Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/7–352: Telegram

No. 120
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Bonn, July 3, 1952—8 p.m.

17. For Jessup from McCloy.² Fol is summary first part mtg Chancellor and High Commissioners (Ward, Poncet, McCloy) on three Western Powers reply to Sov note of 24 May held 3 July.³ First part of mtg devoted discussion Chancellor’s note of 2 July on paras 5 and 6 of draft reply.⁴ (Ref Bonn to London 9, rptd Dept 26, Paris 11 of 3 July⁵) Chancellor emphasized at outset that last sentences paras 5 and 6 of draft reply had raised serious questions regarding general convention and reservation of Allied rights. He wld be obliged inform Cabinet and coalition leaders on this point in next few days and issue wld certainly be raised at Bundestag debate next Wednesday. He had thought of postponing debate until point was cleared up but had reconsidered in view fact such postponement wld not look well in light early ratification conventions by US Senate.⁶ He then rptd at length argument contained in text his note. Last sentences paras 5 and 6, he said, implied that 3 powers interpreted articles 2 and 7 of general agreement⁷ as meaning that future peace treaty with Ger wld first be negotiated by four powers and then discussed with all-Ger Govt. In those circumstances such all-Ger Govt wld be confronted with draft treaty already agreed upon amongst four powers and while the Ger Govt might be able to obtain concessions on minor points, it wld be told on all important issues that four power agreement already reached cld not be disturbed. He suggested there was analogy here with conditions under which Versailles Treaty negotiated. He reiterated his contention that such procedure was inconsonant both with terms of arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement and spirit of negotiations at which they had been drafted. He cld not agree to interpretation which wld put a future Ger Govt in this position. In view doubts raised in his mind by inclusion two sentences in paras 5 and 6 of draft reply, he asked that question of three powers interpretation of arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement be raised with govts.

In reply, I said that while I cld understand Chancellor’s concern that all-Ger Govt shld not be confronted with anything in nature of fait accompli or “diktat” I did not see how two sentences in question cld give rise to such concern. Whole purpose of draft paras 5 and 6 was to protect position of Ger Govt and to ensure that treaty negotiations were freely conducted and without any element of “diktat”. Chancellor was taking two sentences out of context and reading into them meaning which was very opposite that intended. It seemed to me that this reflected over-sensitivity on part of Chancellor to fear that Allies might come to agreement with Sovs behind Ger Govt’s back. Such fear was wholly unwarranted in view of manner in which three powers have conducted their relations with Fed Govt, particularly during past months of negotiations. I doubted whether Allied Govt wld be prepared now to give absolute assurance that under no circumstances wld they hold discussions with Sovs without participation of Ger Govt. Chancellor cld rest assured, however, that Allies had no intention of taking action on matters of substance without consulting Ger Govt. Poncet said Chancellor shld be reassured by spirit and manner in which three powers had conducted their negotiations with Fed Govt in past 8 months. He stressed difference between contractual negotiations and those at Versailles and said fear of repetition of Versailles had become idee fixe in Germany.

Ward also urged Chancellor not to take sentences in draft out of context. Chancellor’s position was fully met by the final words of para 6, i.e., “peace treaty freely negotiated between the four powers and Ger.”

Chancellor’s feeling that some ulterior motive must lie behind inclusion questioned sentences was reflected in his repeated questioning as to why this thought had been included in present draft, whereas it had appeared in none of earlier notes to Sovs. He suggested sentences had been included “to appease Russians.” When this argument was discussed, Chancellor then implied that US at this time was perhaps unduly concerned with mtg Fr preoccupations. He went on to deplore what he described as darkening of Fr-Ger relations which had worsened because of difficulties over Saar question. He complained that, whereas, he had been personally consulted before Schuman Plan was proposed, he was now left to read in newspapers of new Fr proposals on Eur union.

He concluded by stressing difficulties which a four power conference prior to ratification of conventions wld create for him and said that delay of ratification by such conference wld represent diplomatic triumph for Sovs. He expressed keen disappointment over what he described as display of “lack of courage” in Western Eur during recent weeks.

At conclusion this part of mtg, it was agreed refer to three govts Chancellor’s concern as to interpretation they place on arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement.

In my opinion, Chancellor has not been completely frank with us over this issue, and may not be giving all reasons for his outburst over this relatively insignificant matter. He is unduly sensitive over any intimation that Allies are discussing Ger whether on tripartite or quadripartite basis in absence of Ger rep.

He complained that in recent mtgs of Mins in London⁸ no opportunity had been given FedRep to make its views known to them. He also seems to dread the prospect of being shown a previously prepared draft treaty which to him wld limit extent of “free negotiation.” We have all endeavored to reassure him that “freely negotiated” means Ger will have a full voice in determining final conditions of treaty.

McCloy

1. Repeated to London and Washington; the source text is the copy sent to Washington.
2. When Secretary Acheson left Berlin for Vienna, Ambassador Jessup went to Paris to be ready to act as the U.S. representative on any tripartite drafting group which might be established to deal with suggestions that were made by Adenauer and Reuter concerning the draft reply to the Soviet note.
3. For a summary of the second part of the meeting, see telegram 18, infra.
4. Document 118.
5. Telegram 9 transmitted the text of the note of July 2 from Chancellor Adenauer and a brief summary of a personal letter to McCloy. The substance of the note is the same as the points made by the Chancellor in his meeting with the High Commissioners on July 3 and reported to Jessup in this telegram and telegram 18, infra. In the personal letter Adenauer stated that unless his desiderata were met he could not conscientiously present the draft to the Bundestag without expressing his concern about it. (662A.00/7–352)
6. The U.S. Senate had ratified the contractual agreements on July 1.
7. For the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.
8. Regarding the discussion of the reply to the Soviet note during the Foreign Ministers meetings in London, see Secto 26, Document 117.