berlin.

e. Contingency E. A Soviet attack on Western forces in Berlin.

Task. To secure the support of all of all our Allies (including our friends in East Germany) for the Allied policy of armed resistance to Soviet aggression.

3. Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:

a. To encourage in the Soviet Zone disaffection towards the regime and defection from the Soviet and East German military or para-military forces in accordance with existing policies.

b. To reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet and communist administrative and control apparatus by conducting in a nonattributable manner psychological, political, and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlled conditions, for such more active forms of resistance as may later be authorized.

c. To keep the population informed of world events and of U.S. and Western policies, particularly with respect to Germany.

d. To maintain hope in the Soviet Zone population for a unified and democratic Germany integrated within the European Community.

e. To weaken the confidence and ability of the Soviet authorities and communist leaders to maintain or extend their controls in the Soviet Zone, or their influence in West Berlin or the Federal Republic.

4. Concerning German Unity:

a. To demonstrate our willingness to initiate and enter, jointly with the French and U.K. Governments, in negotiations with the Soviet Union for German unification under conditions guaranteeing a unified Germany with a democratic government established by free democratic elections, provided that a reasonable basis for such negotiations exists.

b. To support any legitimate proposal for action seeking peaceful solution to existing territorial problems within the framework of European, rather than national, interests, but to avoid giving official encouragement to German territorial aspirations toward areas external to the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and Berlin, beyond acknowledgment of the established U.S. policy that no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, and that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.

c. Through non-attributable propaganda media in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and all of Berlin, to exploit the Oder-Neisse Line issue as evidence of basic Soviet anti-German attitudes and imperialist aims; and to de-emphasize the related Saar question through non-attributable programs pointing out that the Saar should be subordinated to European unity, which will facilitate settlement by negotiation among the interested parties.

d. To expose and exploit Soviet moves aimed at permanent partition of Germany and satellization of Eastern Germany.

5. Concerning Western Europe:

a. To enhance popular confidence in:

(1) The peaceful future of a European community, within an Atlantic Community, which includes the Federal Republic;

(2) The prospect of mutually beneficial relations with the Federal Republic;

(3) The determination of the Western world to strive for a unified, democratic Germany as a member of a viable European community; and

(4) The intentions of the Western Powers to safeguard the European Community against the resurgence of aggressive German nationalism.

b. To produce among European leaders and people a realistic awareness of the deadly menace of Soviet expansionism and of the strength accruing to the USSR if Germany were included in the Soviet orbit.

c. To stimulate the realization among Europeans that only a tremendous effort of imagination, productivity, and cooperation, far surpassing the present effort of the Atlantic Community, including Germany, will enable them to surmount this threat; and to convince them that the creative energies latent in the free societies, including Germany, when fully developed, will not only nullify the enemy’s aggressive moves or plans but also raise the Western peoples to unprecedented levels of material and moral well-being.

d. To promote the concept of the Atlantic Community as provided by existing U.S. policies so that it may be used to support and supplement the concept of European unity as the dynamic and unifying element of our psychological strategy in Europe.

e. To create among the peoples of Western Europe a sense of positive participation in the international community which is now emerging.

6. Concerning France:

In addition to the specific effect desired in paragraph 5 above:

a. To stimulate popular acceptance of:

(1) a genuine political settlement with the Federal Republic;

(2) the capability of the European Community, within the Atlantic Community, to develop for the common benefit German manpower, heavy industry, and steel production in such a way as to eliminate French fears.

b. To provide reassurance that the distinctive historic culture of France can vigorously flourish within the framework of the European Community, including the Federal Republic.

7. Concerning Eastern Europe:

a. To stimulate popular suspicion of Soviet intentions with respect to Germany.

b. To persuade Soviet-orbit peoples that a unified Germany integrated into a European Community is a guarantee against the revived German drive to the East.

c. To convince Soviet-orbit peoples that the weakening of Soviet power in East Germany is a necessary prerequisite for their own liberation.

d. To sustain the resistance of Soviet-orbit peoples toward the day when their active participation in their own liberation will be required.

1. Attached to a note (JCS 1735/200) dated Aug. 31, which stated that copies had been forwarded to the Commander in Chief, European Command, as SM 1555–53 on Aug. 26. In an attached enclosure the Commander in Chief was instructed to coordinate his activities under this guidance with the U.S. High Commissioner.
2. Enclosure “A” to J.C.S. 1969/15; see Decision on J.C.S. 1969/15. [Footnote in the source text. Not found.]