Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/7–852: Telegram

No. 123
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Bonn, July 8, 1952—7 p.m.

100. In the last few days the Chancellor has become greatly disturbed over the contents of the reply to the Sov note and the implication which he read into it of a possibility of a separate deal between the Allies and Russia over Ger.

From many sources I learn that he is extremely upset and nervous over this thought and it has given him deep disquiet in the course of his preparation for the debates which commence tomorrow.

I believe some of his concern is going to get into the press and I am very afraid it may affect the debate. I did my best to have that para of the reply to the Chancellor’s letter of June 3 eliminated which refers to the possibility of a separate contact with the Russians, but due to Fr opposition was not able to get it removed.² The alternate language proposed is some improvement but this language is still disquieting, particularly in the form in which the Fr have it. While it is too late now to eliminate this passage and we may get by with a good vote in spite of it, if there is one thing which will cause the Chancellor’s majority to fade away, it is just this.

We must remember that our long-range policy demands that we do everything to avoid the possibility of a Russian/Ger alliance.

If we retain the right to deal with the Russians without bringing in the Gers they will demand and use a free hand as well and there are some elements in Ger who wld be quick to take this step if they thought there was any danger of our dealing with the Sovs without Ger participation. In my judgment there is only one way that this fear and this danger can be eliminated and that is by scrupulous action on our part to take the Gers with us in all matters of substance relating to Ger when we deal with the Russians. Our only safe course of conduct is to treat the Gers as equal partners in our future dealings with the Sovs on this issue and hereafter I wld suggest that at least consultation with Gers shld take place from the outset when any matter of substance re Ger is being dealt with by US with the Russians. I think the risks are just too great to justify any other course and, at least while the present Chancellor is in power, we will gain much more by doing so than we cld possibly lose.

I am not suggesting any change in the procedure and the language which is now agreed upon as delivery will be made this evening of the reply to the Chancellor. I am only urging a course of conduct for the future, but I urge it with deep conviction as to its wisdom and the dangers which any other course entails.³

McCloy

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Regarding the letter to Adenauer, see the editorial note, supra.
3. On July 17 Dunn reported that he fully appreciated the arguments presented in this telegram, but he also feared that if they were broached to the French at that time they might encounter serious difficulties since the French press had exhibited considerable resentment over Adenauer’s influence on the text and timing of the note. Dunn suggested that following the next Soviet note it would be desirable to obtain Adenauer’s views during the drafting, thus avoiding adverse publicity. (Telegram 387 from Paris, 662A.00/7–1752) The Department of State also agreed with the cogency of McCloy’s views, but saw the difficulties expressed by Dunn as well. It therefore suggested that Dunn approach the French along the lines he had suggested and attempt to convince them that consultation should be established in the early stages of handling the next note. (Telegram 399 to Paris, July 23, 662A.00/7–1752)